Jack, List: JRKC: Doesn't this depend on how we define "inefficient"?
Peirce prepared the entry for "efficient" in the *Century Dictionary*. *efficient*, *a*. and *n*. *I*. a. *1*. Producing outward effects; of a nature to produce a resuit; active; causative. *2*. Acting or able to act with due effect; adequate in performance; bringing to bear the requisite knowledge, skill, and industry; capable; competent: as, an *efficient *workman, rector, or commander. In this context, it seems to me that Peirce is not using "efficient" in the second sense of "doing more with less," but rather in the first sense of having a *real effect* on the external world. As he says right before the previously quoted sentences, "It appears to me that the essential function of a sign is to render inefficient relations efficient,--not to set them into action, but to establish a habit or general rule whereby they will act on occasion" (CP 8.332, 1904). In other words, according to the physical doctrine (nominalism/materialism/determinism), the *only *relations that have a real effect on the external world are "the continued rectilinear velocities with the accelerations that accompany different relative positions of the particles." By contrast, Peirce's view is that signs and semiosis enable *other *relations to have a real effect on the external world that would otherwise be impotent to do so. As he writes elsewhere ... CSP: But everybody who looks out of his eyes, and is not blinded by a metaphysical theory, well knows that thoughts and other signs may bring about great physical effects that are not, as such, signs. During a battle an aide de camp may ride up to one of the commanding generals, and utter a few words. As long as they are audible, it makes no difference how much or little physical energy the waves of sound carry. The consequence is that in a few minutes a great charge of cavalry takes place, tremendous, terrific; and hundreds of men pass the gates of death. (R 318:169-170[14-15], 1907) As for a sign being "something by knowing which we know something more," Peirce goes on to state in the succeeding sentences, "With the exception of knowledge, in the present instant, of the contents of consciousness in that instant (the existence of which knowledge is open to doubt) all our thought and knowledge is by signs. A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object" (CP 8.332). The only way to know something *at all*, and therefore the only way to know something *more*, is by means of signs; and in accordance with Peirce's pragmatism, the *ultimate *meaning of any acquired knowledge consists in self-controlled habits of conduct, by which those signs have a real effect on the external world. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 10:35 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > Or, essentially, my own (perhaps idiosyncratic) interpretation of the > passage which began this thread is that Peirce seemed to realise that in > “accessing" (perhaps being determined by) one object (whether > dynamic/immediate) we often find a *kind of novelty with which we are > already, in some respect, acquainted* (we merely abstract formal elements > of one “sign” to form abductive hypotheses regarding the possible formal > elements of other, “future”, signs). And this convergence of multiple > objects combined with, or predicated upon, abductive leaps in relative to > the iconicity/aniconcity of structural patterns -- affinity/dissonance > of/between internal relations -- is what draws, again, to my mind, clear > parallels with Chomsky’s poverty of stimulus. > > We abstract from parts internal structural relations which metonymically > correspond to a broader structural pattern which indexes the existence of > the "whole" - this kind of abstraction combined with abductive application > (fallible theses regarding the internal applicability/affinity of/between > patterns) is what unites Peirce, Chomsky, and Bourdieu (even though Chomsky > is a resolute Cartesian and the others reject such a position out of hand). > > Would be very interested to receive any variety of response to this - > preferably those which ardently disagree with me! > > Best > > Jack > > ------------------------------ > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> > *Sent:* Monday, October 4, 2021 3:54 PM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; > tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All > Semiotic, No Puzzle) > > Edwina, List, > > Thanks for you reply! > > An inefficient interaction provides no information; it's just brute > action/reaction. > > Doesn't this depend on how we define "inefficient"? Because Peirce sets > the dyadic (action/reaction) up as the most efficient - "...nothing ever > happens but the *continued rectilinear velocities with the accelerations > that accompany different relative positions of the particles*. *All other > relations*, of which we know so many, *are inefficient*." > > Taking up the colloquial definition of the term -- or its antonym at least > -- we can contrast efficiency with waste. It seems to me that all > interaction -- especially that which babies/children engage in -- is > extremely "inefficient" insofar as they are subject to so much > signification that they do not possess the means of understanding/knowing. > And, aside from that, the fact of polysemy and diagrammatic relations would > seem to posit that all interpretations of anything whatsoever are > inefficient as they mediate one, or at any rate, a limited number, of sides > of what is a many-sided phenomenon. > > Then there is language (and sociality itself) which can be considered > "inefficient" - if we simply wanted to convey denotational information, we > would never have conversations in the style that we do. As Roman Jakobson > notes, there is a spectral quality to language and the phatic/poetic > functions are always present but can be attenuated relative to more > denotational utterances -- the point, though, is that what some consider > "inefficient" others consider "efficient". The two Oxford (or was it > Cambridge?) dons who conversed with each other solely thought mathematical > problems written on sheets of paper delivered back and forth between their > lodgings by intermediaries -- so much so that the death of Ramanujan (whom > one of these two had brought to England) was discussed between the two only > as what seems to most of us a "throwaway" comment immediately followed by > an extensive list of mathematical proofs and hypotheses (it was actually > quite a poignant inclusion if you consider it from the angle that these two > men never spoke in English at all, for the most part). > > So -- and I know this is deviation -- what is "efficient" in matters > "social" is itself a matter of perspective. > > The other point - of the operation of semiosis at it would appear in > itself - is a very salient one, I think. It also refers back, in a > roundabout way, to the discussion we had here last week regarding Peirce's > position on the existence of god (insofar as object-sign-interpretant > implies that the object itself belongs to some universe-external position: > and here I wonder, only speculatively, if we cannot draw comparisons > between "grammar" and "phaneron"). Obviously "grammar" is part of the > phaneron, but Peirce's description of the phaneron, to my mind, and perhaps > mine alone, resembles some distinctions as made by Saussure in relation to > *langue > *(the total[izing] grammatical whole which logically precedes the > utterance in order of necessity) > *. * > > Again, this is all very much a speculative mishmash of ideas resulting > from a thesis overflow, but children are never directly exposed to such > irregular constructions as “go-ed” because adults, acquainted with > linguistic ideology pertaining to what Bourdieu terms “standard” know that > such forms are grammatically “incorrect” (are possessed of negative > cultural capital) and consequently do not reproduce them. > > How then do we account for the continual reproduction (in staggering > statistical frequency across all social classes) of such forms if not by > admitting an *a priori* capacity or faculty for apprehending structural > patterns (within linguistic forms) and thereby abstracting elements from > said patterns in order to apply them, *generatively*, to new > constructions which include, but are not limited to, such > over-irregularized constructs as “go-ed”? Again, the argument I am making > here is not necessarily in favour of *all* which is implied under the > banner of “universal grammar” – I possess neither the competence nor the > interest to engage in interlinguistic analysis for the sole purpose of > supporting or detracting from said hypothesis. My point is merely that the > fundamental part of Chomsky’s theory – the *a priori* capacity for > discernment of structural patterns within linguistic forms – seems sound > even if one wishes to dispense with the rest of the baggage associated with > Chomskyean theory re UG. > > Best > > Jack >
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