Jon, Edwina, List, Please note the subject line. The 1903 Harvard and Lowell lectures were an important starting point for the major developments in Peirce's final decade. And note Tony's word 'evolving' for the developments during that decade. In any decision about Peirce's directions and intensions, it's important to note the evolution of Peirce's thinking and writing.
JAS: As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the three categories (predicates) into the constituents of the three universes (subjects). That's not what I observed. I observed that Welby's emphasis on concrete examples led Peirce to make phaneroscopy closer to observation than to the abstract theories of Kant's phenomenology. In 1903, Peirce was right to object to Kant's Ding an sich. But he had no good replacement. For Welby, significs had no need for anything different from what we see, feel, think about, talk about, and act upon. When Peirce adopted phaneroscopy, he chose Wellby's foundation as a replacement for Kant's. Whenever there is any discrepancy between any MS from 1903 and a later MS, the later one takes precedence. The only exceptions are when an even later MS takes precedence over the middle one. (For example, his recto-verso cuts were a disaster, which he dumped in June 1911 -- along with several words he had used for many years: cut, scroll, recto, verso, illative, illation.) Re the classification of the sciences: That is an idea from 1903 that is generally acceptable. But Max Fisch wrote that the term 'logic as semeiotic' should be abbreviated as 'semeiotic', not 'logic'. The use of the term 'logic' for the Trivium was acceptable in Whateley's day, but it was archaic in 1903, and confusing for everybody who reads Peirce today. For other issues, I agree with Tony Jappy's writings about developments beyond 1903. John _____________________________________________ From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Edwina, List: ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’. I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave it at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign classification includes only three correlates--the sign (or representamen) itself, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. However, its three trichotomies that result in ten sign classes are for the first correlate itself and its dyadic relations to the other two correlates (S, S-Od, S-If). These are divisions based on Peirce's three categories. CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law [qualisign/sinsign/legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its [dynamical] object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant [icon/index/symbol]; thirdly, according as its [final] Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason [rheme/dicisign/argument]. (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating soon leads Peirce to recognize that there are really six correlates, not just three--each sign has two objects and three interpretants. The sign itself is the first and simplest correlate of that relation, with no degenerate sub-correlates. The object is the second correlate of that relation, of middling complexity, with not only the genuine (dynamical) correlate, but also a degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. The interpretant is the third and most complex correlate of that relation, with not only the genuine (final) correlate and a degenerate (dynamical) sub-correlate, but also a doubly degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. This is all grounded in the principle that in addition to genuine 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, "there is such a thing as the 1ns of 2ns and such a thing as the 1ns of 3ns; and there is such a thing as the 2ns of 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). In this context, the sub-correlates that correspond to 1ns of 2ns (immediate object) and 1ns of 3ns (immediate interpretant) are internal to the first correlate (sign), such that they have only degenerate dyadic relations with it--like the inherence of a quality in a thing. Accordingly, Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification (e.g., EP 2:478-490, 1908 Dec 23-25) have ten trichotomies that result in 66 sign classes. Those trichotomies are for the six correlates themselves (Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii), their three genuine dyadic relations (S-Od, S-If, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). Instead of the three categories, they are divisions into the three universes of possibles, existents, and necessitants. Tony Jappy suggests that this reflects a shift in Peirce's approach from phenomenology to ontology for classifying signs, but that would be blatantly inconsistent with his architectonic arrangement of the sciences. Speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, provides principles to ontology, the first branch of metaphysics--not the other way around. As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the three categories (predicates) into the constituents of the three universes (subjects). ET: There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘interpretant', of course we are speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. This is clearly inconsistent with Peirce's own writings. He states explicitly and repeatedly that the sign (or representamen), the (dynamical) object, and the (final) interpretant are the three correlates of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating. While it is true that they only serve in those specific roles within that specific relation to each other, he nevertheless carefully and consistently distinguishes them from each other and from their dyadic relations with each other. When we speak of the "interpretant," we are speaking of the third correlate itself, not its dyadic relation with the sign--these have separate trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies (If, S-If). In fact, there are six separate trichotomies for the three