Gary F, Jon A.S., List, The introduction of psychological considerations into this discussion is, I think, important, posing perhaps some interesting challenges for Peirce's logic.
GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a “dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is between object, sign and interpretant. GF: This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a binocular vision <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x19> (both logical and psychological) of semiosis. . . Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own explanation. That "loose talk" includes, however, this rather telling 'binocular' comment: "Accordingly, it is not merely *a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic*, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. (CP 4.551 <https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4551>, 1906) Yet even here the psychology/logic *distinction* is adumbrated, for dialogic, Peirce writes, is a mere *fact* for psychology, but a *necessity* for logic. That passage in turn reminded me of this remark by Peirce to the effect that approaching research into Speculative Rhetoric his rule of excluding psychological content could be relaxed in the interest of making the last branch of logic as semeiotic "practically useful." CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? CP 2.107 A few years ago Ben Udell and I contributed a short chapter, "Logic is rooted in the social principle, and vice versa" in a volume, C*harles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and Cognition*, edited by Torkild Thellefsen and Ben Sorensen. I had long been intrigued by the juxtaposition of these two snippets of Peirce. . . 1. Logic is rooted in the social principle. CP 2.653 2. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.CP 5.354 . . . and the invitation to contribute a chapter to that volume offered the opportunity to think more deeply on that juxtaposition. I've more to say on the topic of course, but for now I will only remark that Peirce was clear that the work of science was essentially not that of individuals but of communities of common scientific interest over sometimes great lengths of time. But having run out of time as I approach a busy evening, for now I will only leave those two snippets as a kind of intellectual koan for List members to reflect on. Of course they're taken out of context (one can get by reading the CP passages surrounding the two snippets and, perhaps, reading Ben's and my paper). But even as given above, stripped of context, I think they're worth contemplating. Best, Gary R (PS I see Jon has also responded to your post, Gary, but I'd written most of this before it appeared on the List and wanted to send it off today; I'll have to read Jon's post late this evening or tomorrow.) “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 8:59 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon AS, List, > > JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including > both motivation and intention, cannot be *any *interpretant of the sign > that is *currently *being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that > such determinations must pertain somehow to the *object* of that sign, > since they are *antecedent *to it. > > GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an > interpretant of *the dialogue in which he was currently engaged*, which > continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is > *not* an isolated sign. > > CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further > be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at > least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and > although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, > they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, > *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a > necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be > dialogic. (CP 4.551 <https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4551>, 1906) > > GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one > mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a > “dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of > the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant? > There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is > between object, sign and interpretant. > > This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted > above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a > binocular > vision <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x19> (both logical and > psychological) of semiosis. (Follow that link for an explanation relevant > to 21st-Century concerns.) Anyway I think it’s compatible with your own > explanation: > > JAS: I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, > as well. The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected > that ... [the] two of them can have one interpretant" (CP 4.550, 1906). > This "co-determined" dynamical interpretant is different for each > interpreter because connecting the same uttered sign with a different > interpreter's mind results in a system that constitutes a different new > sign. