As Kant himself said, Hume's critique of causality awakened him from his "dogmatic slumber" and inspired his desire to establish an "a priori" foundation for causality. That was Kan't fundamental error. The progress of science for the past two centuries provides overwhelming evidence for (a) the existence of laws of nature and (b) the success of the experimental methods in discovering closer and closer approximations to those laws. There are many laws for which the known approximations are inadequate, but there is no reason for assuming that any of them are inherently unknowable.
John, But Hume never doubted the laws of nature, nor did Kant. Hume doubted that the laws were apriori and Kant sought to demonstrate that they were precisely that. That is Hume's fork, analytic, in a nutshell. What my thesis, if nothing else, demonstrates, is that whether we assume apriori capacity for what Saussure called Langue or Peirce would just label semeiosis, or assume it aposteriori, it is nonetheless true that the apriori remains proven. Its proof is such that you cannot say "we shall one day know it" for that precludes the very definition of it. As for the Apriori/Aposterori: I find it pointless. In the categorical wherein Hume and Kant are discussing it partially. Independent of - experience or prior to - experience. This is not what I am talking about: I see no such evidence for any such apriori which is entirely independent of experience, that, to me, seems nonsensical (even Abduction in Peirce, about as apriori as Peirce will go, is steeped in the experiential). What I am about is the delimitation of the proper categorical "beyond" apriori. That which is necessarily within and beyond: within all experience, but beyond all possible cognition insofar as it is within. That is the True Kantian price. Poverty of Stimulus tells me that we make universal experiential "leaps" as a matter of banal cognitive growth. But is it apriori? Not really. One is inculcated to structures, and one plays with them, mentally - internally as it were - and thus produces the very errors which constitute the Chomksyean PoS. The True Apriori is that which = "beyond". There is no possible experience which can approximate or know it. It is properly metaphysical. JFS: As for the logic, I suggest that you replace all the complexity below with just two predicates: Observable(x) and HasPropery(x,y). For all the things below, there is no need to make define all those terms and write all those axioms. With just these two predicates, you can translate the following sentence to the logical notation of your choice: 1. For any object x, If x is observable and x has some property y, science will eventually be able to observe y. This is the Peircean ideal: that infinite inquiry will eventually resolve that which Pure Transcendental reason - Logic, now - tells us cannot be resolved. The ding-an-sich is such that it simply cannot be observed: semiosis works aposteriori with respect to the apriori which Kant is tracing. Independent of experience, as apriori, is that which implies a logical or empirical fact which stands regardless of what experience may follow. The only sense in which I draw upon this is categorical: that is, no experience will overturn the properly Kantian categorical of the thing in itself/noumenal which is not so much independent of what occurs but is beyond all possible means of observation/cognition with respect to all possible means of empirical observation. This, then, is my task. As for the logic: X is not observable... its properties cannot be discovered except via differential confirmation. That's where we are at loggerheads. I say it is apriori - in that strict sense - of will never be overturned - most Peirceans will disagree. Thus, the cookie crumbles (and I expect a shower of scorn and some acceptance within the already converted). JFS: There is zero evidence that any particular feature of any observable object will forever be unknowable. Yes, but these are physical objects. I am speaking - writing - about the metaphysical which underlies the entire physical endeavor. There is no possible inquiry wherein humans' sensate capacity can tell us what it is to be an ant. Not a joke, but rather serious insofar as metaphysical claims go. Now, as to what an ant experiences - science may well flatter itself that it can know, from a human sensate base, such things, but all of this is an illusion: neither logically nor scientifically possible. The best way - I know now - to demonstrate this thesis (a month out) is to demonstrate precisely why Peirce's semeiotic (signs-in-themselves; objects-in-themselves; genuine/degenerate categories, and so on - also meaningless, if you seriously ignore the thing in itself or dispatch it as "nonsense": for what then is an object-in-itself, the external object, but "reality" in Peircean idiom which fronts for a Kantian categorical which Peirce flatly denies?) - to demonstrate the functionality/precission by which semiosis operates with the Kantian and then without it and assess the clarity thereafter. I do take your notes seriously - I just know the divide won't be reconciled between Peirce and Kant (not by my thesis - but others may well outdo me, I expect they will). Jack ________________________________ From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Sent: Monday, June 26, 2023 5:06 AM To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [EXTERNAL] The history of science and Kant's mistaken response to Hume *Warning* This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe. Jack, My criticisms have nothing to do with logic, yours or anybody else's. They are based solely on the history of science from the 18th century (Hume and Kant) to the enormous progress in the late 19th c. and the revolutionary developments in the 20th and 21st. I'm cc'ing note to Peirce List, since it's important to emphasize this issue in a broader forum. As Kant himself said, Hume's critique of causality awakened him from his "dogmatic slumber" and inspired his desire to establish an "a priori" foundation for causality. That was Kan't