List:
The topic of this comment is p.23 f of the transcript of Gary F. and the moving
picture of thought in relation to the System of Existential Graphs.
The System of Existential Graphs may be characterized with great truth as
presenting before our eyes a moving picture of thought. Provided this
characterization be taken not as a flatly literal statement, but as a simile,
it will, I venture to predict, surprise you to find what a strain of detailed
comparison it will bear without snapping. A picture is visual representation of
the {23} relations between the parts of its object; a vivid and highly
informative representation, rewarding somewhat close examination. Yet from the
nature of things it must fall short of perfection, just as a representation of
any other kind must. It cannot directly exhibit all the dimensions of its
object, be this physical or psychic. It shows this object only under a certain
light, and from a single point of view. There is a hind side, too, that it does
not show at all. Moreover, it will not bear examination under a high-power
microscope; since, so compared with its object, it will be found to represent
parts as simple and homogeneous that really are highly complex. It is curious
how entirely true each of these statements is of the representations of thought
in graphs. On the other hand, whatsoever object is shown in a correct picture
as composite, really is composite, and {24} is really composed of such parts as
the picture shows; only these are, in reality, only proximate, and not
ultimate, parts.
But is this really true of all representations in Existential Graphs? Here is
an important question, and a nice one; and to guard ourselves against mistake
about it, our closest scrutiny is called for. In order to prepare the ground
for this operation, let us begin, as almost every serious inquiry should be
begun, by seeking a suitable standpoint for a comprehensive view of the
question. Now a “point of view” (not to go into piddling distinctions,) is
mostly a comparison; and a “comprehensive” view is one which will {25} be
almost certain to suggest to the mind each serious consideration, just when it
becomes immediately pressing or pertinent. Well, nobody who sufficiently
examines the matter will question that the most interesting term of comparison
for Existential Graphs is the system of “rational formulae,” or graphs, that
are used in Organic Chemistry.
They are, of course, more or less used in Inorganic Chemistry, where, however,
instead of everywhere carrying those potent germs of pragmaticistic truth that
they bear in the Organic branch,— veritable spermatozoons of science,—with
which they have fertilized their proper field, they have hitherto begotten
nothing unless here and there a poor mule. At any rate, in our present
business, let us not get entrapped in that dark Mamoth Cave, Inorganic
Chemistry.
More specifically, my focus is on the strange closing comment of this section:
"let us not get entrapped in that dark Mamoth Cave, Inorganic Chemistry.”
If the bedrock of pragmatism was the chemical sciences, why would CSP assert an
entrapment in “that dark Mamoth (sic) cave” of Inorganic Chemistry?
In particular, at that time (1908?) Inorganic Chemistry was much better
understood as inanimate matter / substance than animate (living) matter?
In the 1870’s, his focus was on the relations among inanimate matter. What
historical events changed his rhetoric from the graphs as inanimate
descriptions of nature / logic to animate descriptions of the nature?
That is,
"A picture is visual representation of the {23} relations between the parts of
its object; a vivid and highly informative representation, rewarding somewhat
close examination."
was clearer for inanimate relationships among atoms than for animate.
It appears that his close study of the Kempe paper (1887?) lead to major
changes in his inner groundings of representations of the forms of things.
These papers address Relatives and Relations
More specifically, the papers of 1889 in W6.
#31, page 246: … the description of matter... has been for some years,
approximately complete.
page 250 … vortex theory of matter is that each atom, or molecule, is
a vortex-ring in a primordial ether, free from viscosity, so that different
chemical elements would correspond to the different kinds of knots and
enfacements.
Is this the image of “continuous predicates” that we are to bring to mind from
the indices of a molecular sin-sign?
#40, p.363, “The Formal Classification of Relations”
The opening sentence is:
“Relations may be classified without regard to the form of their elements.”
and
#41, p.368, Dual Relatives
Opening sentence is:
This may be classified first, with regard to the forms of single couples.
These forms are two: A:A and A:B
(Comment, one can think of these as a couple of two identical objects (H2, O2,
N2), or as different (HF, HCl, HBr,))
Also, we find in W6, page 268, entitled "Mathematical Monads”
The graph of the relations between the addition and multiplication appears to
be fundamental.
My questions:
What is the meaning of term “Bedrock” in connection to the notions of Formal
Relations, Monads, and Dual Relatives?
What is the connection between the physical vertices (different kinds of knots
and enfacements) and the differences between inanimate and animate matter?
Are the physical images of “vertices” connected to the meaning of "A picture is
visual representation of the {23} relations between the parts of its object;…”
Are other meanings of these terms relevant?