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 25-Oct-21 19:04 > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for > interpreting texts > > > > Gary F., Helmut, List: > > > > Your longer Peirce quotation below brings to mind his famous opening > remarks in "The Fixation of Belief"--"Few persons care to study logic, > because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of > reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's > own ratiocination, and does not extend to that of other men" (CP 5.358, EP > 1:109, 1877). It is also consistent with his observation that we > reconstruct argumentations consisting of discrete premisses and conclusions > only in retrospect, since the real inferential process is continuous (CP > 2.27, 1902). > > > > GF: With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word > “immediate” with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes. > > > > That might be appropriate for psychology, but as applied to the object and > interpretant in speculative grammar, Peirce states repeatedly that > "immediate" simply means "as the sign represents it." This explains why his > late taxonomies for sign classification include trichotomies according to > the mode of *presentation *of the immediate object and interpretant vs. > the mode of *being *of the dynamical object and interpretant (and the > *purpose *of the final/normal interpretant), as well as additional > divisions according to the sign's *dyadic relations *with the dynamical > object and interpretant (and final/normal interpretant) but not with the > immediate object and interpretant. > > > > GF: But what I call the “internal context” of an interpreter reading a > text also includes some motivations or intuitions that will determine *what > gets selected from that “range”* when the dynamic interpretant is > generated. > > > > As I said before, I have had trouble accounting for this undeniable aspect > of real semiosis. Where do the interpreter's established habits of > interpretation come into play, such that the uttered sign determines > his/her mind to *this particular* dynamical interpretant rather than > another one? How does Peirce's theory of signs explain the fact that there > can be (and often are) *different *dynamical interpretants--some of which > are clearly *mis*interpretations--that are determined by the *same *uttered > sign, > which has the *same *immediate and final interpretants? > > > > I suspect that it has something to do with every mind being a sign, as > well. The uttered sign and each interpreter's mind "are so connected that > ... [the] two of them can have one interpretant" (CP 4.550, 1906). This > "co-determined" dynamical interpretant is different for each interpreter > because connecting the same uttered sign with a different interpreter's > mind results in a system that constitutes a different new sign. Does that > seem right? I remain open to other suggestions. > > > > GF: Attentively reading or re-reading the texts themselves in their > original context will normally modify, in some measure, the reader's > internalized understanding of the author – unless the reader is more > motivated to find confirmations of his or her prior understanding. > > > > I strongly agree, which is why I keep returning to Peirce's texts as the > only evidence against which we can inductively evaluate anyone's previous > interpretations of them as abductive/retroductive hypotheses, including my > own. > > > > GF: As for the Intentional Interpretant of a Peirce text, I agree that it > can’t be the Final Interpretant; but it can very well be the *motivation* of > his participation in the dialogue in which he was currently engaged > (remember he considered all thought to be dialogic). It is thus the > Immediate Interpretant of whatever *received* signs he had in mind when > constructing the dynamic interpretant of that stage of the dialogue or > inquiry, that dynamic interpretant being the external sign which is the > text we now have. > > > > According to Peirce's definitions, any *actual *effect of a sign is a > dynamical interpretant, not an immediate interpretant. Within a > communicative context, any "determination of the mind of the interpreter," > as distinguished from a determination of the "commind" into which the minds > of the utterer and interpreter are "fused" or "welded" by the sign itself, > is an "effectual" (dynamical) interpretant. Likewise, any "determination of > the mind of the utterer," including both motivation and intention, cannot > be *any *interpretant of the sign that is *currently *being uttered. > Instead, it still seems to me that such determinations must pertain somehow > to the *object* of that sign, since they are *antecedent *to it. > > > > GF: He really believed that there is such a “thing” as Truth, and I think > his work deserves our respect and close attention because his *prime > *motivation > was to work toward it. > > > > Again, I strongly agree. > > > > HR: There obviously are many interpretants. I hope they can be classified > according to the principle, that firstness has one mode (or part?), > secondness has two modes (or parts?), and thirdness has three. > > > > As I see it, that principle is manifested instead in Peirce's > identification of two objects and three interpretants for each sign, the > result of phaneroscopic analysis as depicted by Robert Marty's podium > diagram. The dynamical object is genuine (2ns), while the immediate object > is degenerate (1ns of 2ns); and the final interpretant is genuine (3ns), > while the dynamical interpretant is degenerate (2ns of 3ns) and the > immediate interpretant is doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns). > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 10:59 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Gary, List > > > > There obviously are many interpretants. I hope they can be classified > according to the principle, that firstness has one mode (or part?), > secondness has two modes (or parts?), and thirdness has three. For example > the dynamic object in my understanding has two modes, resp. consists of two > parts: The conceptual and the material part. Both of course those which > exist independently of, and external to the sign. In the same way, I think, > all the interpretants should be classifiable, otherwise I am out (not off > the list, ha-ha, but off the interpretants-topic. > > > > Best > > Helmut > > 25. Oktober 2021 um 17:07 Uhr > g...