Gary F., List: GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an interpretant of *the dialogue in which he [Peirce] was currently engaged*, which continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text
As a determination of the mind of the *utterer *of the specific sign being analyzed--here the mind of Peirce as the author of the text--the intentional interpretant is *only *an interpretant of the portion of the overall dialogue that came *before *that utterance. It is *not* an interpretant of the text *itself*, nor of the portion of the overall dialogue that came *after *its utterance, including our reading of the text. Instead, it is an *object *of those later signs. As R 1345 states, there is a sense in which all three correlates of "the triad" (i.e., "the representation") are signs (i.e., "representamens") undergoing semiosis. Specifically, a sign that is an *interpretant *of a previous sign then becomes an *object *of a subsequent sign. Again, these discrete correlates are artifacts of phaneroscopic analysis, *entia rationis *abstracted at a hypothetical instant of time from the real inferential process, which is continuous. GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a “dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? According to Peirce, the intentional, effectual, and communicational (or com-) interpretants are determinations of the mind of the utterer, the mind of the interpreter, and the commens (or commind), respectively (EP 2:478). He does not say that the first two interpretants/determinations are "welded" into the third interpretant/determination, he says that the first two (quasi-)minds are "welded" into the third (quasi-)mind in the uttered sign itself (CP 4.551). In other words, the three interpretants/determinations remain distinct, even though the two communicating minds are "fused" into one mind. As a determination of that commind, the cominterpretant is *internal *to the uttered sign, and therefore must be the *immediate *interpretant of that sign. By contrast, the intentional interpretant is a *dynamical *interpretant of a previous sign, while the effectual interpretant is a *dynamical *interpretant of the uttered sign. GF: There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is between object, sign and interpretant. On the contrary, it seems to me that in a communicational context, the intentional interpretant (utterer) antecedes the cominterpretant (sign), which antecedes the effectual interpretant (interpreter)--at least logically, if not temporally. When identifying objects and interpretants, we always need to pay careful attention to the specific sign being analyzed. In the case of a text, any connected determination of the mind of its author is an object (antecedent) of that sign, and any connected determination of the mind of a reader is an interpretant (consequent) of that sign. In the case of a dialogue, any signs internal to it are constituents of that sign itself, any connected signs preceding it are constituents of its object (antecedent), and any connected signs succeeding it are constituents of its interpretant (consequent). At least, that is how I am inclined to see it right now. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 7:59 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon AS, List, > > JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including > both motivation and intention, cannot be *any *interpretant of the sign > that is *currently *being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that > such determinations must pertain somehow to the *object* of that sign, > since they are *antecedent *to it. > > GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an > interpretant of *the dialogue in which he was currently engaged*, which > continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is > *not* an isolated sign. > > CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further > be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at > least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and > although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, > they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, > *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a > necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be > dialogic. (CP 4.551 <https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4551>, 1906) > > GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one > mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a > “dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of > the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? > There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is > between object, sign and interpretant. > > This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted > above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a > binocular > vision <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x19> (both logical and > psychological) of semiosis. (Follow that link for an explanation relevant > to 21st-Century concerns.) Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own > explanation: > > JAS: I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, > as well. The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected > that ... [the] two of them can have one interpretant" (CP 4.550, 1906). > This "co-determined" dynamical interpretant is different for each > interpreter because connecting the same uttered sign with a different > interpreter's mind results in a system that constitutes a different new > sign. > > Gary f. >
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