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}Robert - thank you so much for your '76 definitions of the Sign'.
It's an excellent source - As you say- there are 'impossible
triangles and confusions'. Your list of what Peirce actually mean by
the sign-as-a- triad - is excellent.
Edwina
On Tue 05/05/20 6:19 AM , Robert Marty robertmarty...@gmail.com
sent:
Gary, Jon Alan, List
I fully respect yours concerns and of course it is clear that
everyone can invest them in the podium that is quite honored. For the
part concerning me I see no difficulty in using "involution" rather
than "presupposition" and I do not think I have strayed too far from
Peirce with "presupposition" since I think I have shown on the basis
of Frege's definition that the relationships of determination between
the elements of the phenomena as stated by Peirce verified this
assertion. For I just need to inscribe the abstract arrows of the
mathematical object that I build "without reference to their real
existence", within Peirce's empirical discourse. C.S. Peirce, 1976:
NEM, vol. IV, 1122 :
"It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other
than a Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by
anything other than a Necessitant " ( letter to Lady Welby of
December 23, 1908)
I understood very early on that I had to trace a personal path in
what J.M. Chevalier quite rightly called "Le continent peircien"
(https://www.academia.edu/3383353/La_d%C3%A9couverte_du_continent_peircien)
but by justifying at every step a very close and verifiable
proximity to the fundamental conceptions of phaneroscopy and
semiotics. And when we received in Perpignan the MS microfilms that
we had ordered from the Harvard Library (32 reels of 100m each - 3.2
km!) I don't regret my decision ... I spent a year extracting all the
definitions of the sign that Peirce could have imagined and I was not
disappointed since I found 76; they're on peirce.org [1]. I have
taken this effort when I realized the incredible number of scholars
who thought in a non-critical way about the definition of the sign
they attributed to Peirce. In particular, I have seen impossible
triangles and confusions, especially with the Saussurian tradition,
with the conceptions of Hjemslev and in the end of Greimas and his
Ecole de Paris. It would have taken a titanic job to denounce all
distortions, fanciful borrowings and undue annexations.
A practical consequence is that I have not acquired the skill to
discuss the relevance of the intellectual investments that can be
made on the podium. Let me reveal the picture came to mind when I
read Jon Alan's first and almost immediate reaction above; it is not
derogatory: I saw a child jumping from level 3 on the steps of the
podium and I imagined all the possible choices he could make to get
down. Obviously there are 10 and even there are 6 in the inner
cylinder 3 in the outside cylinder and only 1 outside the two
cylinders. To each his obsessions! Since this (dynamic) image no
longer leaves my mind because I wonder if it does not open another
way to go to the lattice of the classes of signs that would not go
through the constraints of purely algebraic formalization. I think
about it often ...
Best regards
Robert
Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 06:04, Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com
[2]> a écrit :
Jon, Robert, List,
I began a draft response to your post, Jon, shortly after you wrote
it, but things began to move so quickly on the list that my initial
thoughts soon seemed to be superseded in the rapid fire exchanges
following. So I am glad that you reposted it as it gives me another
chance to respond (if I can complete it soon enough not to lose it
again as things move on).
I certainly agree with Jon that your paper, Robert, is most
interesting and that your podium diagram effectively represents the
relations holding among the three categories. But I also agree with
you, Jon, that 'involution' is not only Peirce's term, but indeed
expresses the concept of the logical relations holding among the
categories more accurately than does 'presupposition', really
optimally . I would very slightly modify Jon's expression of these
involutional relations: 3ns involves 2ns and 1ns; 2ns involves 1ns.
JAS: Applying this to the "podium" diagram, 1=essence, 2=existence,
and 3=reality. What about the inner portions? I suggest that
1/2=inherence, 2/3=persistence, and 1/2/3=governance.
GR: I think that inherence, persistence and governance make good
terminological sense in consideration of "the inner portions" of the
podium based on CP 1.175. But as I see it the Aristotelian
terminology of NEM 4:292-300, "form for 1ns, matter for 2ns, and
entelechy for 3ns" is potentially misleading, especially if we forget
that for Peirce 'form' is, as you commented, Jon, "whatever it is in
itself, irrespective of anything else/" (1=essence), matter as "all
that it is in reference to something else than itself" (2=existence),
and entelechy as "that which brings things together" (3=reality)."
In short, I see no reason to employ the Aristotelian terminology,
loaded as it is with pre-Peircean notions especially of form.
'Matter' and 'entelechy' fare somewhat better, but still bring with
them the Aristotelian associations. I think that it is possible and
desirable to move beyond these in Peircean scholarship.
Indeed, I found it helpful to my own understanding to substitute
Peirce's terms for Aristotle's in distinguishing the inner relations.
So: "the determination of "[the existent] by [essence]"
(1/2=inherence), "the reaction of [existent] with [existent] "
(2=existence), and "a determination of [an existent] to [an
essential form]" (1/2/3=governance).
Jon, your quoting Colapietro helped clarify the following, I think,
truly important notion: that "reality, is persistence, is regularity
(or, persistence in/as regularity?).
VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance
considered as a continuity of reactions; insofar as it is actually
reacting against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of
being of such a substance seen as a continuity of reactions; insofar
as it endures throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other
words, existence (because it is an instance of opposition) designates
the aspect of secondness exhibited by any individual substance, while
persistence (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the
ways in which it manifests thirdness. ( Vincent Colapietro, Peirce's
Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity,
83).
