Jeff, List: I am not sure whether you saw my response below to your post on Thursday; but in any case, I would like to expand on the EG that I provided in a previous post for the relations among a Sign, its Object, and a series of Interpretants. At that time, I was emphasizing that an Interpretant *always *has the *same *Object as the Sign that determines it; i.e., there is *never *a case where Interpretant C has a *different *Object from Sign A, so there is no reason to posit some *other *Object D. What I would like to point out now is the *termination *of semeiosis at some eventual Interpretant--in this case, G--that is a Feeling, an Exertion, or a Habit, rather than another Sign.
[image: image.png] Presenting this as an EG helpfully clarifies that it includes only the *existential *aspects of semeiosis--a *Dynamic *Object determining *Instances *of Signs to determine *Dynamic *Interpretants. We can better represent this "flow of causation" by replacing the relation of *mediating *with that of *determining*, as I suggested on Friday. Again, the key is treating the latter as *irreducibly triadic*, rather than dyadic--consistent with Peirce's definition (and emphasis) that a Sign "is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this 'sign'" (EP 2:410; 1907). [image: image.png] We now read the EG *clockwise *as "Object B stands in the relation of determining, of Sign Instance A, to Interpretant Instance C," and so on. A, C, and E are all *Tokens*, and thus Existents (green/italic). B is the Dynamic Object of *all three* of these, but need not be an Existent *in itself*; it could instead be a Possible (red/bold) or a Necessitant (blue/underline). Likewise, although G is another Dynamic Interpretant, the *nature *of each kind of effect--a Feeling, an Exertion, or a Habit--situates it within a *different *Universe. This highlights a problematic aspect of Peirce's Speculative Grammar as recorded in the late December 1908 draft letters to Lady Welby. If the division according to the Mode of Being of the Dynamic Object comes *first *in the logical order of determination (EP 2:481), and the Dynamic Object is a Possible, then the Sign must likewise be classified as a Possible according to *all of the other nine trichotomies*. For example, the Sign itself would have to be a Tone or Mark; but this is untenable, because it would entail that a word in *either *of the two senses that Peirce repeatedly employed--as one Type in a written language, or as multiple Tokens on a page--*cannot *represent a quality, which is clearly false. In fact, Peirce himself explicitly classified the *words *"Color, Mass, Whiteness" as Abstractives, meaning that their Dynamic Objects are Possibles; but then just two paragraphs later, he stated that "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective" (EP 2:489). Again, this does not work, since *all *words are either Types or Tokens, and *never *mere Tones or Marks. Moreover, as Peirce commented ten years earlier, "To belong as unit to a collection and to possess as a quality are substantially the same relation" (R 513:30; 1898); so what he called a Collective is really an Abstractive, especially once the constituents of the *third *Universe are identified as Intentions and Tendencies. In other words, I have come to believe that *this *is a case where Peirce got it wrong--although, to be fair, we find it in correspondence that he never actually *sent*, suggesting dissatisfaction with at least some of their contents. My guess is that he was still trying to hash it all out in his own mind as he was writing--something that I often have in common with him. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 3:31 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jeff, List: > > It looks like you intended your most recent message, which you sent only > to me, for the entire List; so I am replying on-List with your post > appended below accordingly. > > JD: Objects have parts. As the second correlate in a thoroughly genuine > triadic relation, two of the parts of the object include, in some sense, > the immediate object and the dynamical object. > > > No--the Immediate and Dynamic Objects are not *parts *of one Object; > rather, the Immediate Object is *within* the Sign, while the Dynamic > Object is *outside of* the Sign (cf. EP 2:480; 1908). That is why a Sign > has a dyadic relation with its Dynamic Object, but not with its Immediate > Object. In the example that we have been discussing, B is the *Dynamic > *Object > of A--i.e., whatever an Instance of A *actually *denotes on a particular > occasion. > > JD: As an interpretant of symbolic sign A, C has parts. Those parts > include, in some sense the immediate, the dynamical and the final > interpretants. > > > Again, no--the Immediate, Dynamic, and Final Interpretants are not *parts > *of one Interpretant; rather, the Immediate Interpretant is *within* the > Sign, while the Dynamic and Final Interpretants are *outside of* the Sign > (cf. EP 2:482; 1908). That is why a Sign has dyadic relations with its > Dynamic and Final Interpretants, but not with its Immediate Interpretant. > In the example that we have been discussing, C is the *Dynamic *Interpretant > of A--i.e., whatever an individual Instance of A *actually *signifies on > a particular occasion. The *Final* Interpretant of A is whatever A *would > *signify in the Ultimate Opinion, after infinite inquiry by an infinite > community. > > JD: In turn, the final interpretant may have parts that stand in a > genuinely triadic relation, one to the other. Those three parts may include > the emotional interpretant, the energetic interpretant and the logical > interpretant. > > > The relationship between the Immediate/Dynamic/Final Interpretants and the > Emotional/Energetic/Logical Interpretants is notoriously vague in Peirce's > writings, and hence has been the subject of considerable debate in the > secondary literature. To me, it makes the most sense to align the latter > with Feelings/Exertions/Signs as the *kinds *of effects that Signs > produce in interpreting Quasi-minds. As such, the concept of involution > applies again--as Dynamic and Final Interpretants, thoughts (Signs) and > habits of thought *involve* Exertions and habits of exertion, which > *involve* Feelings and habits of feeling. However, this does not entail > that Feelings are *parts *of Exertions, or that Exertions are *parts *of > thoughts (Signs). > > JD: I think there is some direct textual support for suggesting that, on > Peirce's view, the object is composed of the parts described above. Thus > far, I've found less direct textual support for the claim I am making about > the internal character of interpretant C and symbolic sign C. > > > I would very much like to know what you have in mind as "textual support," > direct or otherwise, for claiming that Peirce ever endorsed *either *of > these notions. > > JD: As before, I am focusing my attention on the classification of > genuinely triadic relations developed in "The Logic of Mathematics, an > attempt to develop my categories from within." > > > Such an approach is potentially problematic, because that manuscript is > from c. 1896, while Peirce did not even come to recognize that a Sign has > two Objects and three Interpretants until 1904. Unless the evidence > clearly suggests otherwise, I generally assume that his later writings > reflect his more considered views, such that his earlier writings should be > carefully interpreted and applied accordingly. > > JAS: Again, there is no D; the Object of C is B, which is also the Object > of A. > > > JD: In response, my suggestion is that it is important to recognize that > there is a D, and D may be the same or it may not be the same as B. > > > No--if C is a Sign, and C is an Interpretant of A, and B is the Object of > A, then B is the Object of C. If instead there is a D that is the Object > of C, and there is any possibility at all that D is *not *the same as B, > then by definition C *cannot *be an Interpretant of A. > > JD: ... laws are real, general and independent of what you or I might > think about them. A principle is a "conception" of such a law ... Generally > speaking, most laws stand and work independently of our conceptions of them. > > > I suppose that we can (and perhaps should) indeed distinguish between a > leading principle and the *real *law of logic that it represents; > likewise, between a continuous predicate and the *real *relation that it > represents. I will give it some thought. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 10:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Jon S, Gary F., List: >> Jeff D: I am trying to say that there are *relations *internal to >> symbolic signs. >> >> Jon S: I am not aware of anyone *denying *this. However ... >> >> Great, at least we agree on this general point. Let me go ahead and offer >> an interpretative hypothesis that is likely to be more controversial. My >> confidence in the hypothesis is, let's say, about medium--as far as >> my hypothetical explanations go. Here is it: Objects have parts. As the >> second correlate in a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, two of the parts >> of the object include, in some sense, the immediate object and the >> dynamical object. Similarly, Symbolic signs have parts. In order to explain >> what I take this claim to involve, I'd refer to the same diagram: >> >> As an interpretant of symbolic sign A, C has parts. Those parts include, >> in some sense the immediate, the dynamical and the final interpretants. >> Those three interpretants stand, in relation to each other, in a genuinely >> triadic relationship. In turn, the final interpretant may have parts that >> stand in a genuinely triadic relation, one to the