John, Jon, List, JFS: I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) GR: It appears to me that *if* Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping.
But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's "rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not alone in that opinion. This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own: JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade." GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for scientists and other scholars to try to *refute* his work where possible in the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a corollary of the method of science as opposed to the other methods of inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that the *appeal* to authority is a well-known logical fallacy. JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L. Still, I must agree with you that the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or Jon's, or my word for it. JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings. i strongly urge you to study them. GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing belief. It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have always wanted Peirce-L to be essentially self-moderated. But in the past few years I have seen that there are participants who rather flaunt their independence from such ethical and collegial practices as Ransdell outlined. It will no longer be tolerated, and those who have previously been warned their anti-collegial conduct on the List jeopardizes their continuation on Peirce-L. In short, they will be removed without further on or off List discussion. Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator) On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 12:15 AM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of > hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to > mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) > > First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words > that Peirce frequently coined. The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of > thought, which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906. > It's also very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many > issues he had been discussing for years. Except for the fact that those > words are rather ugly, they are the result of deep thinking. > > By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on > one rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice). The word 'mark' is much > more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in > Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent > listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars. (And I believe that > those people are the most important audience for Peirce scholars to > address.) > > Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been devoting years to his analysis of the > evolution of Peirce's writings in his last decade. I have also been > devoting a great deal of study to the evolution of other aspects, > especially EGs during that decade. And I find Tony's analyses convincing > and compatible with my own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last > decade. > > There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. You said that you > had read Tony's writings. i strongly urge you to study them. > > John > > > ------------------------------ > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > > John, List: > > JFS: Peirce defined this trichotomy [potisign/actisign/famisign] without > making any reference to (Tone Token Type). > > > This is highly misleading--Peirce wrote EP 2:478-490 over three > consecutive days (1908 Dec 23-25), and he *did* make reference to > tone/token/type both before and after introducing > potisign/actisign/famisign. > > CSP: For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a *Tone*, > though I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really > good name? An Actual sign I call a *Token*; a Necessitant Sign a *Type*. > (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23) > > CSP: Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible > Presentation, are divisible into: > A. *Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely > possible, but felt to be positively possible ... > B. *Actisigns*, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et nunc*; > such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a > single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. ... > C. *Famisigns*, familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs > must be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24) > > CSP: But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now > use. I formerly called a *Potisign* a *Tinge* or *Tone*, an *Actisign* a > *Token*, a *Famisign* a *Type* ... I think *Potisign Actisign Famisign* might > be called *Mark Token Type (?)* (EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25) > > > Peirce was dissatisfied with potisign/sinsign/actisign and was > *considering* replacing "tone" with "mark," so he explicitly asked Lady > Welby for her opinion, which she gave a few weeks later--"I should prefer > *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say > 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). > He *tentatively* replaced "potisign" with "mark," using the word "might" > and a parenthetical question mark, but then wrote "tone" in his Logic > Notebook two days later ( > https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i, 1908 Dec > 27)--his last known mention of this trichotomy. > > Again, some might hold the opinion that "mark" is a *better *choice than > "tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification whose > other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately claim > that "mark" was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. > > CSP: In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes > were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think. (EP 2:489, > 1908 Dec 25) > > JFS: In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of > trichotomies "the wildest guesses". > > > What Peirce here calls "the wildest guesses" are not the trichotomies > themselves but "the *relations* I assumed between the different *classes*." > In other words, he never presents all ten trichotomies of the 1906-1908 > taxonomies in their proper *logical* order of determination for working > out the 66 sign classes. Instead, he repeatedly presents them in > *phaneroscopic* order. > > JFS: For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's > dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about > Potisign. > > > I agree, and sure enough, there is nothing in Peirce's definition of > "mark" for Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* about it > being a sign whose mode of being, apprehension, or presentation is "merely > possible" as distinguished from an existent token and a necessitant type. > On the contrary ... > > CSP: *Mark*. To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of > whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; > and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say > that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these > terms or things can be predicated. > The word translates the Latin *nota*. It has many practical synonyms such > as quality, mode, attribute, predicate, character, property, determination, > consequent, sign. Most of these words are sometimes used in special senses; > and even when they are used in a general sense, they may suggest somewhat > different points of view from mark. ( > https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) > > > By this definition, a mark is a term that can be predicated of things of > which other terms are predicated. For example, "scarlet" and "crimson" are > different terms that both have the term "red" as a mark--anything that is > scarlet or crimson is also red. However, the *term* "red" is obviously not a > tone/potisign, it is always a token/actisign of a type/famisign. On the > other hand, the *color* red--as well as a specific shade like scarlet or > crimson--can be a tone/potisign when and where it serves as "an indefinite > significant character." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > Jon, List, > > We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in > the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was > based on one example, "a tone of voice". After two more years of intensive > study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of > the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby > (EP2, p. > > "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as > such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible > Presentation, are divisible (o) into: > > "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely > possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray > that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's > hexagram.8 > > "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such > as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single > paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be > repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. > But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an > edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy." > Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token > Type). We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it. But > later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and > Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006. > He also discussed universes in considerable detail. That is a topic he > began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token > Type). But he is now introducing this new triad without making any > reference to it. But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of > detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly. > > Then on p. 488, he writes: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in > 1906,1 devoted much study > to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as > I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former > names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge > or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type.... I think Potisign > Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)... > > Then he continues: "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can > afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I > must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years > and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different > classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think... > > In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of > trichotomies "the wildest guesses". That should not encourage anyone to > consider them as having any reliable status. The best definition of (Mark > Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign > Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488. For the > definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary > should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. > > I also strongly recommend the writings by Tony Jappy, since he has made > far deeper and more extensive analysis of the "evolving" thoughts and > writings by Peirce in the decade from 1903 to 1908. As you know, his > existential graphs also evolved during that time, and they didn't reach > their fully complete specification until the June 1911 for Alpha and Beta. > For Gamma, the 1903 version was quickly cobbled together for the Lowell > lectures. Peirce used metalanguage for specifying modality and a version > of higher-order logic in 1903. > > But he made a major revolution for his Delta graphs of 1911. > > There is much more to say. > > John > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
