Jon, List, JAS: Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are real, not merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a three-category realist" as of 1897. In fact, there are real possibilities that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of a diamond that burns up before ever being tested. "Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905).
I note your italicizing 'some' in the first sentence above. I will continue to suggest that if one claims that at the very 'earliest' stages of a proto-Universe *perhaps *coming into being (there are many factors at work--see the quotations below), where* all *Platonic possibilities are real (which I think you're claiming), then Peirce's notion that *some* possibilities are real becomes utterly meaningless. Max Fisch's comment about Peirce being a "three-category realist" refers, as I believe Robert Lane's conception does as well, to *some *possibilities being real in *this* Universe (yes, *in this universe *the unscratched diamond has the characters which it has whether you or I, etc.) But I'd conjecture that at best one might say, regarding a proto-Universe, is that *some *of the Platonic possibilities are real in that situation--they really *could *come into being. But not all of them. (I suppose that they are real enough if in some other possible universe they should come into being; still, I doubt that all of them ever would, but only God knows). GR: And here we are reminded that Peirce has his own "multi-universes" theory: At the same time all this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many*, both coordinated and subordinated to one another; *until finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*. CP 6.208 If there are many Platonic worlds (perhaps even an infinite number of them, as Peirce suggests elsewhere), let alone an infinity of possibles ostensibly inhabiting the sum total of these Platonic worlds (of course, all very loose language for that earliest stage of *some *one universe potentially coming into being), then I think it strains the idea of "real possible" to apply this expression to even those which do *not* 'stick' in order to 'combine' in ways which result in a universe, ours in the case under consideration. Those which are "unselected" seem to me not to be real possibles since they are excluded in the creation of *this *universe and could never be realized. Here is the passage above with the surrounding paragraphs. Many such reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself act as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality. CP 6.207 At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be. CP 6.208 There is, therefore, every reason in logic why this here universe should be replete with accidental characters, for each of which, in its particularity, there is no other reason than that it is one of the ways in which the original vague potentiality has happened to get differentiated. CP 6.209 Again, even in this earliest stage of the cosmos, it would seem to me that some possibles -- but not all -- are real. If all are real, then the idea of 'real possibles' as applying in our universe (as Peirce applies the concept) becomes meaning. I think we may be straining the notion of "real possibles" here, and I really think that it is possibly not all that important -- we may just be playing with words here. So I'll cede the last word in the matter to you as I've rather forgotten what the thrust of my earlier posts in this thread was given this distraction. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 11:56 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Thank you for clarifying. As Peirce stated in the first Additament to "A > Neglected Argument" ... > > CSP: In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before > or after the evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu-bohu of > which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally. There > must have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable. (CP 6.490; > 1908) > > > And as he said in the published article itself ... > > CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first > comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, > pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name > within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being > consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually > thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908) > > > What makes an Idea real is its "mere capability of getting thought," and > the situation "before" the beginning of our existing universe was "a little > of everything conceivable." Calling these inexhaustible possibilities > "real" just means that they are as they are regardless of what any *individual > *mind or *finite *group of minds thinks about them; it does not preclude > them from being as they are because of how an *infinite *mind conceives > them. > > CSP: The general indefinite potentiality became limited and > heterogeneous. Those who express the idea to themselves by saying that the > Divine Creator determined so and so may be incautiously clothing the idea > in a garb that is open to criticism, but it is, after all, substantially > the only philosophical answer to the problem. Namely, they represent the > ideas as springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent > firstness. But so springing up, they do not spring up isolated; for if they > did, nothing could unite them. They spring up in reaction upon one another, > and thus into a kind of existence. This reaction and this existence these > persons call the mind of God. (CP 6.199, RLT 259; 1898) > > > This *preliminary* kind of existence is obviously not what we mean by > "our existing universe," so I still find it misleading to suggest that > there "are possibilities which [only] become real qualities when they are > embodied in existential things." On the contrary, they must *first *be > real possibilities/qualities in order to be *capable *of such existential > embodiment. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:44 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List, >> >> You quoted me then disagreed with my suggestion. >> >> >> GR: It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in >> the ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we >> say, "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as the >> qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are >> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in >> existential things (2ns). >> >> >> JAS: I disagree. Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are >> real, not merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a >> three-category realist" as of 1897. In fact, there are real possibilities >> that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of >> a diamond that burns up before ever being tested. "Indeed, it is the >> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist >> upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905). >> >> >> I think that you are confusing apples ('before' this, our, existential >> Universe) with oranges ('after' the creation of this Universe). >> >> While I certainly do agree that "there are real possibilities that never >> become actualized," yet even your example of the scratching of a diamond >> occurs, *necessarily* I would say, in the created, the existential >> universe, and not the one "before time is." ('after' creation). >> >> As I quoted Peirce: >> >> >> At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the >> existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, >> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and >> subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic >> worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in >> which we happen to be. CP 6.208 >> >> >> The real possibles that are *not* 'chosen' from the Platonic world are >> 'real' only in a quite peculiar sense that has little or nothing to do with >> "real possibilities that *never *become actualized" in out existential >> world. One really ought to rather strictly distinguish what I thought we >> were discussing, that world in which neither matter nor time exists, from >> the actual existential world we inhabit. Only after there is an existent >> word is it possible to speak of "real possibilities that *never *become >> actualized." Perhaps only for the Scriber can know of such "real" >> possibilities *before* time and space are. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 11:23 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jeff, Gary R., List: >>> >>> Supplementing what I just posted ... >>> >>> JD: On my reading of the last lecture of RLT, I think it is an error to >>> suggest that he is making measurement intrinsic to the definition of those >>> dimensions of either time, space or quality. >>> >>> >>> I said that measurement seems intrinsic to most of the definitions for >>> "dimension," "dimensional," and "dimensionality" that Peirce provided in >>> the Century Dictionary. I then suggested that the familiar notions >>> associated with these words might *not *apply once we adopt a >>> "top-down" synthetic approach, rather than a "bottom-up" analytic >>> approach. Although Peirce was still very much in his "supermultitudinous" >>> phase in 1898, I think that there are already hints of his eventual shift >>> to the topical theory in that last lecture. >>> >>> JD: In saying that the dimensions of space, time and quality were >>> potential and not actual, I do not take him to be saying that the >>> dimensions were not real. >>> >>> >>> I agree. In fact, I take Peirce to be saying that the *only *real >>> parts of a perfect continuum are potential parts. Any part that is >>> *actualized *is a topical singularity that *interrupts *the continuum, >>> rendering it *imperfect*. The actualized part is still *real*, of >>> course, but it is no longer a material part of the continuum. >>> >>> GR: It seems to me that possibles (1ns) are potentially real enough in >>> the ur-continuity (3ns). Continuity as 3ns involves 1ns as those, shall we >>> say, "selected" possibilities which *will *ultimately be realized as >>> the qualities which *can* come into existence. That is, they are >>> possibilities which become real qualities when they are embodied in >>> existential things (2ns). >>> >>> >>> I disagree. Peirce clearly affirmed that *some *possibilities are >>> real, not merely "potentially real"; that is why Max Fisch called him "a >>> three-category realist" as of 1897. In fact, there are real possibilities >>> that *never *become actualized, such as the resistance to scratching of >>> a diamond that burns up before ever being tested. "Indeed, it is the >>> reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist >>> upon" (CP 5.453, EP 2:354; 1905). >>> >>> JD: One thing he is trying to accomplish in clarifying such a limiting >>> idea is to arrive at something that doesn't call out for further >>> explanation. >>> >>> >>> GR: I would question your use of the expression "a kind of limiting >>> idea" here. Beyond limiting "further explanation" (which sounds like a very >>> un-Peircean as Peirce's methodology argues against such a cessation of >>> inquiry). >>> >>> >>> Peirce indeed argued against blocking the way of inquiry by "maintaining >>> that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, >>> independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable" (CP 1.139, EP 2:49; >>> 1898). However, he also recognized that not everything *demands* an >>> explanation. Jeff is suggesting that "the original vague potentiality" is >>> the kind of thing that does not call for any further explanation. However, >>> my response is that just as a "scriber" is needed to draw the chalk marks >>> on the blackboard, likewise a "creator" is needed to make the blackboard in >>> the first place; and accordingly, I suggest instead that the Reality of *Ens >>> necessarium* is the kind of thing that does not call for any further >>> explanation. >>> >>> JD: In this case, I think a better analogy than a function in calculus >>> is the conception of the absolute in projective geometry. It is better >>> because the idea of convergence is a matter of proportion involving >>> continuous magnitudes that may have an indeterminate metrical character. >>> Proportions are preserved, but not scalar values. >>> >>> >>> How does this square with Peirce's contention that *topical *geometry >>> (or *Topics*) is the proper branch for mathematically investigating >>> continuity, rather than *projective *geometry (or *Graphics*)? >>> >>> JD: As Peirce suggests in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties...", >>> the starting point of a process of cognition can be thought of as triangle >>> touching the surface of water in a glass. The starting point of >>> inquiry--the tip of the triangle--is a kind of limiting idea. >>> >>> >>> I quoted and commented on that entire passage very early in this thread >>> as the sort of reasoning that Peirce might apply to the starting point of >>> the universe, as well. If the downward-pointing apex of the triangle is >>> the *beginning*, then what would correspond to the *end*--of cognition, >>> or of inquiry, or of the universe? >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>>>
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