Thanks, Jon, for transcribing that part of R 284, which I didn’t have time to search out yesterday. It’s similar to his detailed procedural and pragmatic ‘definition’ of lithium in the “Syllabus” (EP2:286):
CSP: “The peculiarity of this definition,— or rather this precept that is more serviceable than a definition,— is that it tells you what the word lithium denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the word.” His use of the word “precept” in this context is very apt because the prescription precedes the perception of the object. This reinforces the contrast between the two principles identified by André De Tienne as guiding the classification of sciences, and the difference between preceding in principle and preceding in procedure. It’s interesting that Peirce describes the application of such a precept as “more logical” than the textbook definition of lithium as “that element whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly.” I think you’re quite right to correct the (rather lame) final sentence of my post as you did. Bellucci’s paper on phaneroscopic analysis brings out the complexity of the relations among the sciences of mathematics, logic and phaneroscopy, where the hierarchical order is clear enough but the practice of each of these sciences involves the others procedurally. The special difficulty in phaneroscopy is in gaining “perceptual acquaintance” with the phaneron, because (as Peirce says) it’s right in front of you all the time, and that makes it very hard to see! The procedure he prescribes (for the “subtilizing logician” is to try to think of anything that is not phaneral (according to the verbal definition of the phaneron), because the impossibility of doing that is immediately obvious. This again shows the circularity of scientific method, because the concept of the phaneron must precede the procedure (and so on). Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 15-Jul-21 20:46 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17 Gary F., List: GF: This leaves open the question of how to classify the science--if it is a science--which enables us to “settle” what the phaneron is. Perhaps we can find the answer to that question by consulting what Peirce wrote right before claiming to have just "settled what the phaneron is" as quoted below. CSP: But, come, let us survey the whole field, the broad expanse of all that is before the mind in any way whatever, and see what forms of undecomposable elements, can be detected there. Perhaps somebody may inquire whether I mean the ideas themselves, or the objects they present. Such an inquirer is altogether off the track. The objects that are presented are before the mind, are they not? If the ideas are not the objects presented, then since you speak of them, they are in some sense before your mind too, even if instead of observing, you make the hypothesis that ideas different from the objects are before the mind, although it may be that nothing is really before your mind but the objects. Even then, these ideas are supposed, and as such are before the mind. Suppose there be a mere tinge of melancholy, of annoyance, or of joy, which brings no additional object but only colors the objects that are before the mind independently of the color. Still, in some sense this color is before the mind. All that is imagined, felt, thought, desired, or that either colors or governs what we feel or think is in some sense, before the mind. The sum total of it all I will name the phaneron. If I am asked whether I limit myself to what actually is at this indivisible instant before the mind or include all that ever was or will be before any mind or whether I mean something intermediate, or if I am asked whether I admit anything absolutely inconceivable, or am asked any such hard questions, the answer is that I have made my meaning plain enough to the eye of common-sense. The phaneron embraces all that is present to the mind. This same subtilizing logician who asks these questions, to which I as a logician myself can make no sort of objection and stand ready to follow him in his subtilizing, I give the answer: First exercize every care not to include in the phaneron anything that never enters your head at all and after exercizing the utmost scrupulosity in this respect, if there is any question whether a given thing belongs to the phaneron or not, carefully state the question in writing & set down after it the answer, Yes. Thus, "Is a self-contradictory object included in the phaneron? Yes." (R 284:40-41[37-38], c. 1905) This strikes me as more of a stipulated definition than a result of scientific inquiry. Our mere ability to ask whether X is included in the phaneron is sufficient to entail that X is included in the phaneron. GF: Bellucci appears to argue that it is the logic of relatives, taking a cue (as it were) from the idea of valency generalized from the science of chemistry. Bellucci's claim in the linked paper is not that the logic of relatives settles what the phaneron is, but rather that it is "by means of the logic of relatives that Peirce can establish that the elements of the Phaneron have valence" (p. 3). He later adds, "The logic of relatives is mathematical logic, and therefore is 'hardly to be reckoned' as a part of logic proper. What the logic of relatives teaches us concerning the primitive forms of relations is a mathematical, not a logical, truth. ... The preliminary investigation of 'what is possible' is provided by the logic of relatives" (p. 4). Accordingly, it corresponds to #2 in the "procedural order" rather than #1. Moreover, I suggest that applying the logic of relatives in this way is using principles adapted from mathematics within phaneroscopy. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Thu, Jul 15, 2021 at 8:26 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote: André De Tienne: “a science that happens to make use of a principle formulated in a more abstract science … may provide that prior science with corrective feedback, reasons to revise generalizations, and reasons to redesign formal possibilities. Thus, a science may also be said to precede another science if the latter provides such a critical and validating feedback in return.” (slide 17) GF: Apparently a science may precede another not only in this hierarchical sense but also in a procedural sense: CSP: “Having thus settled what the phaneron is, we have to undertake the examination [of] its indecomposable constituents. But before undertaking the actual work of observation, it is indispensable that we should begin by considering what is possible for otherwise we would be exploring without any definite field to explore. We should idly wonder without accomplishing anything.” (MS 284, p. 39, c. 1905, as quoted by Francesco Bellucci — the emphasis is his — in https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis). GF: The procedural order here is: 1. settling “what the phaneron is” 2. “considering what is possible” [by means of a formal or mathematical logic?] 3. “undertaking the actual work of observation” [i.e. phaneroscpic observation] This leaves open the question of how to classify the science — if it is a science — which enables us to “settle” what the phaneron is. Bellucci appears to argue that it is the logic of relatives, taking a cue (as it were) from the idea of valency generalized from the science of chemistry. Gary f.
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