Gary F., Jon A., List: Coincidentally, Peirce wrote a somewhat similar passage thirty years later, in the manuscript whose complete transcription I distributed over the weekend.
CSP: [E]very general sign, even a "term," involves, at least, a rudimentary assertion. For what is a "term," or "class-name" supposed to be? It is something which signifies, or, to use J. S. Mill's objectionable terminology, "connotes" certain characters, and thereby denotes whatever possesses those characters. That is, it draws the attention to an idea, or mental construction, or diagram, of something possessing those characters, and the possession of those characters is kept in the foreground of consciousness. What does that mean unless that the listener says to himself "that which is *here* (before the attention) possesses such and such characters"? That may not be quite a *proposition*, or fully an assertion, because the object of attention being in this case nothing but a mental creation, the listener does not tell himself what it is that is "here." It is, at least, not an assertion about the real world. But none the less it contains the assertoric element, the mental copula. When a listener hears the term "light," he proceeds to *create* in his mind an image thereof ... . Until this process is performed, the name excites no meaning in the mind of the listener. (R 787:30-31[34-35], CP 2.341, c. 1895-6) A term by itself is a "general sign" that "signifies ... certain characters, and thereby denotes whatever possesses those characters." This is exactly what I mean when I say that a term's immediate interpretant (whatever it *possibly could* signify) is its definition within the system of sign types to which it belongs, and its immediate object (whatever it *possibly could* denote) is anything that satisfies this definition. Moreover, as a symbolic (3ns) sign it *involves *both indexical (2ns) and iconic (1ns) aspects, by means of which "it draws the attention to an idea, or mental construction, or diagram." After all, as Peirce explains earlier in the text, each term in an assertion serves as an index that "directs attention" to one of its subjects (R 787:16[20], CP 2.336); and as Robert pointed out to start us down this whole road, "the only way of directly communicating an idea [or mental construction] is by means of an icon [such as a diagram]" (23[27], 2.278). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jun 15, 2020 at 11:45 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon A, list, > > I was curious about what was omitted by the ellipses in your quotation > from Peirce’s Lowell Lecture VII of 1866, and when I turned back a page for > the context, decided it might be worthwhile to post the whole passage from > W1:465-67 without omissions. For two or three reasons … first, because in > this passage Peirce claims to “here announce the great and fundamental > secret of the logic of science”(!). Second, because of the way he connects > *information* with *implication*. And third, because it uses as an > example an issue which continues to roil the U.S. (and many other nations, > including mine) — especially in the past week or two. > > (Those who are allergic to long Peirce quotes can stop here.) > > [[[ Extension × Comprehension = Information > > which means that when the information is increased there is an increase of > either extension or comprehension without any diminution of the other of > these quantities. > > Now, ladies and gentlemen, as it is true that every increase of our > knowledge is an increase in the information of a term— that is, is an > addition to the number of terms equivalent to that term— so it is also true > that the first step in the knowledge of a thing, the first framing of a > term, is also the origin of the information of that term because it gives > the first term equivalent to that term. I here announce the great and > fundamental secret of the logic of science. There is no term, properly so > called, which is entirely destitute of information, of equivalent terms. > The moment an expression acquires sufficient comprehension to determine its > extension, it already has more than enough to do so. We all know how > deceptive a *word* or *phrase* may be. That is why there are so many > syllogisms afloat. The middle term serves to lead our minds to conclusions, > by its false *implication*. All careful reasoners know what dangers lie > in such syllogisms as these: The Negro is a man and Every man should vote > therefore The Negro should vote. Observe, I do not criticise the > conclusion. That may be very very true. I only say that the question would > arise whether the Negro is not merely a man for the purpose of zoölogy, for > the purpose of religion, but whether he is also a man for the purpose of > politics. In short the question is whether every man is a man. Not that the > word *man* has two meanings but that it has very much implication and > that the truth of all that implication is not agreed to by both parties. > This is a type of the commonest of all fallacies— and I have selected this > particular argument as an example of it both because it is one which all of > you must have heard urged and also because it turns on the word *man* > which has of all words the most