Kirsti,

I'll keep this short so that you can get back to the subject of Joe's paper. 
You wrote,
[[ I'm sorry you did not find my post informative, but rather a distraction. ]]

What i wrote -- with emphasis added to correct the apparent misreading -- was: 
"i wouldn't want *you* to be any further distracted by my question than *you* 
already have been." Unfortunately your reply shows that you're still distracted 
by it -- or rather by the one sentence you chose to pull from my original post 
for special attention (for reasons still unclear to me). If you disapprove of 
historical questions generally, or if the one i posted is as bad as you say, 
why not just drop it and turn to something more productive? As i said before, i 
look forward to your exegesis (or minute analysis or whatever you have in mind) 
of Joe's paper. 

Jumping to your final paragraph (since it appears to ask for a reply from me):
[[ Joe's thesis in the first sentence may seem obvious to you. ]]
My comment did not refer to Joe's first sentence, but to the thesis of his 
paper as a whole.

[[ But if you take a look at the next sentence (a paragraph being the unit of 
interpretation), you find there the distinction between the sciences and the 
humanities. - Do you think this distinction is not generally made in the 
community of inquiry? ]]

The distinction is certainly a common one; but i'm not sure exactly what you 
are referring to as "the community of inquiry".

[[ Or do you think this distinction should not be made? ]]

I don't have a problem with it, as long as it's not made "with an axe" (as 
Peirce would say). Why do you ask? (Please ignore that last question if it's a 
bad one!)

Gary F.

-----Original Message-----
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Määttänen Kirsti
Sent: November-13-11 4:33 PM

Gary F., list

Thanks for an informative reply to my post.  I'm sorry you did not find my post 
informative, but rather a distraction. In many respects, you are right to view 
it as such. I just hope you did not find reading it a waste of time. 

 You wrote:
> GF: You seem to have a lot to say about the paper we are slow-reading, and i 
> look forward to that. But since you have no information to offer in reply to 
> my factual question about the occasion and audience of JR's paper, i wouldn't 
> want you to be any further distracted by my question than you already have 
> been. Indeed you've read so much into what i thought was a simple question 
> that i'd better explain why i thought it so simple.
Here you say that your factual question was about the occasion and audience of 
JR's paper. With all respect, this was not how you stated your question in your 
earlier post. 
> GF:  Since i had never heard (until now) of anyone wanting to make such a 
> distinction, i couldn't help wondering why JR thought it important enough to 
> write a whole paper one the question of how (or whether) such a distinction 
> should be made.

Can you see the difference? 

In my post, I tried to warn you that no answer is to be expected. Instead, I 
focused on slow read as a method, starting from the relation of your question - 
as it was then posed - to the task of interpreting and understanding JR's first 
paragraph. 

I agree with you in that :
> GF: ...for Peirce, semiotic is necessarily experiential...
But not with:
> GF: ...simply because it is a science. 
I can't see anything simple in that. 

Nor do I see that:
> GF: It follows that terms like “experimental semiotics” and “empirical 
> semiotics” would be simply redundant for anyone deploying a strictly 
> Peircean conception of “experience” (as explicated by JR in the paper 
> we are reading)

Hm. There may be many who take themselves to be deploying "a strictly Peircean 
conception of 'experience'" But, unhappily, there is no general agreement in 
the community of inquiry what a strictly Peircean conception of experience is. 
Not even on what Peirce's conception of experience strictly taken involves. 
And, further, if and when the community of inquiry is taken as including not 
only Peirceans, there is no general agreement (i.e. something simple and 
self-evident to all) of a valid concept of experience (which would necessarily 
involve a theory).  

To cut it short, I think you miss the main point in JR's introduction in the 
paper.

First: Note the wording in JR's title. It is not "The Paradigm of  Experience 
Appropriate..., but: "ON the paradigm of...

Which is to interpreted - if the interpretation keeps strictly to the evidence 
at hand (i.e. the title) - that JR was not giving a presentation of THE 
paradigm (etc), but dealing with issues relevant FOR developing such a 
paradigm.  - So, there is no evidence in the title that the paper was  meant to 
be an explication of a strictly Peircean conception of experience. It is only 
telling us that something relevant for developing such a paradigm is dealt 
with. 

In his mature work, Peirce considered himself first and foremost a synechist. 
That is, he took continuity as the most basic ground in his philosophy.  (Not 
classification of signs, for example, which has been so popular amongst 
Peirceans. For a reason I can see, still not a good reason, I think.)

One of all the myriads of aspects involved in continuity and synechism, is that 
no jumps are allowed. - You make jumps, Gary. You jump into conclusions and 
interpretations leading to premature questions. As we all do, most of the time. 
But that is not a Peircean way.  - The Peircean way, as I see it, involves 
meticulous work and a critical stance to the workings of our own minds, our own 
thinking.

Which, then, involves a critical stance in relation with the questions we pose, 
not only in relation to the answers, whoever gives them. - We ourselves, or 
others.

A critical stance towards ourselves, our own thinking and doing, is the hardest 
part of the way.

On some occasions Peirce laments that people ask him to give the evidence for 
his theories, but when he proceeds to give it, they get bored and do not 
listen. 

Peirce also wrote that no one should just believe what he wrote, but try it out 
 themselves. - This is a rule I have followed as best I can. - Therefrom comes 
the understanding I have gained. 

You wrote:
> GF: You might ask why there's any need for such guesses about the occasion 
> and audience of JR's paper. The simple answer is that Joe's thesis in this 
> paper seems to me so obvious that i can't help wondering why he would bother 
> to write a whole paper on it. 


Yes, I do not see any need for such guesses. But, more importantly, I view such 
guesses harmful to an attempt to understand the paper. That is what I'm trying 
to convey, not only to you, but to those in the list who may be interested. 

Joe's thesis in the first sentence may seem obvious to you. But if you take a 
look at the next sentence (a paragraph being the unit of interpretation), you 
find there the distinction between the sciences and the humanities. - Do you 
think this distinction is not generally made in the community of inquiry ? - Or 
do you think this distinction should not be made?

These two questions are of a deeply and thoroughly different kind. 

The meaning of an answer always depends on the question it is an answer for.

Kirsti

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