Jon, List, JAS: I agree that some authors unfortunately "blur the important distinction" between "the *formal *logic of relations/relatives as pure mathematics and its *application *to terms and propositions within the normative science of logic as semeiotic." To be honest, it is likely that I have done so myself at times.
GR: It seems to me that the very language of "relative *terms*" and " *propositional* forms" makes it all too easy to blur the distinction. You quoted me, then commented: GR: You [JAS] quoted Peirce as writing, "The Phaneron [is] itself far too elusive for direct observation." ... But isn't such "direct observation" the method -- and in a sense -- the very *essence *of phaneroscopy? JAS: [. . . ] It certainly does seem squarely contradictory to his *definition *of phaneroscopy just two years earlier. CSP: There is nothing quite so *directly open to observation* as phanerons ... . What I term *phaneroscopy* is that study which, supported by the *direct observation* of phanerons Well, as a famous American poet once wrote: Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.) ― Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass <https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/28117> See Gary F's online version of the 1892 edition of Leaves of Grass ( https://www.gnusystems.ca/grass/Leaves0.htm) JAS: [. . .] Might *studying *the phaneron using EGs correspond to the aspects of phaneroscopy that he spells out in the earlier definition (quoted above) as coming *after *direct observation and generalization? This would again be the *application *of formal/mathematical logic *within *phaneroscopy--or perhaps what you have proposed to call "trichotomic category theory" as a subsequent branch of a broader science of phenomenology, in which phaneroscopy as the first branch is *limited to* direct observation and generalization. GR: EGs might very well prove to be a powerful analytical tool *succeeding* the "direct observation of phanerons" (which observation alone ought to be called "phanersocopy" in my opinion). In CP 1.286, which you quoted, Peirce goes on to describe the study of phenomenology beyond the direct observation of phanerons as including the following (I've added numbers in brackets to emphasize the several facets of phenomenology which Peirce thought ought to follow phaneroscopic observation. CSP: . . .[1] generalizing its observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; [2] describes the features of each; [3] shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then [4] proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and [5] finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP 1.286, 1904) JAS: Might *studying *the phaneron using EGs correspond to the aspects of phaneroscopy that he spells out in the earlier definition (quoted above) as coming *after *direct observation and generalization? This would again be the *application *of formal/mathematical logic *within *phaneroscopy--or perhaps what you have proposed to call "trichotomic category theory" as a subsequent branch of a broader science of phenomenology, in which phaneroscopy as the first branch is *limited to* direct observation and generalization. GR: You've included "generalization" as a part of phaneroscopy (i.e., observation of the phaneron). I hadn't been thinking of it that way because "generalizing" obviously goes beyond "observation." But you might be right. For a time I thought that De Tienne's notion of "iconoscopy" (modified) suggested* just* that generalization and might be developed as a second branch of phenomenology. As you know, Andre has said off List that *that* was *not *his intention (however, he did title his paper "Iconoscopy Between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic" so that he would seem to be suggesting that *something* ought to follow the direct observation of phanerons. For his paper, see: (*https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar/ <https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar/>* ) Some of the other work Peirce stated that the study of phenomenology ought to include (in CP 1.286 quoted with added numbers just above) might be included in a second branch of phenomenology however it comes to be instituted and developed, and whatever it comes to be called (Andre comments in his Iconoscopy paper that "iconoscopy" is probably not the best name for it; he's undoubtedly correct, esp. as it borrows language from semeiotic grammar, viz., 'icon'. As I recall he thought something like the thoroughly ugly term, 'imagography' (?) might be closer to what he had in mind as the paper discusses images throughout. At the moment I'm thinking that a third branch, "trichotomic category theory," would be concerned, at least principally, with only the last item in that list such that the study of phenomenology would conclude with "the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories." However, *all* of this is mere guesswork at present. It is possible -- perhaps likely -- that EGs could play an important part in those other proposed branches of phenomenology following