Gary F., List: I apologize for the length of this post, but the thread is already getting a lot of my wheels turning.
GF: The Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be the basic one for logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless. I agree, and I have even written a paper that has been accepted for publication by *Semiotica*, entitled "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants," which discusses three such trichotomies--immediate/dynamical/final, emotional/energetic/logical, and intentional/effectual/communicational. I will post a link and the abstract whenever it appears online. GF: ... an Intentional Interpretant as Peirce defines it can be internal *both *to the sign itself and to the utterer, so that it is an Immediate Interpretant *as well as* an Intentional Interpretant. Any interpretant is always an interpretant *of a particular sign*, because it must be *determined by* that sign in order to be *its *interpretant. I take Peirce's point in the Logic Notebook entry to be that what he had been calling "the intentional interpretant" is *not *determined in any way by the sign that is *currently *being communicated from the utterer to the interpreter. Again, as "a determination of the mind of the utterer," I believe that it is instead a dynamical interpretant of a *previous *sign. The interpreter thus has no direct access to it and can only apprehend it to the extent that it is "betrayed" (Peirce's word) in the sign itself as the *immediate *interpretant. The second definition of "betray" in Google's online dictionary is "unintentionally reveal; be evidence of," so a sign "betrays" the utterer's intention only insofar as the sign serves as *evidence of* that intention, regardless of whether the utterer intended his/her intention to be so revealed. GF: The same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign can also be part of the interpreter's internal context, as his more or less intuitive sense of what the utterer's intention was in uttering the sign. As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the *sign*. As I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of *possible *understandings in accordance with the definitions of the words that comprise it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the syntax and other rules of grammar for the language in which it is written. A reader's *dynamical *interpretant of the text, his/her *actual *understanding of it--whether an "intuitive sense" or a result of subsequent reflection--*ought *to be a sincere attempt to discern the author's intended meaning, not in the abstract, but *as expressed in the text*. In the words of William J. Abraham ( https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=asburyjournal, p.20), "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement." Accordingly, I now recognize that the author's intention is *not *the final interpretant--again, the *ideal aim* of interpretation, how the sign *necessarily would be* understood after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. Instead, it seems to me that there is a sense in which the author's intention is the *object *of the text as a sign, much like the object of the command to "ground arms" is "the will of the officer" (CP 5.473, 1907). Again, Peirce describes the intentional interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the utterer," and he similarly describes the object as "the essential ingredient of the utterer" (EP 2:404, 1907), going on to add the following. CSP: For, after all, collateral observation, aided by imagination and thought, will usually result in some idea, though this need not be particularly determinate; but may be indefinite in some regards and general in others. Such an apprehension, approaching, however distantly, that of the Object strictly so called, ought to be, and usually is, termed the "immediate object" of the sign in the intention of its utterer. (EP 2:409, 1907) As I see it, the immediate object is also always internal to the *sign*. However, in a communicative context, the *commens *is "that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place" (EP 2:478, 1906). What is its essential ingredient? "It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind" (EP 2:391, 1906). "Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer *and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*" (CP 4.551, 1906). In other words, the sign itself "fuses" or "welds" the otherwise distinct minds of the utterer and interpreter into "one mind" such that the immediate object and interpretant, being internal to the sign, are also internal to this "commind." GF: If a semiosic process is *continuous*, as you have argued in another thread, then the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of analysis: they are not as real as the process of which they are parts. Naturally, I agree in accordance with my recent post on semiosic synechism ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-10/msg00204.html). For me, this entails that any "individual" sign, "its" object, and "its" interpretant are all *entia rationis*--products of analysis resulting from the exertion of some will for a particular purpose. As such, the internal/external distinction is one that we create *within *the analysis--again, the immediate object and interpretant are conceived as *internal *to the sign, while the dynamical object and interpretant are conceived as *external *to the sign. Hence, the reader of a text contributes *nothing * to its immediate interpretant, only its dynamical interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the interpreter." In fact, what I sometimes call an "event of semiosis"--again, an *ens rationis* "marked off" by analysis in retrospect, not a real constituent of the ongoing continuous process--occurs whenever an individual dynamical object determines an individual sign token to determine an individual dynamical interpretant. However, I have always struggled to figure out the exact role within Peirce's semeiotic of an interpreter's previously established *habits *of interpretation--what I take to be your "internal context"--in explaining why *different *interpreters can be and often are determined to *different *dynamical interpretants by the *same *sign, which by definition has the *same *immediate and final interpretants. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 12:33 PM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, I’m with you on this, except maybe for one detail. You quoted > Peirce’s Logic Notebook: > > CSP: The Immediate Interpretant is the Interpretant represented, > explicitly or implicitly, in the sign itself. I have thus omitted the > *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, > it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, > it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it is in no sense the > interpretant of *that *sign. (R 339:414[276r], 1906 Apr 2) > > I wouldn't say that this entry means that he “abandoned” the term > “Intentional Interpretant” introduced in his letter to Welby. Peirce > introduced three or four sets of Interpretants, and I think he used them > for different analytical purposes, so that they might well overlap in their > reference to a given situation. In the Welby letter, Peirce is focused on > the *communicative* function of signs. In the Logic Notebook entry he > seems to be more focused on, well, logic (as semeiotic). The > Immediate/Dynamic/Final triad of interpretants may be the basic one for > logic, but that doesn't render the other triads useless. > > Semiotically, if both utterer and interpreter of a sign have their own > internal contexts for the external (“published”) sign – as is generally the > case in verbal communication between humans – an Intentional Interpretant > as Peirce defines it can be internal *both* to the sign itself and to the > utterer, so that it is an Immediate Interpretant *as well as* an > Intentional Interpretant. The same Immediate Interpretant of the same sign > can also be part of the interpreter's internal context, as his more or less > intuitive sense of what the utterer's intention was in uttering the sign. > > If a semiosic process is *continuous*, as you have argued in another > thread, then the boundaries between sign and interpretant are artifacts of > analysis: they are not as real as the process of which they are parts. On > the psychological side, Peirce asserted that the boundaries between > *people* are likewise indeterminate and arbitrary: > > > > CSP: Nor must any synechist say, ‘I am altogether myself, and not at all > you.’ If you embrace synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of > wickedness. In the first place, your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, > and in far greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you > would believe. Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, > for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, > all men who resemble you and are in analogous circumstances are, in a > measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors > are you. (EP2:2, CP 7:571, 1894) > > > > Peirce also recognized that persons are themselves signs, so that a > continuous semiosic process can very well involve both. How else would > communication between people by means of signs be possible? This synechism > also has a phenomenological basis, which Peirce recognized in his early > work (long before he started using the term “phenomenology”): > > > > CSP: … whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some > feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a > sign. But it follows from our own existence (which is proved by the > occurrence of ignorance and error) that everything which is present to us > is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves. This does not prevent its being > a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a > manifestation both of the sun and of the rain. When we think, then, we > ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign. (EP1:38) > > > > The rainbow is *at once* a sign of realities “without us” *and* a > “phenomenal manifestation of ourselves.” Our perception of it is both > objective and subjective. For a synechist semiotician, then, there should > be no problem seeing an Intentional Interpretant as *also* an Immediate > Interpretant internal to the sign. The “boundaries” between signs, like > those between organisms and their environments, are permeable by nature. > > > > Gary f. >
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