Helmut,
I think I follow. You guys are clearly expert logicians, but it is easy to get
so far into the weeds the way out is lost forever.
Now the problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be
knowers besides knowers-that-not about one topic.
Yes. Logic can kill you. About the world we live in, we're all "believers that"
and "knowers not" even if we think and say we are "knowers that”. (Where
“belief” is an understanding one's prepared to act on.)
Here’s how I think of it… the word “to know” is already assuming some position,
from an imputed independent vantage point, outside the system. But with big
questions, how do you step outside the system (reality) to make the judgement?
One can never know with infallibility the state of ontology if the knower is
within the system ("that what is") under consideration, right? I think that was
shown by Goedel, right?
In terms of logic and the big questions, don’t we live more in a state of
"fuzzy logic" where things have likelihoods — percentages of truth? And then
things begin to feel pretty intuitionistic.
SxS
On Dec 23, 2020, at 9:05 AM, Helmut Raulien
<h.raul...@gmx.de<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of our organization. Do not click
links, open attachments, or respond unless you recognize the sender's email
address and know the contents are safe.
Supplement: Interesting is the difference between belief and knowledge: The
belief values (affirmation, weak, strong negation) classify three groups:
Believers, non-believers, and deniers. Affirmation makes believers a class,
weak negation makes non-believers and deniers one class, strong negation makes
deniers a class. The knowledge values classify three groups too: Affirmation
makes knowers a class, weak negation not-knowers, and strong negation
knowers-that-not. With knowledge to each value is assigned one group each,
while with belief, to the weak negation two groups are assigned. Now the
problem with knowledge is, to call it a classification, there cannot be knowers
besides knowers-that-not about one topic. About one certain object there can be
only either affirmation-knowers, and weak negation-not-knowers (e.g. about the
colour red), or weak-negation-not-knowers, and strong-negation-knowers-that-not
(e.g. about unicorns). So, knowledge is, other than belief, in general
three-valued, but for an instance two-valued. Therefore it is closer than
belief related with truth, which is two-valued both in general and in the
instances.
List,
For me it is not clear, what exactly is claimed to justify intuitionistic
logic. Is it the not yet done proof, is it the weak negation, or is it habout
handling concepts?
If it is the not yet achieved proof, I think, that is nominalism, isnt it? And
it can easily, by induction, be refuted: Nature has worked due to natural laws
based on mathematic laws before these laws have been proved by humans or
aliens, yet at a time before there were stars and possibility of life of e.g.
mathematicians concerned with proofs. You can see that with a telescope.
If it is the weak negation, I think it can be shown, that the weak negation
applies to e.g. belief or knowledge, but not to existence or nonexistence, that
is truth or falsity. What is true, is true throughout the whole universe, and
what is not true, is false. "I don´t believe that A exists" (weak negation) is
not the same as "I believe, that A does not exist" (strong negation). But there
is no difference between "A is not true" and "A is false".
If it is about handling concepts, the justification of intuitionstic logic
would be a misunderstanding due to inaccurate language: "For atheists, God does
not exist" is inaccurate. It means: "For atheists, it seems, that God does not
exist". This is not existence, but belief. "For cows, the concept of the colour
red does not exist" means: "Cows do not share the concept of the colour red",
or "Cows don´t know the concept of the colour red". This does not mean, that
the shape of a cow has got the ability to punch a hole out of the
colour-concept´s existence domain, which is the universe. This example too is
not about existence, but in this case about knowledge.
The example I earlier gave, about somebody talking about a concept in another
universe, is absurd, because information cannot travel between universes.
So I wonder, what justifies intuitionistic logic.
Best, Helmut
23. Dezember 2020 um 05:37 Uhr
"John F. Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>
wrote:
Jon, List,
I have a high regard for the work that Ahti and Francesco have been doing, and
I read the article you cited (copy of the reference below). They have been
doing meticulous scholarship on the development of Peirce's EGs up to 1911. But
unfortunately, they overlooked the implications of those five MSS from 1911.
While Peirce was writing the three EG rules of inference around 8 pm on 2 June
1911, he suddenly realized that the rules depend *only* on whether an area is
positive or negative. There is nothing special about a scroll.
To see the difference, do a detailed comparison of R669 and R670. After June
2, everything depends on whether an area is shaded or unshaded. In R670, the
primitives are existence, conjunction, and negation, The scroll is just a
convenient way to draw two ovals without raising the pen.
There is much more to say, but I'm short on time.
John
---------------
JAS> I have been thinking about writing an article on this topic myself, but it
turns out that Bellucci and Pietarinen already covered a lot of the relevant
ground in a 2016 paper
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275038453_Existential_Graphs_as_an_Instrument_of_Logical_Analysis_Part_1_Alpha<https://nam03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F275038453_Existential_Graphs_as_an_Instrument_of_Logical_Analysis_Part_1_Alpha&data=04%7C01%7Cs.skaggs%40louisville.edu%7C192520d8a0604495b99308d8a74bda38%7Cdd246e4a54344e158ae391ad9797b209%7C0%7C0%7C637443291523949907%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=4RAu0F5JWQPjr2EP71FQwd7lRlan74%2BZ99JL675V%2F9w%3D&reserved=0>).
Here are a few especially pertinent excerpts, which are entirely consistent
with what I have been advocating all along.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with no subject, and with the
sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of
the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
