There have been some discussions about intuitionistic logic and the claim that Peirce anticipated aspects of Brouwer's version of intuitionistic logic However, Peirce and Brouwer were on opposite sides of fundamental issues about the nature of mathematics. Peirce maintained that mathematical theories represent real possibilities. By real, he meant that they are independent of anything that anyone might think. By possibilities, he meant that they would be true of any actuality that happened to satisfy their premises. Brouwer, however, maintained that mathematical patterns and theories about them were mental creations that had no existence until somebody happened to have some intuition about them. For Brouwer's writings and comments about them, see the collection I posted in a temporary directory on my web site: http://jfsowa.com/temp . The file brouwer08.pdf contains a copy of an article that Brouwer wrote in 1908 and some commentary about it. There is also a book that contains his Cambridge lectures of 1951 and some other commentaries about related issues. In general, Brouwer's assumptions were diametrically opposed to Peirce's fundamental assumptions. Other intuitionists weren't as extreme as Brouwer. Some, such as Oostra, could be reconciled to Peircean views, but there is no evidence that Peirce had been thinking along those lines. John
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