implication because of all things in the > universe this is the one of which we all know the most. > > We are all, then, familiar with the fact that many words have much > implication; but I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that > every word implies some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, > concept, symbol has an equivalent term— or one which has become identified > with it,— in short, has an *interpretant*. > > Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a > representation is something which stands for something. I will not > undertake to analyze, this evening, this conception of *standing for* > something— but, it is sufficiently plain that it involves the standing > *to* something *for* something. A thing cannot stand for something > without standing *to* something *for* that something. Now, what is this > that a word stands *to*? Is it a person? We usually say that the word > *homme* stands to a Frenchman for *man*. It would be a little more > precise to say that it stands *to* the Frenchman's mind— to his memory. > It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular remembrance > or image in that memory. And what *image*, what remembrance? Plainly, the > one which is the mental equivalent of the word *homme*— in short, its > interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or *stands to*, is its > interpretant or identified symbol. Conversely, every interpretant is > addressed by the word; for were it not so, did it not as it were overhear > what the word says, how could it interpret what the word says. There are > doubtless some who cannot understand this metaphorical argument. I wish to > show that the relation of a word to that which it addresses is the same as > its relation to its equivalent or identified terms. For that purpose, I > first show that whatever a word addresses is an equivalent term,— its > mental equivalent. I next show that, since the intelligent reception of a > term is the being addressed by that term, and since the explication of a > term's implication is the intelligent reception of that term, that the > interpretant or equivalent of a term which as we have already seen > explicates the implication of a term is addressed by the term. The > interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are identical. > Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it should stand > *to* something, every symbol— every *word* and every *conception*— must > have an interpretant— or what is the same thing, must have information or > implication. ] W1:465-67 ]] > > Gary f. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> > Sent: 15-Jun-20 09:29 > To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] (Interpreter → Interpretant) and (Possible → Actual) > > Edwina, Auke, Jon Alan, List ... > > Just to remind folks of two very old and ever recurring themes: > > 1. Peirce's locus pragmaticus on the transformation from talking about > interpretive agents, whether individuals or communities, and whether > animal, vegetable, or mineral, to talking about interpretant signs can be > found here: > > Inquiry Driven Systems • C'est Moi > > https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_1#C.27est_Moi > > <QUOTE> > > I think we need to reflect upon the circumstance that every word implies > some proposition or, what is the same thing, every word, concept, symbol > has an equivalent term — or one which has become identified with it, — in > short, has an interpretant. > > Consider, what a word or symbol is; it is a sort of representation. Now a > representation is something which stands for something. … A thing cannot > stand for something without standing to something for that something. Now, > what is this that a word stands to? Is it a person? > > We usually say that the word homme stands to a Frenchman for man. It would > be a little more precise to say that it stands to the Frenchman's mind — to > his memory. It is still more accurate to say that it addresses a particular > remembrance or image in that memory. And what image, what remembrance? > Plainly, the one which is the mental equivalent of the word homme — in > short, its interpretant. Whatever a word addresses then or stands to, is > its interpretant or identified symbol. … > > The interpretant of a term, then, and that which it stands to are > identical. Hence, since it is of the very essence of a symbol that it > should stand to something, every symbol — every word and every conception — > must have an interpretant — or what is the same thing, must have > information or implication. > > (Peirce, CE 1, 466–467). > > </QUOTE> > > 2. When we employ mathematical models to describe any domain of > phenomena, we are always proceeding hypothetically and tentatively, and the > modality of all mathematics, in its own right, is the possible, since > mathematical existence is existence in the moderate sense of “what's not > inconsistent”. In the idiom, “it's would-be's all the way down”, and the > usual scales of modality are flattened down to one mode, Be ♭. It's not > until we take the risk of acting on our abduced model that we encounter > genuine brute force Secondness. > > Regards, > > Jon >
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