Dear Jacob,

I am very sorry to hear this. Along with John, I send my condolences.

I spoke with your father in a couple of very long phone calls about 2 years 
ago, when I was beginning my research on Peirce. He was extremely helpful, 
generous, and kind. 

All my best to your family,

Dan Everett


> On Jan 15, 2021, at 5:06 PM, Charles Pyle <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hello Everyone,
>  
> I’m writing on behalf of my father Charles Pyle.  He passed away on 1/12 due 
> to COVID.  We have seen that he was fairly active in this list and wanted to 
> let everyone know – my sincere apologies for the group email to the entire 
> list and letting you know in this manner.  We are having a small ceremony on 
> Sunday at 2pm which we will livestream.  We have received notes and memories 
> from all over the world which we will be reading and sharing along with our 
> memories at the “sharemony”, so if anyone has thoughts, memories or anything, 
> it has been a real blessing to receive and we would love to have more.  If 
> anyone wants the private link to the livestream, please message off list and 
> I will provide the link.  Link to his obituary:
> https://www.walkerfuneralhomes.com/obituaries/Charles-Robert-Pyle?obId=19639780#/obituaryInfo
>  
> Thank you all and again, my apologies for coopting this conversation. 
>  
> Sincerely,
> Jacob Pyle
>  
> From: Charles Pyle 
> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 9:09 PM
> To: [email protected]; Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]>
> Cc: Peirce List <[email protected]>
> Subject: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Edwina, list:
>  
> I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the 
> claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened 
> on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the 
> source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to 
> semiosis.
>  
> ---begin quote
> The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all 
> conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is 
> itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and 
> immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and 
> new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, 
> original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining 
> cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the 
> object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; 
> it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, 
> and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always 
> implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! 
> What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had 
> drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that 
> is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, 
> free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description 
> of it must be false to it.
> ---end quote
>  
> Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, 
> collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to 
> semiosis.
> ---begin quote
> 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14:  "A Sign may bring before 
> the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a 
> thing, an event, a law, etc.  But it never can convey anything to a person 
> who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of 
> the same object, collateral experience."
> ---end quote
>  
> Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of 
> knowing that is outside of the system of signs.
> ---begin quote
> I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of 
> signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the 
> prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 
> 1909)
> ---end quote
>  
> And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the 
> sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are 
> inscribed.
>  
> Regards,
> Charles Pyle
>  
>  
> From: Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> 
> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM
> To: Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]>; Charles Pyle 
> <[email protected]>
> Cc: Peirce List <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Charles, list:
> 
> I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to 
> semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. "
> 
> My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the 
> entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we 
> are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is 
> perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f.  
> [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of 
> semiosis].
> 
> "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind 
> you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not 
> prior to it].
> 
> And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to 
> its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction.
> 
> I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori 
> Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a 
> view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a 
> mechanical function.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle [email protected] sent:
> 
> Hi Jerry,
>  
> It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around 
> since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body 
> of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. 
> Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to 
> have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the 
> civilian world.
>  
> If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of 
> information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about 
> the beginning of markedness theory.
>  
> ----begin quote
> Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain 
> linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than 
> others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first 
> proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and 
> Roman Jakobson.
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf
> ----end quote
>  
> There is also an informative Wikipedia page: 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness
>  
> As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to 
> extensive empirical testing.
>  
> As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous 
> scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship.
>  
> Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been 
> active on this list for many years. See this article for example.
> https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf
>  
> Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine 
> of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that 
> is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s 
> thinking.
>  
> Cheers,
> Charles Pyle
>  
>  
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler 
> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM
> To: Charles Pyle 
> Cc: Peirce List 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Hi Charles
>  
> Your post below left me stone cold!
>  
> One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of 
> chemistry.
> It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The 
> propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several 
> facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. 
>  
> The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience.  Taste and smell 
> are remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of 
> chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in 
> human communication.
>  
> Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory 
> experiences on feelings / emotions.  The connections between chemical 
> receptor encoded directly from the chemical genetic structures and the 
> chemical circumstances is firmly grounded in decades of experience and 
> centuries of experience.  The consistency of the chemical language has 
> remained unchallenged for centuries.  
>  
> What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? 
>  
> What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your 
> assertions?
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry
>  
> 
> On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle <[email protected]> wrote:
>  
> Hi Helmut,
>  
> Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of 
> Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.  
>  
> The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where 
> truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of 
> which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. 
> Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of 
> falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space 
> because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the 
> underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or 
> the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the 
> relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, 
> repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart.  
>  
> In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. 
> Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. 
> Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound 
> that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on 
> which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, 
> the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first 
> mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.
>  
> Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is 
> a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a 
> beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound 
> begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there 
> during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; 
> between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the 
> characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of 
> continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic 
> analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of 
> language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth 
> by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. 
>  
> Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to mark the 
> vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the 
> continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic 
> infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of 
> timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here 
> phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three 
> elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space 
> resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further 
> divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. 
> Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of 
> development here:
> Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, 
> Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.
>  
> And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in 
> “Wild Language” which can be found here:https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle
>  
> Charles Pyle 
>  
> From: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> 
> Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
> To: Charles Pyle <[email protected]>
> Cc: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
> Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Charles,
> wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a 
> linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked 
> starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space?
> I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term 
> confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political 
> meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional".
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
>  
> 22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr
>  "Charles Pyle" <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> Helmut,
>  
> Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take 
> in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken.
>  
> --begin quote from Helmut----------
> The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like 
> black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When 
> somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative 
> people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to 
> grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately 
> being the reason for that.
> --end quote from Helmut-----------
>  
> To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of 
> asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the 
> logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised 
> from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in 
> phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, 
> p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specific example, it is a well-tested 
> language universal that (put in non-technical terms) if a language as f then 
> it has p, but a language can have p without f. The effects of such a claim 
> can be manifest in the order in which children learn language (they learn p 
> before f), the order in which language loss takes place in aphasia, etc., the 
> order in which language is recovered in the recovery from aphasia, and the 
> phonology systems of language. An example illustrating the latter type of 
> evidence can be seen Philippine languages, which do have p but not f. When 
> Filipinos who are not also not native speakers of English try to pronounce 
> English word with f like ‘fish’ they would say ‘pis’. And they would 
> pronounce Filipino as Pilipino.
>  
> So it is incorrect to characterize the desire to preserve the logic of the 
> word pairs you cite as particularly conservative in a political sense, or in 
> terms of an underlying moral anxiety in relation to sexual deviance. If you 
> use language, you use this logic. And it is not just an arbitrary 
> characteristic of these few pairs of words. You can’t just fudge around with 
> the logic of a few pairs of words without attacking the fabric of language 
> itself. Thus the resistance to loss of control you talk about should be seen 
> as conservative in relation to language itself, not conservative in relation 
> to politics or morality.
>  
> Furthermore, one must be aware the logic of opposition in language is 
> asymmetric. All oppositions in language are asymmetric. What is in play here 
> is not just asymmetry in relation to concepts that have come to be 
> politically or socially sensitive such as male-female, black-white, 
> right-wrong, open-closed, etc., but in relation to all concepts and 
> structures of language. To illustrate, I assume I can take it as self-evident 
> that the opposition between one and many, manifest in grammar as 
> singular-plural is asymmetric: singular is first and plural is second. When 
> you start counting, you must begin with 1 and then you can get to 2. If you 
> have two eggs in a basket, then you have one egg in the basket, but the 
> reverse is not true. And in keeping with this self-evident character of 
> numerology there has been found to be a universal of language, an empirical 
> claim supported by lots of evidence, that if a language has grammatical 
> singular and plural, then the singular is unmarked and the plural is marked. 
> (And, by the way, if that language has also dual, it is twice marked in 
> relation to singuilar.) That is, some piece of form is added to a word to 
> mark it as plural e.g. dog vs dog+s, tree vs tree+s. Similarly, while many 
> people would not regard it as self-evident that truth is prior to falsity, I 
> hold that it is, and have argued as such in various publications. In keeping 
> with the order of this asymmetry truth is unmarked and falsity is marked. 
> Similarly, down is first and up is second. Similarly, happy is first and sad 
> is second. Thus we can say ‘unhappy’ but not ‘unsad.’ Similarly well and 
> unwell.
>  
> People often cite right vs left as an example of symmetric opposition, but 
> language, generically, has presupposed that right is first and left is 
> second. Numerically, most people are right handed. And in many cultures 
> left-handed people are punished for learning to write with their left hand, 
> sometimes forced to learn to write with their right hand. And in many 
> cultures left is explicitly associated with evil or dirtiness and right with 
> cleanness and good.
>  
> There are also cases where the asymmetry goes contrary to what is 
> conventionally believed. For example, the conventional view holds that the 
> past is first, the present it next, and then comes the future. But to the 
> contrary language presupposes that the present is first and the past is 
> second. This contrary view does make sense, however, in that we experience 
> things first in the present, and then they become past. We take a picture in 
> the present, but it instantly becomes past. In keeping with this experiential 
> view the language universal is that the past is marked in relation to the 
> present. Thus look vs look+ed.
>  
> Obviously the male-female and black-white oppositions, and indeed the 
> true-false opposition, have become the locus of a raging power struggle in 
> western society. In service of this struggle we might want to try to modify 
> the logic and semantics of these fundamental pairs of words, but it would not 
> help that endeavor to suppose such changes are merely going to be resisted by 
> political or morally conservative people. The resistance is embodied in the 
> very fabric of language. Perhaps we need to deconstruct language itself, but 
> you cannot just deconstruct a few pairs of words without attacking the logic 
> underlying them.
>  
> Charles Pyle
> https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> From: Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
> Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 11:00 AM
> To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> List,
>  
> As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for 
> the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that 
> multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the 
> values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, 
> multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being 
> relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension 
> of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is 
> tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity 
> can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can 
> hardly ever, be reduced to binarities.
>  
> I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then 
> on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence.
>  
> A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So 
> this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. 
> This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia:
>  
> The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like 
> black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When 
> somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative 
> people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to 
> grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately 
> being the reason for that.
>  
> The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society 
> there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the 
> biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social 
> dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is 
> the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth 
> dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole 
> topic.
>  
> I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in 
> contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays 
> culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy 
> anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was 
> in former decades.
>  
> Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things sensibly, with 
> using adicy-models and the concept of emergence and irreducibility of triads. 
> I have the feeling, that a triadic view is opposed to digitalism, which, with 
> its binary 1-0-distinction in the small transistor-scale just creates 
> polarities, fiter bubbles, hatred, in the large scales of communication too.
>  
> Best,
> Helmut
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