In a word, 'persistence' is the existential form of continuity.
JAS: Peirce describes two different classes of possible states of
things that may be realized at a lapse of time--prolonged states,
which are realized at any instant within a lapse; and gradual
states, which are realized only at an entire lapse during which a
change occurs from one prolonged state to another, these two states
being "logically incompossible" (see NEM 3:1074-1077, c.1905). Such
diversity requires real qualities to be continuous (1/2/3), rather
than isolated (1), and real things to persist (2/3), not merely
exist (2). (Boldface and underlining as emphasis added by GR.)
To repeat: In a nutshell, real qualities are continuous (not
isolated); real things persist (not just exist).
I expect to spend more time reflecting on the following quotations
(which I've read numerous times over the years) and your succinct
comment which separates them.
CSP: Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of
continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot
exist unless there is something to undergo change [2/3] and to undergo
a change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable
qualities [1/2/3]. (CP 6.132, EP 1:323, 1892)
JAS: This is one specific sense in which all three categories are
always present within our existing universe.
CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order
to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it
indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that
Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other
elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have
anything upon which to operate. (CP 6.202, 1898)
Best,
Gary
"TIME IS NOT A RENEWABLE RESOURCE." GNOX
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 9:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [3]> wrote:
List:
I am repeating my post below from a few weeks ago with a new subject
heading, because it seems to have gotten lost in the flurry of
responses to the one on semeiotic that I sent a couple of hours
later, which by now has spawned several subsequent threads. If it is
actually just a case where no one had anything to say about it, then
never mind. :-)
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Sat, Apr 11, 2020 at 2:17 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Robert, List:
Thank you for sharing this very interesting paper. The "podium"
diagram strikes me as an effective representation of the relations
among Peirce's three categories, although his term was "involution"
rather than "presupposition"--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns.
Coincidentally, I have been thinking about modes of being along
similar lines recently, since "Metaphysics consists in the results of
the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as
regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896).
CSP: Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in
metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of
being, and as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics
as a Thing, an ens having Existence as its mode of being, so the
logical reason, or premise, reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an
ens having a Reality, consisting in a ruling both of the outward and
of the inward world, as its mode of being. The being of the quality
lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies in opposition to
other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing qualities
and things together. (CP 1.515, c. 1896)
Applying this to the "podium" diagram, 1=essence, 2=existence, and
3=reality. What about the inner portions? I suggest that
1/2=inherence, 2/3=persistence, and 1/2/3=governance.
In NEM 4:292-300 (1904), Peirce adapts Aristotelian terminology to
discuss the categories--form for 1ns, matter for 2ns, and entelechy
for 3ns. He describes form as "whatever it is in itself,
irrespective of anything else" (1=essence), matter as "all that it is
in reference to something else than itself" (2=existence), and
entelechy as "that which brings things together" (3=reality). He
goes on to distinguish three relations--"the determination of Matter
by Form" (1/2=inherence), "the reaction of Matter with Matter"
(2=existence), and "a determination of a Matter to a Form"
(1/2/3=governance). The first and third quotes reflect two subtly
different meanings of "determination" as explained on page 12 of your
paper.
In CP 1.175 (c. 1893), Peirce states, "The reality [3] of things [2]
consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon our recognition.
... Reality, then, is persistence [2/3], is regularity." Vincent
Colapietro helpfully spells this out further in his 1989 book,
Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human
Subjectivity.
VC: Existence is the mode of being of an individual substance
considered as a continuity of reactions; insofar as it is actually
reacting against other things, it exists. Persistence is the mode of
being of such a substance seen as a continuity of reactions; insofar
as it endures throughout a series of reactions, it persists. In other
words, existence (because it is an instance of opposition) designates
the aspect of secondness exhibited by any individual substance, while
persistence (because it is a case of continuity) designates one of the
ways in which it manifests thirdness. (p. 83)
Based on my immersion in Peirce's writings about time lately,
another candidate for 1/2/3 is diversity--the realization of
different states of things at different determinations of time, which
involves both persistent things (2/3) and changing qualities (1/2/3).
Peirce describes two different classes of possible states of things
that may be realized at a lapse of time-- prolonged states, which are
realized at any instant within a lapse; and gradual states, which are
realized only at an entire lapse during which a change occurs from
one prolonged state to another, these two states being "logically
incompossible" (see NEM 3:1074-1077, c.1905). Such diversity
requires real qualities to be continuous (1/2/3), rather than
isolated (1), and real things to persist (2/3), not merely exist (2).
CSP: Time with its continuity logically involves some other kind of
continuity than its own. Time, as the universal form of change, cannot
exist unless there is something to undergo change [2/3] and to undergo
a change continuous in time there must be a continuity of changeable
qualities [1/2/3]. (CP 6.132, EP 1:323, 1892)
This is one specific sense in which all three categories are always
present within our existing universe.
CSP: I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order
to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it
indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that
Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other
elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have
anything upon which to operate. (CP 6.202, 1898)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [5] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [6]
Links:
------
[1] http://peirce.org
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'gary.richm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[5] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[6] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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