List I am unaware of anyone who "confines semiosis to the biological realm”!! Never heard of such a thing! But, of course, there are many who confine semiosis to the human mind realm - and many who reject the operation of semiosis within the physicochemical realms.
As I’ve said - my point is that there are many researchers who are actually examining the semiotic function within non-human realms - but are not using Peircean terms. The difficulty, as I’ve said, of accessing and deciphering the Peircean texts - as well as the isolationism of the Peircean community - has, I think, led to this separation. I think it would be instructive for Peirceans to actually explore the work being done in biological, physico-chemical and AI areas and see how- using different terms from Peirce - there are strong correlations to Peirce in their arguments. The additional emphasis in their work on material, concrete examples, is, I feel, extremely helpful in moving Peircean analysis from the purely argumentative and hypothetical into the pragmatic realism that, after all, was Peirce’s basic agenda. Edwina > On Feb 11, 2024, at 3:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Gary, List: > > It has been several years since I read Natural Propositions, so I will not be > able to comment on it specifically, although Stjernfelt's more recent book > includes examples like fireflies glowing and bees dancing. What I can say is > that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines semiosis to the biological > realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the entire universe is "a vast > representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if it is not composed > exclusively of signs." I take the additional step, fully consistent with his > overarching synechism though never explicitly expressed in his writings, of > conceiving it as a semiosic continuum--an ongoing inferential process whose > parts are likewise signs, but indefinite unless and until they are > deliberately marked off for a purpose. The analysis of propositions is one > such purpose; after all ... > > CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a > proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The > purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other > signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which > would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may > use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c. 1901) > > If the universe consists entirely of signs, and the purpose of every sign is > to express fact, and a fact is an element of the universe itself that has the > structure of a proposition, then the importance of understanding the > structure of a proposition should be obvious. Moreover ... > > CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a > nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one > individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of > reality. A fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that > it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," > here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP > 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906) > > Every asserted proposition purports to represent a fact prescinded from > reality as a whole, directly corresponding to a scribed Existential Graph on > the otherwise blank sheet that represents the entire continuum of true > propositions within the universe of discourse. In both cases, the whole is > ontologically prior to its parts--reality is not built up of discrete facts > and the sheet of assertion is not built up of discrete EGs, any more than an > argument is built up of discrete propositions. > > CSP: [A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built > up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ... > Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact > Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or ens > rationis), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of > small range, or else (what is the better view), are entia rationis (i.e. > fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented for > the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise, Thought > (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) > cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but inferential > process; and propositions are either roughly described states of > Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the > description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second > order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R 295, > 1906) > > The upshot is that discrete things and their dyadic reactions, as well as > monadic qualities and their inherence in discrete things, are degenerate > outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis--"The one intelligible theory of > the universe is that of objective idealism," but as a process ontology > instead of a substance ontology in which "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25, EP > 1:293, 1891). This is just what we would expect in accordance with Peirce's > architectonic classification of the sciences. > > CSP: Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of > logical [i.e., semeiotic] principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as > truths of being. Accordingly, it is to be assumed that the universe has an > explanation, the function of which, like that of every logical explanation, > is to unify its observed variety. It follows that the root of all being is > One; and so far as different subjects have a common character they partake of > an identical being. (CP 1.487, c. 1896) > > The common character that all subjects of propositions have is > intelligibility, that is, being representable--capable of serving as > dynamical objects of general signs by virtue of belonging to one of the three > Universes of Experience--and thus likewise being of the nature of a sign, > since "Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative > nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). Whenever we prescind such subjects from the > continuous flow of semiosis as if they were individual constituents of the > universe, we also need to account for their general logical relations with > each other, and that is where pure/continuous predicates come into play. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 11:23 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com > <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> Jon, List, >> >> Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify >> Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted: >> >> JAS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the indexical >> nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must >> already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and >> leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the iconic part of the >> proposition. >> >> Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move >> of Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural >> Propositions." In his extraordinary book, Natural Propositions: The >> Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at his >> word, so to speak, and generalizes the meaning of proposition well beyond >> the logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which biosemioticians >> naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know what lasting impact >> -- if any -- his book has had in that community since, as far as I can tell, >> it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking. This antipathy was >> suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering at Roosevelt >> University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius Romanini to read a >> paper he himself could not deliver since officials refused to allow him to >> board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his Italian, rather than his >> Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several Peircean-inspired >> biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at every turn. >> >> Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in Natural Propositions that Peirce's >> generalization of the logical concept of proposition to dicisign as to >> include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of the greatest >> consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our specie's >> intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not necessarily >> require human language, thought, and logic -- not human consciousness -- >> whatsoever. >> >> I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable >> interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most >> interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the >> generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into >> the natural world. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary Richmond > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