fundamental error. The progress of science for the past two centuries provides overwhelming evidence for (a) the existence of laws of nature and (b) the success of the experimental methods in discovering closer and closer approximations to those laws. There are many laws for which the known approximations are inadequate, but there is no reason for assuming that any of them are inherently unknowable. As for the logic, I suggest that you replace all the complexity below with just two predicates: Observable(x) and HasPropery(x,y). For all the things below, there is no need to make define all those terms and write all those axioms. With just these two predicates, you can translate the following sentence to the logical notation of your choice: 1. For any object x, If x is observable and x has some property y, science will eventually be able to observe y. This is, in essence, Peirce's belief in the progress of science. And the developments in the sciences in the past century have provided abundant evidence for that belief. There is zero evidence that any particular feature of any observable object will forever be unknowable. Suggestion: There is no reason why you need to discard your research on these issues or the 58 pages that you have already written for the thesis. You can just begin with sentence #1, discuss the reasons why Hume and Kant may have not realized its importance, show why scientists today believe it, and why Peirce was justified in using that assumption to reject Kant's attempt to answer Hume. Please show this note to your thesis adviser, and let us the response. John _______________________________________________________ From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> Hi John, Apologies for formatting, but the thesis statements are consistent in a variety of logics. Can we know an ant's experience of concrete? No. But we do know that it has an experience, beyond all infinite human inquiry, for that refers to human sensate capacity, with an element, or elemental quality which is not as we experience it. And no relational schema - semeiotic - can understand that without what Kant calls "ding an sich". Below are some easy ways of understanding it: Ontological Relata 1 Let's define the following predicates: * SelfExistence(S): Predicate indicating the existence of the self. * ThingExistence(T): Predicate indicating the existence of things. * ExistWith(Self, Thing): Predicate indicating the relationship between the self and things, denoting that the self exists with the thing. * Definition(Self, Thing): Predicate indicating that the existence with things defines the self or the things. 1. Revised predicate structure: ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T) Ontological Relata 2: Let's define the following predicates: * SelfExistence(S): Predicate indicating the existence of the self. * ThingExistence(T): Predicate indicating the existence of things. * ExistWith(S, T): Predicate indicating the relationship between the self and things, denoting that the self exists with the thing. * Essence(Self): Predicate indicating the essence of the self. * Essence(Thing): Predicate indicating the essence of things. 1. Revised predicate structure: ∀S ∃T ∃E: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ ¬Essence(S) ∧ ¬Essence(T) ∧ (E ∈ S) ∧ (E ∈ T) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T)) Decision Tree Does Self Exist? / \ Yes* \ *Descartes: Cogito / \ Does Self exist with 'things'? / \ \ Yes* No \ *HUME CONTIGUITY/FACT/FEELING/IDEAS. / \ \ Yes Terminate \ / \ Is the self’s existence with things the definition of the self, in itself, or the things with which it exists? / \ \ Yes* No** GODEL: YES/NO.*** (Truth which breaks the formal decision tree system: consubstantial self, cannot be binary). / \ \ Terminal \ \ 1. ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T) \ No (Godel (not true), but : \ Godelresolved: 1. ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧ TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T)) Differentially: To express the given decision tree in a consistent logic and incorporate paraconsistent logic at the specified point, we can modify the formulation as follows: 1. Does Self Exist? * Yes: * Does Self exist with 'things'? * Yes: Proceed to Step 3 * No: Terminate 2. Does Self exist with 'things'? * Yes: Proceed to Step 3 * No: Terminate 3. Is the self's existence with things the definition of the self or the things with which it exists? * Yes*: Proceed to Step 4 * No**: Proceed to Step 5 4. Terminal: ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T) 5. Yes/No***: At this point, the decision tree breaks into paraconsistent logic, allowing for the handling of contradictory options. We retain the ontological form and proceed with the following formulation: 6. No Godel (not true), but: * Godelresolved: ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧ TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T)) In this modified formulation, the decision tree remains consistent until Step 5, where paraconsistent logic is introduced to handle contradictory options. Step 4 represents the ontological form in consistent logic, while Step 6 formalizes the ontological assertions within paraconsistent logic while retaining the ontological structure. Peirce's semeiotic is great but he is wrong to say the "ding an sich" is meaningless. I can explain Godel a hundred different ways by the necessary acceptance of it. I accomodate Godel and then explain, elsewhere, the entire premise of incompleteness within the Kantian framework and beyond it. It is a KnownIncognizable (we know such a thing, in itself, exists, but cannot represent or feel/think it as it is in itself). This is just the now easily proven truth (though the argument will take longer). My thesis advisor has access to enormous amounts of data which aren't shared here and knows the consistency is perfect (though that much of my logical formulation will alter to eliminate natural language ambiguity and various small errors which you note). Best Jack
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