List I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?.
And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we see, of course, the same format Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, not within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad. And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. Edwina > On Apr 4, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > List: > > While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing > that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign > classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign > classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more > plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the > possibility of misinterpretations. > > Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor > "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible > can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by > nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant > divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, > 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final > interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," > respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following > restrictions. > A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a > sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; > i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only > feelings. > Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, > can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is > necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or > possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally > produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might > instead produce exertions or feelings. > A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, > must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of > presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can > only present those effects as abstract qualities. > Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is > necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of > presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a > categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that > actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, > although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract > qualities. > Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic > percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic > percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, > categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is > misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a > different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the > direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to > possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always > involves 1ns. > > By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would > require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to > existent to necessitant--which does not make sense since 2ns cannot be built > up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final > interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) > actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants > instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce > self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical > interpretants. > > Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy > according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant > is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds > of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity > that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The > phemic sheet is a strictly logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined > to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all > three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy > for the immediate interpretant must come after the one for the dynamical > interpretant--if it were the other way around, then only relative > propositions with at least two lines of identity could be scribed on the > phemic sheet, which is obviously not the case. > > That said, since the trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its final > interpretant (name/proposition/argument or seme/pheme/delome) presumably > comes after all three trichotomies for the interpretants themselves, > regardless of which way we arrange them, only categorical and relative signs > can be propositions (phemes). Hypothetic signs can only be names (semes), > which would be scribed on the phemic sheet without any attached lines of > identity, if that were allowed in Beta EGs--the interpretant as represented > by the sign is presented as a possible, not an existent. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> List: >> >> It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most >> important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final >> interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant >> (SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly >> imply this. In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly >> supports my position. >> >> TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition >> of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is >> present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce >> gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: >> ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., >> the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic >> Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: >> 482, 1908). >> >> Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being >> "explicit." It is the interpretant that is right there in the sign itself, >> which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classification is a >> division according to its mode of presentation. >> >> CSP as quoted by TJ: The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result >> to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently >> considered ... The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. >> (SS 111, 1909) >> >> Here the final interpretant is unambiguously identified as the "destined" >> interpretant, i.e., the "destinate" interpretant. >> >> CSP as quoted by TJ: But we must note that there is certainly a third kind >> of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that >> which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if >> consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion >> were reached. (EP 2:496, 1909) >> >> As Peirce says elsewhere, "No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, >> it is assumed that he will end in one predestinated belief" (CP 7.327, >> 1873). Also, "No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of >> other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to >> escape the predestinate opinion" (CP 5.407, 1878). Also, "The logician >> maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that >> of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain predestinate conclusions >> which are the same for all men" (CP 3.161, 1880). Also, "I call 'truth' the >> predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which would >> ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that >> particular direction" (EP 2:457, 1911). Since the "ultimate opinion" is the >> "predestinate opinion," the final interpretant is likewise the "destinate" >> interpretant. >> >> TJ: JAS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic >> object is genuine and the immediate degenerate ... >> >> Indeed, Peirce's recognition around 1904 that each sign has two objects and >> three interpretants is the result of phaneroscopic analysis--within the >> genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, the >> sign is the first and simplest correlate, the object is the second correlate >> of middling complexity, and the interpretant is the third and most complex >> correlate (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903). Accordingly, the dynamical object >> is the genuine object, as it is in itself, independent of the sign; and the >> immediate object is the degenerate object, as it is represented by the sign. >> >> TJ: It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in >> a classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is >> defined to be present. >> >> It is perfectly logical in a classification of signs, because the three >> correlates of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating are the >> genuine correlates--the sign itself, its dynamical object, and its final >> interpretant. On the other hand, there is only a degenerate triadic relation >> between the sign, its dynamical object, and its dynamical interpretant--it >> is reducible to the sign's genuine dyadic relations with its dynamical >> object/interpretant, each of which has its own trichotomy; and there are >> only degenerate dyadic relations between the sign and its immediate >> object/interpretant, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for >> these relations. Moreover, all six discrete correlates are entia >> rationis--artifacts of analysis prescinded from the real and continuous >> process of semiosis. >> >> TJ: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which >> the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) >> might take place, surely not after the final interpretant. >> >> Again, this is a matter of logical ordering for the classification of signs, >> not causal/temporal sequence within the process of semiosis. The final >> interpretant is not the last interpretant in a series of dynamical >> interpretants--recall that in 1906, "I confess that my own conception of >> this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536). >> Instead, it is the normative interpretant, hence "normal interpretant" in >> some places--the dynamical interpretant that the sign would produce under >> ideal circumstances. It is "final" in the sense of a final cause, "that >> toward which the actual [dynamical interpretant] tends," not an efficient >> cause that deterministically necessitates the dynamical interpretant. >> >> TJ: There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant determines the >> sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the exponent). >> >> All three interpretants of a linguistic sign are aspects of its meaning. The >> immediate interpretant is the range of what it possibly could mean in >> accordance with its constituent word definitions and grammatical syntax, the >> dynamical interpretant is what it actually does mean to any one interpreter >> of it, and the final interpretant is what it