other. Those three parts >> may include the emotional interpretant, the energetic interpretant and the >> logical interpretant. >> >> As a symbolic sign, C also stands in a thoroughly triadic relation to >> object D and Interpretant E. As a symbolic sign it is composed, in some >> sense of parts. Those parts include the same correlates and relations that >> were also parts of interpretant C. >> >> I think there is some direct textual support for suggesting that, on >> Peirce's view, the object is composed of the parts described above. Thus >> far, I've found less direct textual support for the claim I am making about >> the internal character of interpretant C and symbolic sign C. Regardless, >> I'd like to explore the position. Here are some of my reasons for thinking >> it may be worth the effort. >> >> First, I have a hunch that it will be helpful in explaining the >> similarities and differences between the generals involved in the three >> classes of (1) the laws of quality, (2) the laws of facts, and what (3) >> what he refers to as genuinely triadic relations. As before, I am focusing >> my attention on the classification of genuinely triadic relations developed >> in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from >> within." >> >> Second, Peirce says that, strictly speaking, symbols are living things. >> On the classical Aristotelian account of living things, we find that the >> predominant hallmarks of life are the same as we accept today. Living >> beings are capable of homeostasis, growth and reproduction. One of the >> marks of a living thing is that, as a whole, it is capable of calling >> out, generating and otherwise governing and organizing its parts according >> to purposes. Those purposes include the three hallmarks of living things >> listed above. >> >> There is more to say, but I'll save that for later. Let me finish by >> responding to some smaller points. >> >> Jon S: Again, there is no D; the Object of C is B, which is also the >> Object of A. >> >> In response, my suggestion is that it is important to recognize that >> there is a D, and D may be the same or it may not be the same as B. >> In cases of arguments that are not sound, the objects expressed in the >> argument that need to be the same are not the same. The explanation of >> soundness and validity is based, in part, on whether or not B and D, as >> represented severally in the premisses and conclusion, are the same object >> or correspond in some way. Similarly, some false propositions may be false >> because the objects that are asserted in the proposition to be the same >> are not, in fact. See the example involving giving offered earlier, where >> there is some question as to whether or not I regifted a book that was a >> present from my wife. >> >> >> Finally, Jon S seemed to be puzzled as to why I have drawn a distinction >> between the laws of logic, on the one hand, and the leading principles of >> logic, on the other. One reason I am using the terminology of "law of >> logic" because it is the basis of one of the classes of genuine triadic >> relations of fact in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt...." As I >> indicated earlier, I am trying to follow the lines of thought in that essay. >> >> What is more, I take Peirce to be following well-established uses of the >> terms "laws" and "principles", as employed by other philosophers. See, for >> instance, the 5th definition of "principle" in the Century Dictionary. >> Take Kant, for instance, who says (in effect) that laws are real, general >> and independent of what you or I might think about them. A principle is a >> "conception" of such a law. As such, the principles that we hold dear may >> be confused, in error, etc. >> >> Generally speaking, most laws stand and work independently of our >> conceptions of them. In my particular case, the efforts I've made to engage >> in self-controlled processes of reasoning may involve the laws of logic >> really moving me in virtue of my representation of those laws as >> principles. If they determine my behavior independently of my >> representation of those laws as conceptions (i.e., as principles), then it >> would not be a case of self-controlled reasoning. Rather, it would simply >> be a case of my obeying logical laws as a matter of fact. That happens all >> of the time. Or, so I'd like to think. >> >> On Kant's view all laws, including the laws of nature, the laws morality >> and the laws of logic are the same. They are intelligible in character. >> They are universal and necessary as laws. The laws of morality and logic, >> function to give us imperatives insofar as we represent them to ourselves >> and recognize what is required of us. As such, the laws of morality and >> logic also have a normative character for creatures like us. >> >> Yours, >> >> Jeff >> >>>
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