JW = Jim Willgoose

JW: List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans;
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis
    upon the priority principle in Frege, which stresses that the
    judgement is epistemically, ontologically, and methodologically
    primary.  He tries to show that Frege thought that Schroder's
    view exhibited a bias towards the methodological primacy of
    concepts by drawing on Schroder's Introductory parts of the
    Algebra of Logic.  I think the central claim of the Sluga
    paper is that this supposed bias of the Booleans towards
    abstraction and the treatment of concepts as extensions
    of classes leads to a confusion over the relation between
    "abstract" or "pure" logic and predicate logic.  How this is,
    is not always easy to see, but the segmenting of the judgement
    relation does seem to lead to a problem in seeing the abstract
    logic as a special case of predicate logic.  How serious any of
    this is I don't know.  For instance, Mitchell took issue with a
    "Mr. Peirce" for speaking of a "universe of relation" instead of
    a "universe of class terms." (Studies in Logic; Johns Hopkins 1883).
    Maybe Peirce was vaguely aware of something which the products of
    analysis would end up obscuring.

Jim,

Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking about
the notion of judgment that was represented by the "judgment stroke" in Frege's
“Begriffsschrift” and that supposedly got turned into the turnstile symbol ( ⊦ )
or “assertion symbol” in later systems of notation?

Jon

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