Jon, Jack, John Shook, List, I also concur with John Shook's critique of Jack's latest argumentation. While Jon's message here should at least put to rest what Peirce's position is in this matter (although it no doubt won't), his succinct summary of that position (especially when taken along with his other posts on this topic in the past few days) is worth studying, perhaps especially beginning with this snippet:
JAS: "[No] one is disputing that those external things exist *independently of* those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object. . ." A concise summary of Peirce's view on the thing in itself can be found at the very top of Robert Burch's 2021 Supplement to Charles Sanders Peirce <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/index.html>, "Peirce's View of the Relationship Between His Own Work and German Idealism" in SEP. To me his article suggests the philosophical importance of just the discussion that's been going on here. Jon has already provided most if not all of these quotations, but I think that it's helpful to see them together. Peirce’s own ultimate philosophical position, as claimed by his own self-description of his most mature thinking, had much in common with the transcendental idealism of Kant. In 1905, for example, Peirce writes: “The present writer [i.e. Peirce himself] was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; … .” Again in 1905, in connection with a series of four papers of 1905 and 1906 published in *The Monist* in connection with pragmaticism, Kantianism, and common-sensism, Peirce wrote in the voice of the pragmatist: “Kant (whom I *more* than admire), is nothing but a somewhat confused pragmatist.” (*CP*, 5.525) Again, “… in half a dozen ways the *Ding an sich* has been proved to be nonsensical.” (*CP*, 5.525) Again, “The *Ding an sich*, however, can neither be indicated nor found. Consequently, no proposition can refer to it, and nothing true or false can be predicated of it. Therefore, all reference to it must be thrown out as meaningless surplusage.” (*CP*, 5.525) Some here may find Burch's first sentence above somewhat overstated, others perhaps will find it problematic given Peirce's extreme realism. See, for example: https://www.academia.edu/12635422/Peirces_Extreme_Realism_and_Supermultitudinous_Conception_of_Continuity ) But it seems to me that there is an undeniable correspondence between their philosophies. Nonetheless, Peirce, who sees Kant as perhaps a proto-pragmatist (perhaps a kinder expression than his 'confused pragmatist'), nonetheless absolutely rejects Kant's notion of a *thing in itself*. Best, Gary R On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 6:09 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jack, List: > > John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two > different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of > object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. > However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them > two different *representations *of object 1. Nevertheless, their > resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might > very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair." > > Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other > representations are *identical to* the external things being perceived, > cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those > external things exist *independently of* those perceptions, cognitions, > or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor > does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object > determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), > and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal > effect) is the normative measure of representational "success." > > I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object > generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much > 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and > helpful. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY < > jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote: > >> edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is >> sound (that's not the purpose here). >> >> interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what >> I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce >> and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics >> when it comes to general terminology. >> >> best >> >> jack >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> >> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> >> *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM >> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Peirce-L < >> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; robert >> marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>; Edwina Taborsky < >> edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The >> Thing In Itself) >> >> John, Jon, list, >> >> We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as >> to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant). >> >> Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this: >> >> [image: User]JC: >> Premise 1: An object exists. >> Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist. >> Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object >> 1) differently due to subjectivity. >> Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the >> perceiving objects. >> Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as >> they are copies. what is the conclusion? >> ChatGPT >> >> Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be: >> >> Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving >> objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their >> perceptions. >> >> This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the >> distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. >> It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or >> experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it >> exists independently of perception. >> I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there >> by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough. >> >> Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in >> itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative >> which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the >> structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd >> like @Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> to weigh in (not on >> knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say >> no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left >> out for now I think). >> >> I just remember @robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> and @Edwina >> Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> (among others) telling me of such >> things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the >> mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it >> from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in >> itself's in(cognizablility). >> >> Best >> >> Jack >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