Cheers
Jerry
The System of Existential Graphs may be characterized with great truth as
presenting before our eyes a moving picture of thought. Provided this
characterization be taken not as a flatly literal statement, but as a simile,
it will, I venture to predict, surprise you to find what a strain of detailed
comparison it will bear without snapping. A picture is visual representation of
the {23} relations between the parts of its object; a vivid and highly
informative representation, rewarding somewhat close examination. Yet from the
nature of things it must fall short of perfection, just as a representation of
any other kind must. It cannot directly exhibit all the dimensions of its
object, be this physical or psychic. It shows this object only under a certain
light, and from a single point of view. There is a hind side, too, that it does
not show at all. Moreover, it will not bear examination under a high-power
microscope; since, so compared with its object, it will be found to represent
parts as simple and homogeneous that really are highly complex. It is curious
how entirely true each of these statements is of the representations of thought
in graphs. On the other hand, whatsoever object is shown in a correct picture
as composite, really is composite, and {24} is really composed of such parts as
the picture shows; only these are, in reality, only proximate, and not
ultimate, parts.
But is this really true of all representations in Existential Graphs? Here is
an important question, and a nice one; and to guard ourselves against mistake
about it, our closest scrutiny is called for. In order to prepare the ground
for this operation, let us begin, as almost every serious inquiry should be
begun, by seeking a suitable standpoint for a comprehensive view of the
question. Now a “point of view” (not to go into piddling distinctions,) is
mostly a comparison; and a “comprehensive” view is one which will {25} be
almost certain to suggest to the mind each serious consideration, just when it
becomes immediately pressing or pertinent. Well, nobody who sufficiently
examines the matter will question that the most interesting term of comparison
for Existential Graphs is the system of “rational formulae,” or graphs, that
are used in Organic Chemistry.
They are, of course, more or less used in Inorganic Chemistry, where, however,
instead of everywhere carrying those potent germs of pragmaticistic truth that
they bear in the Organic branch,— veritable spermatozoons of science,—with
which they have fertilized their proper field, they have hitherto begotten
nothing unless here and there a poor mule. At any rate, in our present
business, let us not get entrapped in that dark Mamoth Cave, Inorganic
Chemistry.
> On Mar 2, 2019, at 4:04 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> List,
>
> I finally found (just as I was on the point of giving up) a text in which
> Peirce explains the relationship between his Existential Graphs and his
> phenomenological “categories” (or experiential Universes, as he calls them
> there). It’s one of the incomplete drafts included in R 300, which Peirce
> entitled “The Bed-rock Beneath Pragmaticism.” I’ve been busy transcribing
> this from the manuscript images at the Peirce Archive
> https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php
> <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php>, and although my
> transcript is incomplete, I decided to put it up on my website, because parts
> of it relate to several of the current threads on this list.
>
> R 300 is a very interesting document, partly because it appears to be his
> very last attempt to complete the Monist series on pragmatism which had
> occupied him for over three years. The first two articles in the series
> (Selections 24 and 25 in EP2) appeared in 1905, followed by the “Prolegomena
> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” in 1906. In the “Bedrock” MS, Peirce says
> that there would be two more articles in the Monist series to complete his
> “proof” of Pragmaticism — and this was apparently written after Selection 28
> in EP2 (R 318, 1907), where “Peirce comes closer than in any other to fully
> expressing his brand of pragmatism and to giving a clearly articulated
> proof,” according to the editors (EP2:398). Don Roberts dates R 300 “about
> March of 1908,” which is consistent with the time spans mentioned by Peirce
> in the MS itself.
>
> The main part of “Bedrock” consists of 65 manuscript pages numbered by
> Peirce. Much of it is about Existential Graphs, identity and teridentity,
> etc., and may be of interest to John S. and Jon A.S. (Jon has posted some
> quotes from it already). Jerry C. should be interested in the part where
> Peirce says that the “most interesting term of comparison for Existential
> Graphs is the system of ‘rational formulae,’ or graphs, that are used in
> Organic Chemistry.” Helmut R. should be interested in Peirce’s argument that
> the concept of Sequence (which does indeed involve time) is logically simpler
> than the concept of negation. As for the partial draft relating EGs to
> phenomenology, I think it might give some clues as to why Peirce abandoned
> the project of using EGs for his proof of pragmaticism. Any of this and a lot
> more can be found by searching for the right keywords in the page on my
> website, http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm <http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm>.
>
> Comments or questions on this text can be posted here with the subject line
> above.
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
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