@gnusystems.ca > wrote: > > Jerry R, Jon AS, list, > > I’m looking forward to Jon’s paper on the various interpretants, which > will surely bring his usual precision to the subject. I must confess, > though, that my own internal context for thinking about these matters is > weighted toward the psychological perspective on them. Peirce was always > careful not to base his logic, or his semeiotic, on psychological theories > — but his work “betrays” plenty of psychological insight. Jerry’s response > to my earlier post gave added emphasis to this one: “In the first place, > your neighbors are, in a measure, yourself, and in far greater measure > than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe” (EP2:2). > Another one appears here: > > CSP: Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt > that this is largely illusory: they are much less guided by reason, much > more guided by instinct, than they seem to themselves to be; because their > reasonings are prominent in their consciousness, and are attended to, while > their instincts they are hardly aware of, except later when they come to > review their conduct. Even then, they are so immersed in instinct that they > are hardly able to perceive it. (R 410:1–2, c. 1894) > > In our time, cognitive science and social psychology have taken this a > step further with the study of “motivated cognition” and “motivated > reasoning <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivated_reasoning>”, which > shows that our conscious reasoning itself is driven by subconscious > motivations and intentions, or “instincts” as Peirce called them. Jonathan > Haidt encapsulates this in the metaphor of the elephant (instinctive > motivation or intuitive judgment) and the rider (reason): the rider may > think he controls the elephant, but much of our reasoning is a more or less > desperate attempt to rationalize our actions or our intuitive beliefs. And > many of our intuitive beliefs are determined by conformity to the beliefs > of some *group* that we belong to, or wish to belong to. This is one > reason why your neighbors are yourself, as Peirce put it. > > “Motivated reasoning” often leads to the “hypocrisy” that Jerry mentioned, > among other effects on communication between humans. For an obvious > example, just consider a typical campaign speech by any politician. But we > all act this way in matters that we care about, and getting to the Truth > (or Final Interpretant) is not always our prime motivation, even in a > process of inquiry. Often it takes some effort to make it prevail over > other motivations. > > With all this in mind, I have a tendency to associate the word “immediate” > with spontaneous, unconscious or uncontrolled mental processes. When it > comes to Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants, this bias of mine > may be hard to reconcile with Jon’s more purely semiotic definitions. > > JAS: As I see it, the immediate interpretant is always internal to the > *sign*. As I have said before, in the case of a text, it is the range of > *possible *understandings in accordance with the definitions of the words > that comprise it, along with their arrangement in accordance with the > syntax and other rules of grammar for the language in which it is written. > > GF: OK, that fits with the Firstness and indeterminacy of the first in a > triad of interpretants. But what I call the “internal context” of an > interpreter reading a text also includes some motivations or intuitions > that will determine *what gets selected from that “range”* when the > dynamic interpretant is generated. And that selection itself tends to be > pre-conscious or “immediate” in my psychological sense of the word. The > reader may even be subconsciously motivated to *overlook* “the syntax and > other rules of grammar” *and the external context* of the text when > constructing a dynamic interpretant. > > Peirce's theories and applications of those theories, whether directly > quoted, paraphrased or summarized, come out of a context which (for us) is > the whole body of Peirce's extant work. That work came out of an even > larger context, which is the whole body of scientific discourse extending > at least from the time of Aristotle up to Peirce's lifetime. In order to > situate his work in that larger context, Peirce had to internalize it, to > develop an implicit understanding of it which served as the internal > context of his explicit thoughts. Likewise, students of Peirce internalize > an understanding of Peirce which is vastly simplified in comparison with > the totality of Peirce's work. It may include a few familiar quotations > which are represented in memory more or less accurately, but onboard memory > is limited. Attentively reading or re-reading the texts themselves in their > original context will normally modify, in some measure, the reader's > internalized understanding of the author – unless the reader is more > motivated to find confirmations > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias> of his or her prior > understanding. > > As for the Intentional Interpretant of a Peirce text, I agree that it > can’t be the Final Interpretant; but it can very well be the *motivation* > of his participation in the dialogue in which he was currently engaged > (remember he considered all thought to be dialogic). It is thus the > Immediate Interpretant of whatever *received* signs he had in mind when > constructing the dynamic interpretant of that stage of the dialogue or > inquiry, that dynamic interpretant being the external sign which is the > text we now have. All *intentions* are future-oriented, and that dynamic > interpretant was his way of *aiming at* the Final Interpretant of the > whole dialogue which included his text. He really believed that there is > such a “thing” as Truth, and I think his work deserves our respect and > close attention because his *prime* motivation was to work toward it. > > Gary f. > > } A journey of a thousand miles starts under one's feet. [*Tao Te Ching* > 64 (Feng/English) { > > https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
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