John, List: It should be easy enough to copy and paste text from an offline draft into an e-mail message. I do it myself from time to time, and also did so below.
JAS: Formal Semeiotic is simply how Peirce defined Logic, which is the third branch of Normative Science in his 1903 classification. It certainly does not fall under Phenomenology. JFS: Both of those sentences are false. No, they are true, no matter how many times or in how many ways someone tries to claim otherwise. Any classification of the sciences that situates any aspect of Semeiotic under Phenomenology, rather than as the third branch of Normative Science, is not Peirce's; especially not the referenced one in CP 1.180-202, since CP 1.191 is unmistakably clear about this. Please either delete "Formal Semeiotic," put "Semeiotic" in parentheses under "Logic," or change the overall title to something like "A Peirce-Inspired Classification of the Sciences." Otherwise, the diagram will continue to be a blatant misrepresentation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Sep 7, 2019 at 11:06 AM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Ben, Jon, List, > > Everyone has the right to express their own opinions. What bothers > me are claims that somebody's opinion is what Peirce really meant, > intended, or considered as final. > > April 2014 was a stopping point. Nobody knows what Peirce might have > thought, but didn't write. Nobody knows what MSS have been lost. > And nobody knows what he might have written if he had access to the > latest research of his day or of ours. His writings show a living, > growing development of ideas up to the end. Any attempt to freeze > that growth would "block the way of inquiry." > > BU > > From Draft D - MS L75.235-237 > > "I define logic very broadly as the study of the formal laws of > > signs, or formal semiotic." > > > > the mathematics of logic is not necessarily fully the selfsame > > thing as the logic of mathematics. Peirce often discusses how > > mathematics USES diagrammatic reasoning, but usually says that > > mathematics needs, and anyway has taken, no help FROM logic except > > in a few cases... > > Thank you. MS L75 is probably where I first saw the term 'formal > semiotic', but I forgot where I read it. But that also reminds me > of the value of the Commens Dictionary. For most terms we have been > discussing, it has a chronological list of definitions and significant > examples: http://www.commens.org/dictionary > > JAS > > what I have been saying all along--Formal Semeiotic is simply how > > Peirce defined Logic, which is the third branch of Normative Science > > in his 1903 classification. It certainly does not fall under > > Phenomenology. > > Both of those sentences are false. > > The word 'logic' occurs 2,303 times in CP in various senses. For the > details, see Commens entries for 'logic', 'logic in the narrow sense', > 'formal logic', 'exact logic', and 'normative science'. > > Some Commens quotations for the term 'formal logic': > > > Formal logic classifies arguments by producing forms in which, the > > letters of the alphabet being replaced by any terms whatever, the > > result will be a valid, probable, or sophistic argument, as the > > case may be. (CP 2.549) > > > > Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed, > > is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of > > logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as > > a part of logic proper. (CP 4.240) > > > > Formal logic is mathematics; it is the most abstract branch of > > mathematics. But no other logic is called for in pure > > mathematics. (R 1336.11) > > These quotations are consistent with my diagram. The only point > a modern logician would question is the claim (CP 4.240) that formal > logic is not a principal part of logic. > > More Commens quotations about logic: > > > Logic proper is the theory of reasoning. That is to say, it is > > the study which aims to ascertain what must be the perceptible > > relations between possible facts in order that the knowledge > > that certain ones are true may warrant us in assuming that > > certain others are not true. (PSR 43, 1897) > > > > Logic is the science of the general necessary laws of Signs and > > especially of Symbols. (CP 2.93, 1902) > > > > Logic is that branch of normative science which studies the > > conditions of truth, or that kind of excellence which may or may > > not belong to objects considered as representing real objects. > > (NEM 4:192, 1904) > > > > Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which > > signs must conform in order to function as such. (EP 2:309, 1904) > > > > the very kernel of logic consists in the investigation of the > > validity of arguments, which depend upon their necessary conformity > > (whether perfect or not) to real facts. (R 498, 1906) > > > > it would seem proper that in the present state of knowledge logic > > should be regarded as coëxtensive with General Semeiotic, the > > a priori theory of signs. (R 634:15, 1909) > > Commens has many more quotations, but these show the range of options. > According to Peirce's ethics of terminology, established usage should > determine the choice. By that criterion, the standard should be the > second branch of the Trivium: Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. That > was his choice in the 1860s. > > A definition of logic as a synonym for Semeiotic would violate Peirce's > ethics and make one of the terms redundant. But the quotation from > 1909 sounds more like an observation than a definition. Whether it's > his last considered opinion is irrelevant. More important is the fact > that it's consistent with his ethics and with 21st c terminology. > > Next question: How is formal semeiotic related to phenomenology? > > Some quotations for 'phenomenology' and 'phaneroscopy' from Commens: > > > The business of phenomenology is to draw up a catalogue of categories > > and prove its sufficiency and freedom from redundancies, to make out > > the characteristics of each category, and to show the relations of > > each to the others. (CP 5.43, 1903) > > > > So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is > > occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron. (CP 1.284, 1905) > > > > The general survey of the building-materials, the elements out of > > which concepts are to be built. Let us give this work the name of > > phaneroscopy. (R 339:268r, 1905) > > These quotations are consistent with CP Vol 1, Book 3, which has > the title "Phenomenology". The primary topic of those 148 pages > is the use of mathematics to analyze the phaneron and derive the > semeiotic categories. That is formal, it conforms to Peirce's > definition of phenomenology/phaneroscopy, and it develops the > foundation of semeiotic, > > For these reasons, I designed cspscience.png with a single line under > Phenomenology to a node labeled Formal Semeiotic, which is the result > of the analysis. Then I drew dotted lines to show that the normative > sciences depend on phenomenology, by itself, and on the result of > using mathematics to derive the categories (formal semeiotic). > > That diagram plus the few lines of description form a slide that I > have used to explain Peirce's classification to a 21st c audience. > It's not a replacement for studying Peirce's writings or the many > insightful and well-written commentaries about them. But I have > never seen a better one-slide teaching aid for the classification. > For a copy, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/cspscience.png > > Has anyone who has taught, written, or lectured about Peirce's > classification found or developed other useful teaching aids? > If so, I'd like to see a copy. > > John >
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