necessarily would mean under >> ideal circumstances, including after infinite investigation by an infinite >> community. >> >> TJ: And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the degree of >> congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the utterer and the >> actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii >> is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign >> and If a future tendency) surely suggest that the only possibility of >> misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is >> not congruent with the intended interpretation. >> >> On the contrary, a sign is mis-uttered to the extent that its immediate >> interpretant deviates from the utterer's intention, while it is >> mis-interpreted to the extent that a dynamical interpretant of it deviates >> from its final (normative) interpretant. We are not always completely >> successful in accurately conveying our intentions with the signs that we >> utter, so their final interpretants are not strictly dictated by those >> intentions. "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to >> the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the >> Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of that >> sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). As William Abraham nicely puts it, "If meaning >> has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in >> achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author >> intended" >> (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=asburyjournal, >> p. 20). >> >> TJ: To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) >> displaying 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and >> 1908, of which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by >> JS - all the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final >> interpretants. >> >> I do not have the book, but Peirce's late taxonomies are almost always >> arranged in phaneroscopic order--from the simplest correlate (sign) to the >> most complex correlate (interpretant); for each correlate, from the most >> degenerate (immediate) to the genuine; for each dyadic relation, coming >> right after its second correlate; and for the genuine triadic relation, >> coming last. He never provided a typology with all ten trichotomies arranged >> in their proper logical order for sign classification--if he had done so, >> then there would obviously be no room for debate about what he had in mind. >> Instead, we have only a few partial orderings--S, S-Od, S-If (1903); S-If, >> S-Id (1904); and Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii (1908), taking destinate=final and >> explicit=immediate. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 2:46 AM Anthony Jappy <anthony.ja...@gmail.com >> <mailto:anthony.ja...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> List, >>> >>> I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the >>> three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper >>> published in Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text >>> mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his >>> posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless >>> will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much >>> greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the >>> interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS >>> and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are >>> sufficient to support my position. First this statement: >>> >>> ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical >>> determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal >>> determination within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate >>> (If) determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly >>> degenerate correlate (Ii)’. (JS) >>> >>> Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably: >>> >>> 1) That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical >>> (causal, temporal). As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought >>> and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern >>> of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination >>> out in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The >>> action of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and >>> the interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds >>> of insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying >>> signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought >>> in action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there >>> is no difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which >>> the empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the >>> six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the >>> process of semiosis. >>> 2) That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within >>> the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly >>> degenerate). If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, >>> for example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically >>> within each interpretant division, following the universe distinction from >>> least to most complex within the possible, existent and necessitant >>> universe hierarchy. Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to >>> point out that there are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories >>> suggest them, and the suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ >>> (R318: 251, 1907), there is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are >>> hierarchically organized; they simply differ in complexity. JS’s >>> phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic object is >>> genuine and the immediate degenerate, which is surely not the case. >>> >>> What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, >>> opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources. >>> >>> I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons >>> (there are others): >>> >>> · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear >>> definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means >>> that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to >>> descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the >>> interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the >>> Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in >>> the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the >>> mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). >>> >>> It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a >>> classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is >>> defined to be present. >>> >>> · As for the possibility of misinterpretation, consider the >>> descriptions Peirce gives LW in 1909 of his three interpretants: >>> >>> ‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have >>> its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My Dynamical >>> Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and >>> is different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is >>> the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to >>> come if the sign is sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is >>> an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is >>> a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the >>> actual tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909) >>> >>> ...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it >>> immediately expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added) >>> >>> And of the final interpretant (If) he says this: >>> >>> That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached), >>> interpretant (final I mean, in the logical sense of attaining the purpose, >>> is also final in the sense of bringing the series of translations [to a >>> stop] for the obvious reason that it is not itself a sign) is to be >>> regarded as the ultimate signification of the [sign]. (LI: 356-357; 1906) >>> >>> The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every >>> Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered... >>> The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS: 111, >>> 1909) >>> >>> But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, >>> which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally >>> be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter >>> were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP2: 496; 1909) >>> >>> It is difficult to see how such definitions might accord with JS’s >>> ordering: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that >>> toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual >>> interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not after the final >>> interpretant. There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant >>> determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the >>> exponent). And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the >>> degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the >>> utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These >>> definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the >>> actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that the >>> only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual >>> semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended >>> interpretation. We know from the draft to LW of March 1906 that there is >>> ‘the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the >>> utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind >>> of the interpreter’ (SS: 196-7, 1906). This, too, suggests that Ii follows >>> the sign of which it is the intended meaning and that Id is the >>> interpreter’s reaction that follows interpretation. >>> >>> · ‘The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of >>> determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the >>> order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when >>> accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations.’ (JS) >>> >>> To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying >>> 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of >>> which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - all >>> the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants. >>> >>> NB LI followed by page number and year = Peirce, (2009), The Logic of >>> Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-Series, E. Bisanz, ed, Berlin: Akademie >>> Verlag GmbH, e.g. (LI 356-357, 1906) >>> >>> With this I rest my case and leave the list members to make up their own >>> minds. I have no intention of engaging in protracted discussions. >>> >>> TJ >>> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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