It was not a joke... I myself committed a lapsus calami by writing "calmi"! Excuse me ... RM Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>*
Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 17:00, robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> a écrit : > Margaretha, Edwina, List > > Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami .... it > is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too... > > "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument > that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and > of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail > -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic > relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But > you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may > think that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic > idea. But analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On > Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on > Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced > the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I > saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a > recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a > conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see > two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of > them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them, > not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man. > But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is > something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant > thought, [emphasize mine] > > C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that > while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two > or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to > build graphs with every higher number of tails. > [image: image.png] > > And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic, > or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic > relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three > elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to > be found in the phenomenon " > > Best regards, > Robert Marty > > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > > > > Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> a > écrit : > >> Margaretha >> >> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this >> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle >> but in a Y shape. >> >> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - >> Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is >> closed, but within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and >> enable networking with other triads. >> >> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y >> shapes connecting with each other [1.327]. >> >> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that >> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his >> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance, >> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex >> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve. >> >> 2] I have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's >> Third World has strong comparisons with Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets >> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his >> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in >> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an >> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to >> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness >> and Thirdness] in the development of a society. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent: >> >> List, >> >> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the >> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce? >> >> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this >> intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire. But there must >> be others. >> >> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not >> in philosophy. I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his >> work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key >> answers to epistemological problems in management research. >> >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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