interpretants (If, Id, Ii), the two genuine dyadic relations (S-lf, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). The only one of these that appears in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is its third trichotomy, the one for the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its (final) interpretant (S-If). ET: I don’t see how the 8.338 reference suggests your conclusion. In that passage, Peirce explicitly states that an argument can be submitted, urged, or presented; a dicisign can be urged or presented; and a rheme can only be presented. This entails that within the logical order of determination for sign classification in accordance with his 1906-1908 taxonomies, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy (later seme/pheme/delome) for the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its final interpretant (S-If) must come before the presented/urged/submitted trichotomy (later suggestive/imperative/indicative) for the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant (S-Id). "It is evident that a Possible [rheme/seme] can determine nothing but a Possible [presented/suggestive]; it is equally so that a necessitant [submitted/indicative] can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant [argument/delome]" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). I then take an additional step--since the S-If trichotomy explicitly comes before the S-Id trichotomy, it makes sense that likewise the If trichotomy comes before the Id trichotomy. Again, the only one of these four trichotomies that appears in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is the one for S-If. ET: My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the semiosic process. "Semiosic" is not synonymous with "cognitive"--all cognition is semiosic, but not all semiosis is cognitive. In my view, this is where Kelly A. Parker goes wrong in his otherwise generally excellent 1998 book, The Continuity of Peirce's Thought, when he ascribes to Peirce the opinion "that there are existent things, characterized predominantly by 2ns, independent of semiosis" (p. 220). The independence of existent things (as well as possible qualities) from any actual cognition, which Peirce affirms, does not entail their independence from all semiosis whatsoever, which Peirce denies. On the contrary, discrete things with their monadic qualities and dyadic reactions are degenerate manifestations of continuous and triadic semiosis--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns. "Thus, 2ns is an essential part of 3ns though not of 1ns, and 1ns is an essential element of both 2ns and 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). CSP: Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903) Put another way, the real consists of whatever is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it, and the external consists of whatever is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about anything (CP 8.191, c. 1904), but nothing in the universe of being--i.e., nothing in any of the three Universes of Experience, which together contain whatever might serve as dynamical objects of signs--is independent of semiosis. "Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). "Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of all representation" (EP 2:328, 1904). CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906) Accordingly, I have never stated nor implied that semiosis is confined to "the linguistic realm." I only mentioned "linguistic signs" in a previous post because Tony Jappy had mentioned "meaning"--I said that a linguistic sign's immediate interpretant is the range of what it possibly could mean in accordance with its constituent word definitions and grammatical syntax, its dynamical interpretant is what it actually does mean to any one interpreter of it, and its final interpretant is what it necessarily would mean under ideal circumstances. I wholeheartedly agree with Peirce that such definitions are "a sop to Cerberus" (EP 2:478, 1908 Dec 23)--more generally, a sign's immediate interpretant is the range of effects that it possibly could have, its dynamical interpretant is any effect that it actually does have, and its final interpretant is the effect that it necessarily would have under ideal circumstances. Finally, just to be clear, although the terminology is similar, this is not the same division as possible/existent/necessitant for each individual trichotomy in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification. Again, the purpose of the final interpretant (ideal effect) is either to produce feeling (for a gratific sign), to produce action (for an actuous sign), or to produce self-control (for a temperative sign); the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant (actual effect) is either that of a feeling (for a sympathetic sign), that of an exertion (for a percussive sign), or that of another sign (for a usual sign); and the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant (range of possible effects) is either as abstract qualities (for a hypothetic sign), as concrete inherences (for a categorical sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> wrote: I will try to answer in pints: 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes to the interpretants? 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical modes. 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 reference suggests your conclusion. 6] My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of being of the DI..and the DI contains the mode of presentation of the II. I don’t see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual example. I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a ‘purpose to the FI. Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, th DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that the mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the clarity of Secondness. So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree. Edwina
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