Gary F., List: It is interesting that you see this paragraph as anticipating what Peirce would later call phenomenology or phaneroscopy. I believe that you are correct, although he clearly did not yet recognize any such distinction himself; in fact, he went on to state that "Philosophy, in the sense defined, will have two branches, logic and metaphysics, resting respectively upon observed facts relating to knowledge, or representation, and upon observed facts relating to being" (RS 787(s):2[7], c. 1895-6). He explicitly excludes esthetics and ethics in what you quoted, and a few years later he still maintains that "an analysis of what appears in the world," which is what leads to the discovery of the categories, falls within the scope of logic as opposed to metaphysics (CP 2.84, 1902). I also find it noteworthy that in the same manuscript, one of the corrections that Peirce offers of his earlier views pertains to the characterization of the categories themselves.
CSP: In 1867, although I had proof (duly published) that there was only a third category of characters besides non-relative characters and dual relations, yet I had not discovered that plural relations (which it had not occurred to me were sometimes not reducible to conjunctions of dual relations) constitute that third class. I saw that there must be a conception of which I could make out some features, but being unfamiliar with it in its generality, I quite naturally mistook it for that conception of *representation* which I obtained by generalizing for this very purpose the idea of a sign. I did not generalize enough, a form of error into which greater minds than mine might fall. I supposed the third class of characters was quite covered by the representative characters. Accordingly, I declared all characters to be divisible into *qualities* (nonrelative characters), *relations*, and *representations*, instead of into non-relative characters, dual relations, and plural relations. (R 787:26[30], CP 1.565) Non-relative (monadic) characters, dual (dyadic) relations, and plural (triadic) relations are more explicitly aligned with *mathematical *notions of 1ns/2ns/3ns than qualities/relations/representations and what he eventually calls "the purest conceptions" of the categories--"quality, reaction, and mediation" (CP 1.530, 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jun 16, 2020 at 9:20 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon AS, list, > > What caught my attention so far in your transcript of R787 was this > paragraph, which comes just *before* the one I’d quoted earlier from NEM > 4:ix: > > [[ There are, however, observations which are not only open to all men; > but which are necessarily open to all intelligences capable of acquiring > scientific, imperfect knowledge from observation and reasoning. The science > which is based on such observations as these may suitably be called > *philosophy*. This science will be somewhat narrower than what is > commonly called philosophy, since it will exclude ethics, esthetics, etc. > which repose on observations which might be foreign to some kind of > scientific mind. This science of philosophy, although it is observational, > yet will have, in a certain sense, a necessary character; for it is based > exclusively on such observations as *must* be open to every scientific > intelligence. According to my views of logic, it is impossible to find any > absolute criterion of whether a given obser-[s1|6]vation is necessary, in > that sense; and continual errors in this respect in the course of the > evolution of the science ought to be expected. This quasi-prediction, based > on the above theory of the nature of philosophy, has been amply fulfilled > in the history of philosophy; and this is a probable argument in favor of > the approximate correctness of that theory. But it does not follow that > there is no method by which philosophy may be gradually and indefinitely > improved and its errors be successively eliminated. ]] > > It seems clear to me that what Peirce calls *philosophy* here is what he > later calls *phenomenology* (and still later, *phaneroscopy*), as this > observational science is positive (unlike mathematics) but not normative > (as it excludes ethics, esthetics, etc.). What makes its observations > “necessary” is that they are not relative to the species of the observer, > but must be observable by “every scientific intelligence”. So he makes the > “quasi-prediction” that, for instance, certain observations may turn out to > be relative to the human sensorium, or the specifically human embodiment, > and are thereby proven to be *not* “necessary” in this sense. It seems, > then, that we can only arrive at our list of “observations which *must* > be open to every scientific intelligence” through a process of elimination. > Peirce’s retroductive prediction in his phenomenology is that the only > “observables” which can never be eliminated by that process are Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness. I would say that his “reduction thesis” is an > attempt to prove this *mathematically*, but of course mathematics can > never prove an assertion made by a positive science, i.e. any assertion > claiming to be true of the real world of experience. This is why Firstness, > Secondness and Thirdness, abstract as they are, are not *primarily* > mathematical objects. > > It’s also the reason that *iconic* signs (such as diagrams) should not be > regarded as *primarily* visual, because there may well be “scientific > intelligences” whose embodiment does not enable visual experience. > > Gary f. >
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