As Kant himself said, Hume's critique of causality awakened him from his
"dogmatic slumber" and inspired his desire to establish an "a priori"
foundation for causality. That was Kan't fundamental error. The progress of
science for the past two centuries provides overwhelming evidence for (a) the
existence of laws of nature and (b) the success of the experimental methods in
discovering closer and closer approximations to those laws. There are many laws
for which the known approximations are inadequate, but there is no reason for
assuming that any of them are inherently unknowable.
John,
But Hume never doubted the laws of nature, nor did Kant. Hume doubted that the
laws were apriori and Kant sought to demonstrate that they were precisely that.
That is Hume's fork, analytic, in a nutshell. What my thesis, if nothing else,
demonstrates, is that whether we assume apriori capacity for what Saussure
called Langue or Peirce would just label semeiosis, or assume it aposteriori,
it is nonetheless true that the apriori remains proven. Its proof is such that
you cannot say "we shall one day know it" for that precludes the very
definition of it.
As for the Apriori/Aposterori: I find it pointless. In the categorical wherein
Hume and Kant are discussing it partially. Independent of - experience or prior
to - experience. This is not what I am talking about: I see no such evidence
for any such apriori which is entirely independent of experience, that, to me,
seems nonsensical (even Abduction in Peirce, about as apriori as Peirce will
go, is steeped in the experiential). What I am about is the delimitation of the
proper categorical "beyond" apriori. That which is necessarily within and
beyond: within all experience, but beyond all possible cognition insofar as it
is within. That is the True Kantian price.
Poverty of Stimulus tells me that we make universal experiential "leaps" as a
matter of banal cognitive growth. But is it apriori? Not really. One is
inculcated to structures, and one plays with them, mentally - internally as it
were - and thus produces the very errors which constitute the Chomksyean PoS.
The True Apriori is that which = "beyond". There is no possible experience
which can approximate or know it. It is properly metaphysical.
JFS: As for the logic, I suggest that you replace all the complexity below with
just two predicates: Observable(x) and HasPropery(x,y). For all the things
below, there is no need to make define all those terms and write all those
axioms. With just these two predicates, you can translate the following
sentence to the logical notation of your choice:
1. For any object x, If x is observable and x has some property y, science
will eventually be able to observe y.
This is the Peircean ideal: that infinite inquiry will eventually resolve that
which Pure Transcendental reason - Logic, now - tells us cannot be resolved.
The ding-an-sich is such that it simply cannot be observed: semiosis works
aposteriori with respect to the apriori which Kant is tracing.
Independent of experience, as apriori, is that which implies a logical or
empirical fact which stands regardless of what experience may follow. The only
sense in which I draw upon this is categorical: that is, no experience will
overturn the properly Kantian categorical of the thing in itself/noumenal which
is not so much independent of what occurs but is beyond all possible means of
observation/cognition with respect to all possible means of empirical
observation. This, then, is my task.
As for the logic: X is not observable... its properties cannot be discovered
except via differential confirmation. That's where we are at loggerheads. I say
it is apriori - in that strict sense - of will never be overturned - most
Peirceans will disagree. Thus, the cookie crumbles (and I expect a shower of
scorn and some acceptance within the already converted).
JFS: There is zero evidence that any particular feature of any observable
object will forever be unknowable.
Yes, but these are physical objects. I am speaking - writing - about the
metaphysical which underlies the entire physical endeavor. There is no possible
inquiry wherein humans' sensate capacity can tell us what it is to be an ant.
Not a joke, but rather serious insofar as metaphysical claims go. Now, as to
what an ant experiences - science may well flatter itself that it can know,
from a human sensate base, such things, but all of this is an illusion: neither
logically nor scientifically possible.
The best way - I know now - to demonstrate this thesis (a month out) is to
demonstrate precisely why Peirce's semeiotic (signs-in-themselves;
objects-in-themselves; genuine/degenerate categories, and so on - also
meaningless, if you seriously ignore the thing in itself or dispatch it as
"nonsense": for what then is an object-in-itself, the external object, but
"reality" in Peircean idiom which fronts for a Kantian categorical which Peirce
flatly denies?) - to demonstrate the functionality/precission by which
semiosis operates with the Kantian and then without it and assess the clarity
thereafter.
I do take your notes seriously - I just know the divide won't be reconciled
between Peirce and Kant (not by my thesis - but others may well outdo me, I
expect they will).
Jack
________________________________
From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Monday, June 26, 2023 5:06 AM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] The history of science and Kant's mistaken response to Hume
*Warning*
This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not
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Jack,
My criticisms have nothing to do with logic, yours or anybody else's. They are
based solely on the history of science from the 18th century (Hume and Kant) to
the enormous progress in the late 19th c. and the revolutionary developments in
the 20th and 21st. I'm cc'ing note to Peirce List, since it's important to
emphasize this issue in a broader forum.
As Kant himself said, Hume's critique of causality awakened him from his
"dogmatic slumber" and inspired his desire to establish an "a priori"
foundation for causality. That was Kan't fundamental error. The progress of
science for the past two centuries provides overwhelming evidence for (a) the
existence of laws of nature and (b) the success of the experimental methods in
discovering closer and closer approximations to those laws. There are many
laws for which the known approximations are inadequate, but there is no reason
for assuming that any of them are inherently unknowable.