phaneroscopy, but I'd like to see a demonstration of that; I don't believe that it was something Peirce himself ever attempted, let alone any student of phenomenology since. But as he provided us with numerous examples of his own phaneroscopic observation it ought to be doable. Best, Gary R Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Jul 17, 2021 at 10:28 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List > > Jon wrote: > > [I]t appears that Atkins is right not to see much difference between "the > -adicity of relative terms themselves" and "propositional forms." > Nevertheless, *both terms and propositions are obviously **signs*, and I > believe that *it is important to maintain the distinction between the * > *formal *logic of relations/relatives as pure mathematics and its > *application **to terms and propositions within the normative science of > logic as semeiotic. *(Emphasis added by GR) > > > I whole-heartedly agree that making this distinction is essential. Yet, in > my experience there are discussions of the *logic of relatives *as > purportedly providing the mathematical principles which will become the > basis for phenomenologists expecting to find -- and subsequently > *actually* finding examples of manifestations of the Universal Categories > -- which seem to me to, at very least, blur the important distinction you > make above. Occasionally I've had a sense that an author is *not* discussing > pure mathematics, the simplest mathematics (including the *logic of > relatives*) but, rather, exactly the applications of these to *logic as > semeiotic*. In the days and weeks ahead I'll offer examples of this, > perhaps including some from Atkins' book. > > You quoted Peirce as writing, "The Phaneron [is] itself far too elusive > for direct observation." > > But then what are we to make of Peirce's directing us elsewhere to > phaneroscopic observations of qualities of feeling, to existential > actions/reactions, to representations, thoughts, signs, say: 1ns (e.g., a > red color), or 2ns (the manifestation of a dual action, e.g., a loud sound > suddenly breaking the silence), or 3ns (e.g., thoughts of these as signs of > 1ns and 2ns)? Does Peirce not argue elsewhere that it is possible to > phenomenologically observe *whatever comes before the mind* unencumbered > by mathematical (including valentally structural) or logical thoughts? > > The quotation continues: > > What, in a general way, does the Diagram of Existential Graphs represent > the mode of structure of the Phaneron to be like? The question calls for a > comparison, and in answering it a little flight of fancy will be in order. > It represents the structure of the Phaneron to be quite like that of a > chemical compound. ... Each Elementary Graph, like each chemical element, > has its definite Valency. . . > > In my opinion, valency and the reduction thesis are, in themselves, *not > at all sufficient* to establish phenomenology as a science; let's say > that they are necessary, but not sufficient. No doubt one can employ EGs to > analyze phenomenological manifestations *after the fact* of phaneroscopic > observation. But monadicity, dyadicity, and triadicity are *totally void > of content*. They are, indeed, the "modes of structure" of the phaneron > for Peirce. But it would seem to me that he contradicts himself here (in > consideration of *many *other discussions) in saying that "the Phaneron > [is] itself far too elusive for direct observation." If that were so, > then phaneroscopy would amount to, well, virtually nothing: it would be > empty of content. I'm fairly certain that there are some logicians who hold > that view. > > But isn't such "direct observation" the method -- and in a sense -- the > very *essence *of phaneroscopy? > > Best, > > Gary R > “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, Jul 18, 2021 at 3:59 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I agree that some authors unfortunately "blur the important distinction" > between "the *formal *logic of relations/relatives as pure mathematics > and its *application *to terms and propositions within the normative > science of logic as semeiotic." To be honest, it is likely that I have done > so myself at times. > > GR: You quoted Peirce as writing, "The Phaneron [is] itself far too > elusive for direct observation." ... But isn't such "direct observation" > the method -- and in a sense -- the very *essence *of phaneroscopy? > > > I had a similar reaction when I came across that particular statement by > Peirce, but in context chose to focus mainly on the the implication of the > entire passage that he situated EGs within mathematics rather than the > normative science of logic as semeiotic. It certainly does seem squarely > contradictory to his *definition *of phaneroscopy just two years earlier. > > CSP: There is nothing quite so *directly open to observation* as > phanerons ... . What I term *phaneroscopy* is that study which, supported > by the *direct observation* of phanerons and generalizing its > observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes > the features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed > together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their > characters are quite disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a > certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of > phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult > task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories. (CP > 1.286, 1904; bold added) > > > Applying the principle of charity, perhaps Peirce means something subtly > different by "direct observation" in these two texts. In the later one > (quoted previously), he goes on to say that "there can be no better method > of studying it [the Phaneron] than through the Diagram of it which the > System of Existential Graphs puts at our disposition" (NEM 4:320, 1906). > Might *studying *the phaneron using EGs correspond to the aspects of > phaneroscopy that he spells out in the earlier definition (quoted above) as > coming *after *direct observation and generalization? This would again be > the *application *of formal/mathematical logic *within *phaneroscopy--or > perhaps what you have proposed to call "trichotomic category theory" as a > subsequent branch of a broader science of phenomenology, in which > phaneroscopy as the first branch is *limited to* direct observation and > generalization. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Jul 17, 2021 at 10:28 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Jon, List >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> [I]t appears that Atkins is right not to see much difference between "the >> -adicity of relative terms themselves" and "propositional forms." >> Nevertheless, *both terms and propositions are obviously **signs*, and I >> believe that *it is important to maintain the distinction between the * >> *formal *logic of relations/relatives as pure mathematics and its >> *application **to terms and propositions within the normative science of >> logic as semeiotic. *(Emphasis added by GR) >> >> >> I whole-heartedly agree that making this distinction is essential. Yet, >> in my experience there are discussions of the *logic of relatives *as >> purportedly providing the mathematical principles which will become the >> basis for phenomenologists expecting to find -- and subsequently >> *actually* finding examples of manifestations of the Universal >> Categories -- which seem to me to, at very least, blur the important >> distinction you make above. Occasionally I've had a sense that an author >> is *not* discussing pure mathematics, the simplest mathematics >> (including the *logic of relatives*) but, rather, exactly the >> applications of these to *logic as semeiotic*. In the days and weeks >> ahead I'll offer examples of this, perhaps including some from Atkins' book. >> >> You quoted Peirce as writing, "The Phaneron [is] itself far too elusive >> for direct observation." >> >> But then what are we to make of Peirce's directing us elsewhere to >> phaneroscopic observations of qualities of feeling, to existential >> actions/reactions, to representations, thoughts, signs, say: 1ns (e.g., a >> red color), or 2ns (the manifestation of a dual action, e.g., a loud sound >> suddenly breaking the silence), or 3ns (e.g., thoughts of these as signs of >> 1ns and 2ns)? Does Peirce not argue elsewhere that it is possible to >> phenomenologically observe *whatever comes before the mind* unencumbered >> by mathematical (including valentally structural) or logical thoughts? >> >> The quotation continues: >> >> What, in a general way, does the Diagram of Existential Graphs represent >> the mode of structure of the Phaneron to be like? The question calls for a >> comparison, and in answering it a little flight of fancy will be in order. >> It represents the structure of the Phaneron to be quite like that of a >> chemical compound. ... Each Elementary Graph, like each chemical element, >> has its definite Valency. . . >> >> In my opinion, valency and the reduction thesis are, in themselves, *not >> at all sufficient* to establish phenomenology as a science; let's say >> that they are necessary, but not sufficient. No doubt one can employ EGs to >> analyze phenomenological manifestations *after the fact* of >> phaneroscopic observation. But monadicity, dyadicity, and triadicity are >> *totally >> void of content*. They are, indeed, the "modes of structure" of the >> phaneron for Peirce. But it would seem to me that he contradicts himself >> here (in consideration of *many *other discussions) in saying that "the >> Phaneron [is] itself far too elusive for direct observation." If >> that were so, then phaneroscopy would amount to, well, virtually nothing: >> it would be empty of content. I'm fairly certain that there are some >> logicians who hold that view. >> >> But isn't such "direct observation" the method -- and in a sense -- the >> very *essence *of phaneroscopy? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> “Let everything happen to you >> Beauty and terror >> Just keep going >> No feeling is final” >> ― Rainer Maria Rilke >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
