Thanks for elevating me to the realm of the academically enabled . No
doctor I. A mere lapsed MDiv. As to your concluding question, my answer is
why not? At least in the realm of dreams and musement. It seems to me that
Peirce has a sense of benignity that when tied to his sense of continuity
and fallibility excludes no possibility that can be proved out. Bring on
the dolphins and therapy dogs. Cheers, S

*ShortFormContent at Blogger* <http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/>



On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 2:38 AM, Gary Moore <gottlos752...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Dear Doctor Rose,******
> Thank you for your reply! ****
> --****
> The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it
> potentially referred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal
> characters of the subject”. ****
> ---------------****
> Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there
> are times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more
> ‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse
> itself – which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS
> triumphs over philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption
> to ‘ordinary discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy
> insignificant] – but rather refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does
> here. ****
> ------------****
> Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce
> quote into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the
> theological ‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing
> high regard for Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor
> Heidegger would accept literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive
> internal characters of the subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly
> and almost uniquely recognizes the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something
> I was lucky enough to see in Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the
> categories of John Duns Scotus whom Peirce admired]. ****
> ----------------****
> Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal”
> and to “subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of
> experience presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is
> completely ‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem
> to me Peirce would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience
> is an undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this
> for Peirce.****
> ----------------****
> Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since
> such a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language
> as either ‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be
> approached obliquely or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J.
> Richardson SJ does this with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems
> anyway, Deely disapproves of. The point is, it seems with both Heidegger
> and Peirce, the popular phrase “What you see is what you get” is taken in a
> strict and radical sense. I think also both consider the ‘unconscious’ as a
> matter of historicity being logically being teased out of the long dream of
> language which completely overwhelms any one individual.****
> -----------------****
> Another issue with Deely and Heidegger related to this is Deely’s
> seemingly strict separation between human consciousness, which dreams the
> dream of language, and the ‘animal’ which largely does not do so. Heidegger
> also separates the two but simply as an observation and method of trying to
> delimit language within manageable bounds, and not because of a religious
> agenda since he explicitly holds for an “atheistic methodology”. In other
> words, if he had found another animal than human being he could converse
> with, he would have no ideological or theological problem, being more
> attuned to Nietzsche in this matter.****
> ----****
> Therefore I raise another question: “Does Peirce raise a distinct
> separation between the human being as the only linguistic animal, and if
> so, where, and if not, where?”****
> -----------------****
> Gary C. Moore****
>
>
>
>
>  ----- Forwarded Message -----
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose <stever...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Gary Moore <gottlos752...@yahoo.com>
> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 6:36 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY
> LOCATION
>
> The wonders of Google,
>
>  Commens Peirce Dictionary: Thirdness, Third [as a 
> category]<http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/thirdness.html>:
> "
> Thirdness, Third [as a category]
> (see also Firstness, Secondness, Categories)
>
>
> "Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
> indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
> predicates. Firstly come "firstnesses," or positive internal characters of
> the subject in itself; secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of
> one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third
> subject; thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental
> influence of one subject on another relatively to a third." ('Pragmatism',
> CP 5.469, 1907)"
>
> 'via Blog 
> this'<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pengoopmcjnbflcjbmoeodbmoflcgjlk>
>
> I didn't realize that Steven was quoting this in his most interesting post.
>
> Cheers. S
> *ShortFormContent at Blogger* <http://shortformcontent.blogspot.com/>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 3:17 AM, Gary Moore <gottlos752...@yahoo.com>wrote:
>
>
>
>   ----- Forwarded Message -----
> *From:* Gary Moore <gottlos752...@yahoo.com>
> *To:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith <stevenzen...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:14 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
>
>   Thank you! I was expecting more. But it just seems to be passing
> phraseology.
> GCM
>
>   *From:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith <stevenzen...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Gary Moore <gottlos752...@yahoo.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:09 AM
>
> *Subject:* Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
>
>
> It's there, second sentence of the second paragraph.
>
>
> Steven
>
> --
>     Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>     Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>     http://iase.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  On Apr 24, 2012, at 11:30 PM, Gary Moore wrote:
>
> > Dear Doctor Ericsson-Zenith,
> > Thank you for the reply! However, unless my brain is far too fuzy, I do
> not find John Deely's quotation "the positive internal characters of the
> subject in itself". Did Doctor Deely misquote? Did the quote come from
> elsewhere?
> > -----
> > It is an intriguing statement possibly subtantualizing both "internal"
> and "subject" which, in Deely and Poinsot's terminology would mean they are
> foundational terminals in a Peircean Triad would it not?
> > -----
> > Does anyone have suggestions, referrences, or information?
> >
> > Thank you for your consideration,
> > Gary C. Moore
> >
> > P. S. If I have done anything improper please tell me. I am new to the
> group.
> > From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith <stevenzen...@gmail.com>
> > To: Gary Moore <gottlos752...@yahoo.com>
> > Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 1:12 AM
> > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
> >
> > FYI
> >
> > CP 5.469 This illustration has much more pertinence to pragmatism than
> appears at first sight; since my researches into the logic of relatives
> have shown beyond all sane doubt that in one respect combinations of
> concepts exhibit a remarkable analogy with chemical combinations; every
> concept having a strict valency. (This must be taken to mean that of
> several forms of expression that are logically equivalent, that one or ones
> whose analytical accuracy is least open to question, owing to the
> introduction of the relation of joint identity, follows the law of
> valency.) Thus, the predicate "is blue" is univalent, the predicate "kills"
> is bivalent (for the direct and indirect objects are, grammar aside, as
> much subjects as is the subject nominative); the predicate "gives" is
> trivalent, since A gives B to C, etc. Just as the valency of chemistry is
> an atomic character, so indecomposable concepts may be bivalent or
> trivalent. Indeed, definitions being scrupulously observed, it will be seen
> to be a truism to assert that no compound of univalent and bivalent
> concepts alone can be trivalent, although a compound of any concept with a
> trivalent concept can have at pleasure, a valency higher or lower by one
> than that of the former concept. Less obvious, yet demonstrable, is the
> fact that no indecomposable concept has a higher valency. Among my papers
> are actual analyses of a number greater than I care to state. They are
> mostly more complex than would be supposed. Thus, the relation between the
> four bonds of an unsymmetrical carbon atom consists of twenty-four triadic
> relations.
> >
> > Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of
> indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or
> predicates. Firstly come "firstnesses," or positive internal characters of
> the subject in itself; secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of
> one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third
> subject; thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental
> influence of one subject on another relatively to a third. Since the
> demonstration of this proposition is too stiff for the infantile logic of
> our time (which is rapidly awakening, however), I have preferred to state
> it problematically, as a surmise to be verified by observation. The little
> that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that matter, to any other
> department of philosophy), has been entirely the fruit of this outgrowth
> from formal logic, and is worth much more than the small sum total of the
> rest of my work, as time will show.
> >
> > Steven
> >
> > --
> >    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> >    Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
> >    http://iase.info
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Apr 24, 2012, at 10:40 PM, Gary Moore wrote:
> >
> > > To whom it may concern,
> > > In John Deely's FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING page 647 he quotes Peirce
> as saying "the positive internal characters of the subject in itself"
> [footnote 109 Peirce c. 1906: CP 5.469].
> > > -------------
> > > I only have the two volumes of THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE and cannot locate
> it.
> > >
> > > Gary C Moore
> > > P O Box 5081
> > > Midland, Texas 79704
> > > gottlos752...@yahoo.com
> > >
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
>
>
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