As for the logic, I suggest that you replace all the complexity below with just
two predicates: Observable(x) and HasPropery(x,y). For all the things below,
there is no need to make define all those terms and write all those axioms.
With just these two predicates, you can translate the following sentence to the
logical notation of your choice:
1. For any object x, If x is observable and x has some property y, science
will eventually be able to observe y.
This is, in essence, Peirce's belief in the progress of science. And the
developments in the sciences in the past century have provided abundant
evidence for that belief. There is zero evidence that any particular feature
of any observable object will forever be unknowable.
Suggestion: There is no reason why you need to discard your research on these
issues or the 58 pages that you have already written for the thesis. You can
just begin with sentence #1, discuss the reasons why Hume and Kant may have not
realized its importance, show why scientists today believe it, and why Peirce
was justified in using that assumption to reject Kant's attempt to answer Hume.
Please show this note to your thesis adviser, and let us the response.
John
_______________________________________________________
From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Hi John,
Apologies for formatting, but the thesis statements are consistent in a variety
of logics. Can we know an ant's experience of concrete? No.
But we do know that it has an experience, beyond all infinite human inquiry,
for that refers to human sensate capacity, with an element, or elemental
quality which is not as we experience it. And no relational schema - semeiotic
- can understand that without what Kant calls "ding an sich".
Below are some easy ways of understanding it:
Ontological Relata 1
Let's define the following predicates:
* SelfExistence(S): Predicate indicating the existence of the self.
* ThingExistence(T): Predicate indicating the existence of things.
* ExistWith(Self, Thing): Predicate indicating the relationship between the
self and things, denoting that the self exists with the thing.
* Definition(Self, Thing): Predicate indicating that the existence with
things defines the self or the things.
1. Revised predicate structure:
∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T)
Ontological Relata 2:
Let's define the following predicates:
* SelfExistence(S): Predicate indicating the existence of the self.
* ThingExistence(T): Predicate indicating the existence of things.
* ExistWith(S, T): Predicate indicating the relationship between the self
and things, denoting that the self exists with the thing.
* Essence(Self): Predicate indicating the essence of the self.
* Essence(Thing): Predicate indicating the essence of things.
1. Revised predicate structure:
∀S ∃T ∃E: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧ ¬Essence(S)
∧ ¬Essence(T) ∧ (E ∈ S) ∧ (E ∈ T) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T))
Decision Tree
Does Self Exist?
/ \
Yes* \ *Descartes: Cogito
/ \
Does Self exist with 'things'?
/ \ \
Yes* No \ *HUME CONTIGUITY/FACT/FEELING/IDEAS.
/ \ \
Yes Terminate \
/ \
Is the self’s existence with things the definition of the self, in itself, or
the things with which it exists?
/ \ \
Yes* No** GODEL: YES/NO.*** (Truth which breaks the formal decision tree
system: consubstantial self, cannot be binary).
/ \ \
Terminal \
\
1. ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T)
\
No (Godel (not
true), but :
\
Godelresolved:
1. ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S, T) ∧
Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧ TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E
∉ ExistWith(S, T))
Differentially:
To express the given decision tree in a consistent logic and incorporate
paraconsistent logic at the specified point, we can modify the formulation as
follows:
1. Does Self Exist?
* Yes:
*
Does Self exist with 'things'?
* Yes: Proceed to Step 3
* No: Terminate
2. Does Self exist with 'things'?
* Yes: Proceed to Step 3
* No: Terminate
3. Is the self's existence with things the definition of the self or the
things with which it exists?
* Yes*: Proceed to Step 4
* No**: Proceed to Step 5
4. Terminal: ∀S ∃T ∃D: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧ ExistWith(S,
T) ∧ Definition(S, T) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ S) ∧ (Definition(S, T) ∉ T)
5. Yes/No***: At this point, the decision tree breaks into paraconsistent
logic, allowing for the handling of contradictory options. We retain the
ontological form and proceed with the following formulation:
6. No Godel (not true), but:
* Godelresolved: ∀S ∃T ∃E ∃R: SelfExistence(S) ∧ ThingExistence(T) ∧
ExistWith(S, T) ∧ Essence(E) ∧ BeyondInteraction(E) ∧ Knowable(E) ∧
TranscendentalReason(R) ∧ (E ∉ ExistWith(S, T))
In this modified formulation, the decision tree remains consistent until Step
5, where paraconsistent logic is introduced to handle contradictory options.
Step 4 represents the ontological form in consistent logic, while Step 6
formalizes the ontological assertions within paraconsistent logic while
retaining the ontological structure.
Peirce's semeiotic is great but he is wrong to say the "ding an sich" is
meaningless. I can explain Godel a hundred different ways by the necessary
acceptance of it. I accomodate Godel and then explain, elsewhere, the entire
premise of incompleteness within the Kantian framework and beyond it. It is a
KnownIncognizable (we know such a thing, in itself, exists, but cannot
represent or feel/think it as it is in itself). This is just the now easily
proven truth (though the argument will take longer).
My thesis advisor has access to enormous amounts of data which aren't shared
here and knows the consistency is perfect (though that much of my logical
formulation will alter to eliminate natural language ambiguity and various
small errors which you note).
Best
Jack
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