Dear Stephen Rose, MD --- Thank you again for the reply! ---- Your introduction of dolphins leads to two problems in this regard that befuddle me profoundly - which is very easy to do. Both dolphins and sperm whales have enormously larger cerebrums than humans do. This would seem to completely undermine any possible ground to ‘progressive’ evolution making physical adaptation merely the chance happening of time and place, Darwin’s “niche”, with purely accidental inheritances which you as an MD know more times than not are far more malignant in the short or long run than benevolent if they are truly ever so. There is no point to physical existence except the lottery of abilities you have at the singular moment of selection. And whatever is selected as survivor traits at that moment may kill the species off in the moment after that. So there is never any accumulation of benefits, just different levels of liabilities hopefully on the whole neutral or of indifferent ‘quality’. --- Also, these sea creatures with enormous brains and what seems to us ‘primitive linguistic’ abilities [reading Melville’s MOBY DICK from its literal mass of quotes on cetology to Job-type messenger end, “I alone have survived to tell thee” is a real help] brings up the Heideggerian distinction between present-to-hand with ready-to-hand. Our whole intellectual milieu is purely oriented to tool usage and being busy with work for one’s daily bread, whereas cetaceans romp and play all day. Everything – largely – is a game to them. If tragedy strikes it is but for a moment then either disregarded as irrelevant or simply forgotten. With human beings we drag it with us to the grave. Which, then, is the ‘superior’ being? ----- Therapy dogs: this follows therefrom. If there is no care, there is no unhappiness. Heidegger founded the whole of what might be loosely called ‘consciousness’ or ‘attention’, or better ‘circumspection’ from Peirce’s original mentor, Kant, in being-there upon “care” largely derived from Augustine. This hardly seems a benefit in and of itself unless one really counts the accomplishments of human kind as a whole as beneficial. But it is hard for me to see that in the actual case of the facts of the matter. --- Regards, Gary C. Moore
From: Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> To: Gary Moore <[email protected]> Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2012 5:26 AM Subject: Re: Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION Thanks for elevating me to the realm of the academically enabled . No doctor I. A mere lapsed MDiv. As to your concluding question, my answer is why not? At least in the realm of dreams and musement. It seems to me that Peirce has a sense of benignity that when tied to his sense of continuity and fallibility excludes no possibility that can be proved out. Bring on the dolphins and therapy dogs. Cheers, S ShortFormContent at Blogger On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 2:38 AM, Gary Moore <[email protected]> wrote: Dear Doctor Rose, >Thank you for your reply! >-- >The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it >potentiallyreferred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal >characters of the subject”. >--------------- >Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there are >times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more >‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse >itself – which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS >triumphs over philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption to >‘ordinary discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy insignificant] – >but rather refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does here. >------------ >Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce quote >into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the theological >‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing high regard >for Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor Heidegger would accept >literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive internal characters of the >subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly and almost uniquely >recognizes the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something I was lucky enough to >see in Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the categories of John Duns Scotus >whom Peirce admired]. >---------------- >Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal” and to >“subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of experience >presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is completely >‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem to me Peirce >would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience is an >undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this for >Peirce. >---------------- >Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since such >a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language as either >‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be approached obliquely >or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J. Richardson SJ does this >with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems anyway, Deely disapproves of. The >point is, it seems with both Heidegger and Peirce, the popular phrase “What >you see is what you get” is taken in a strict and radical sense. I think also >both consider the ‘unconscious’ as a matter of historicity being logically >being teased out of the long dream of language which completely overwhelms any >one individual. >----------------- >Another issue with Deely and Heidegger related to this is Deely’s seemingly >strict separation between human consciousness, which dreams the dream of >language, and the ‘animal’ which largely does not do so. Heidegger also >separates the two but simply as an observation and method of trying to delimit >language within manageable bounds, and not because of a religious agenda since >he explicitly holds for an “atheistic methodology”. In other words, if he had >found another animal than human being he could converse with, he would have no >ideological or theological problem, being more attuned to Nietzsche in this >matter. >---- >Therefore I raise another question: “Does Peirce raise a distinct separation >between the human being as the only linguistic animal, and if so, where, and >if not, where?” >----------------- >Gary C. Moore > > > > >----- Forwarded Message ----- >From: Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> >To: Gary Moore <[email protected]> >Cc: [email protected] >Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 6:36 AM >Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY >LOCATION > > >The wonders of Google, > > >Commens Peirce Dictionary: Thirdness, Third [as a category]: " >Thirdness, Third [as a category] >(see also Firstness, Secondness, Categories) > > > > >"Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable >concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come >"firstnesses," or positive internal characters of the subject in itself; >secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of one subject or substance on >another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes >"thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on >another relatively to a third." ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)" > > >'via Blog this' > > >I didn't realize that Steven was quoting this in his most interesting post. > > >Cheers. S >ShortFormContent at Blogger > > > > >On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 3:17 AM, Gary Moore <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> >> >> >>----- Forwarded Message ----- >>From: Gary Moore <[email protected]> >>To: Steven Ericsson-Zenith <[email protected]> >>Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:14 AM >>Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION >> >> >>Thank you! I was expecting more. But it just seems to be passing phraseology. >>GCM >> >> >>From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith <[email protected]> >>To: Gary Moore <[email protected]> >>Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:09 AM >> >>Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION >> >> >>It's there, second sentence of the second paragraph. >> >> >>Steven >> >>-- >> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith >> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering >> http://iase.info >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>On Apr 24, 2012, at 11:30 PM, Gary Moore wrote: >> >>> Dear Doctor Ericsson-Zenith, >>> Thank you for the reply! However, unless my brain is far too fuzy, I do not >>> find John Deely's quotation "the positive internal characters of the >>> subject in itself". Did Doctor Deely misquote? Did the quote come from >>> elsewhere? >>> ----- >>> It is an intriguing statement possibly subtantualizing both "internal" and >>> "subject" which, in Deely and Poinsot's terminology would mean they are >>> foundational terminals in a Peircean Triad would it not? >>> ----- >>> Does anyone have suggestions, referrences, or information? >>> >>> Thank you for your consideration, >>> Gary C. Moore >>> >>> P. S. If I have done anything improper please tell me. I am new to the >>> group. >>> From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith <[email protected]> >>> To: Gary Moore <[email protected]> >>> Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 1:12 AM >>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION >>> >>> FYI >>> >>> CP 5.469 This illustration has much more pertinence to pragmatism than >>> appears at first sight; since my researches into the logic of relatives >>> have shown beyond all sane doubt that in one respect combinations of >>> concepts exhibit a remarkable analogy with chemical combinations; every >>> concept having a strict valency. (This must be taken to mean that of >>> several forms of expression that are logically equivalent, that one or ones >>> whose analytical accuracy is least open to question, owing to the >>> introduction of the relation of joint identity, follows the law of >>> valency.) Thus, the predicate "is blue" is univalent, the predicate "kills" >>> is bivalent (for the direct and indirect objects are, grammar aside, as >>> much subjects as is the subject nominative); the predicate "gives" is >>> trivalent, since A gives B to C, etc. Just as the valency of chemistry is >>> an atomic character, so indecomposable concepts may be bivalent or >>> trivalent. Indeed, definitions being scrupulously observed, it will be seen to be a truism to assert that no compound of univalent and bivalent concepts alone can be trivalent, although a compound of any concept with a trivalent concept can have at pleasure, a valency higher or lower by one than that of the former concept. Less obvious, yet demonstrable, is the fact that no indecomposable concept has a higher valency. Among my papers are actual analyses of a number greater than I care to state. They are mostly more complex than would be supposed. Thus, the relation between the four bonds of an unsymmetrical carbon atom consists of twenty-four triadic relations. >>> >>> Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of >>> indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or >>> predicates. Firstly come "firstnesses," or positive internal characters of >>> the subject in itself; secondly come "secondnesses," or brute actions of >>> one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third >>> subject; thirdly comes "thirdnesses," or the mental or quasi-mental >>> influence of one subject on another relatively to a third. Since the >>> demonstration of this proposition is too stiff for the infantile logic of >>> our time (which is rapidly awakening, however), I have preferred to state >>> it problematically, as a surmise to be verified by observation. The little >>> that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that matter, to any other >>> department of philosophy), has been entirely the fruit of this outgrowth >>> from formal logic, and is worth much more than the small sum total of the >>> rest of my work, as time will show. >>> >>> Steven >>> >>> -- >>> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith >>> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering >>> http://iase.info >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Apr 24, 2012, at 10:40 PM, Gary Moore wrote: >>> >>> > To whom it may concern, >>> > In John Deely's FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING page 647 he quotes Peirce as >>> > saying "the positive internal characters of the subject in itself" >>> > [footnote 109 Peirce c. 1906: CP 5.469]. >>> > ------------- >>> > I only have the two volumes of THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE and cannot locate it. >>> > >>> > Gary C Moore >>> > P O Box 5081 >>> > Midland, Texas 79704 >>> > [email protected] >>> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >>> > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >>> > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body >>> > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >>> > [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >>listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >>[email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of >>the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >>[email protected] >--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >[email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of >the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >[email protected] > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
