Jeff, List: Please provide specific quotes from "The Logic of Mathematics" (or other writings of Peirce) to support your claim that "any sign that is general in character ... have the nature of genuine triadic relations." If that were the case, then what would be the three correlates of such relations? Instead, my understanding is that the triadic relation is that of *representing *or (more generally) *mediating*.
CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907) This is reflected by the first EG in the attachment. As Peirce stated here, there are also *dyadic *relations between the Object and the Sign, and between the Sign and the Interpretant--namely, that of *determining*--but the triadic relation cannot be *reduced *to these. The second EG in the attachment is my initial attempt to diagram this--in accordance with the dyadic relations, "the flow of causation" is from Object to Sign to Interpretant; but although the Object *also *determines the Interpretant, it does so only *through the mediation* of the Sign. JD: You have focused on the first three clauses. What is implied in the 4th and fifth? ... For any interpretant that has a general nature, it will itself be a genuine triadic relation in its nature. I do not see anything in *any *of the five clauses from CP 2.242 to warrant treating *either *a Sign *or* an Interpretant as a triadic *relation*, rather than a *correlate *of such a relation. On the contrary, clause 1 states plainly that "A Representamen [such as a Sign] is the *First Correlate* of a triadic relation," and clause 4 states just as plainly that "the possible Interpretant is determined to be the *First Correlate* of the same triadic relation to the same Object" (emphases added). JD: In the process of representation, correlate A functions as a sign in relation to some real interpretant C, where that interpretant C, in turn, serves as a sign in relation to some further object D [to some] interpretant E. What does interpretant C represent to E as a sign? For one thing, it represents object B is the same object as D (or B corresponds to D in some way). My reading is instead that Interpretant C simply has B as its Object, just like Sign A; there is no need to posit "some further object D." The difference is that Interpretant C is determined by Object B *through the mediation* of Sign A. Likewise, Interpretant E has B as its Object, but Interpretant E is determined by Object B *through the mediation* of Interpretant Sign C. This is reflected by the third EG in the attachment. JD: What is more, the kind of genuine triadic relation that interpretant C embodies ... *Signs* are embodied in their Replicas (1903) or Instances (1906), but where did Peirce ever say that a *relation *can be embodied? JD: Thus far, I've argued that all legisigns, and *a fortiori*, all symbols have the character of being, themselves, genuine triadic relations. What is more, I've argued that all symbolic signs are, in themselves, thoroughly genuine triadic relations. You have offered these *assertions*, but so far I am frankly not seeing any *arguments* for them. Again, CP 2.242 seems quite explicit that Signs and Interpretants are *correlates*, not triadic *relations*, genuine or otherwise. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:40 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hello Jon S, List, > > Does the sign itself constitute a triadic relationship? You say, No. It is > the first correlate of a triadic relation, but it is not itself a triadic > relation. Let me adopt the other side of the argument and see what points I > can marshall in its favor. > > First, I'd like to point out that any sign that is general in character: > (i.e., all legisigns, and therefore all symbols) have the nature of genuine > triadic relations. Legisigns have that nature in themselves. Symbolic > legisigns have that nature in themselves and in the relation that holds > between sign and object. That much follows from the account of genuine > triadic relations offered in a number of places, including "The Logic of > Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." > > Furthermore, consider the following definition of a sign offered in NDTR: > > A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second > Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being > termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible > Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic > relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is > a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs > are the only representamens that have been much studied. (1903 - C.P. > 2.242) > > > Let's separate the clauses: > > > > 1. A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, > 2. the Second Correlate being termed its Object, > 3. and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, > 4. by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined > to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, > 5. and for some possible Interpretant. > > You have focused on the first three clauses. What is implied in the 4th > and fifth? For those interpretants that *really* are general signs in > relation to some further object and interpretant, what is the character of > such a sign? For the sake of the argument, let's set to the side > interpretants that are, in themselves, mere possibles or mere existents. > For any interpretant that has a general nature, it will itself be a > genuine triadic relation in its nature. > > Let me ask: why is this important for the sake of offering explanations > of how signs and interpretants *function* in the process of semiosis? As > we try to answer this question, let us shift the focus of our > attention from the anatomy to the physiology of signs and explain what is > essential to their proper functioning. In the process of representation, > correlate A functions as a sign in relation to some real interpretant C, > where that interpretant C, in turn, serves as a sign in relation to some > further object D interpretant E. What does interpretant C represent to E > as a sign? For one thing, it represents object B is the same object as D > (or B corresponds to D in some way). What is more, Peirce suggests, C > represents the relation that A holds to B to interpretant E. C cannot > really serve the function of representing such features about A and B to > E without itself being genuinely triadic in character. > > What is more, the kind of genuine triadic relation that interpretant C > embodies is not a genuine triadic relation of quality (i.e., what he calls > a law of quality) or a genuine triadic relation of fact (i.e., a law of > fact). Rather, it is what Peirce calls a *thoroughly* genuine triadic > relation. These sorts of relations are special in that the general > character of C, in serving the function of both an interpretant in relation > to A and as a sign in relation the further interpretant E, is not a mere > law. That is, it is not simply a rule having some sort of generality or > some sort of necessity. Rather, as a representamen, C has the character of > a living general--one that has life and is capable of growth. This is > something that C itself possess as a sign. > > Thus far, I've argued that all legisigns, and *a fortiori*, all symbols > have the character of being, themselves, genuine triadic relations. What is > more, I've argued that all symbolic signs are, in themselves, thoroughly > genuine triadic relations. One reason they must have this character is that > it is essential for serving, in turn, the function as a symbolic sign in > relation to some further object and interpretant. > > What should we say of signs that are, in their nature, iconic qualisigns > (tones) or indexical sinsigns (tokens)? Without arguing the point, I would > like to point out that they are always *capable* of serving as parts of > larger inferences. I'll leave it at that. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > >>
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