John, Sluga ties the priority of judgement in Frege to Kant's favoring
judgements over concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason. The article is open
source. I can see a connection with the judgement stroke
/- since one asserts the truth; a trick that is hard to do with only concepts
or objects. Sluga includes a quote from Frege where he says something to the
effect that he (Frege) never "segments the signs" of even an incomplete
expression in any of his work. (ie. "x" is never separated from "F" as in Fx.)
> Date: Thu, 10 May 2012 23:50:09 -0400
> From: jawb...@att.net
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>
> JW = Jim Willgoose
>
> JW: List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans;
> Notre Dame Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis
> upon the priority principle in Frege, which stresses that the
> judgement is epistemically, ontologically, and methodologically
> primary. He tries to show that Frege thought that Schroder's
> view exhibited a bias towards the methodological primacy of
> concepts by drawing on Schroder's Introductory parts of the
> Algebra of Logic. I think the central claim of the Sluga
> paper is that this supposed bias of the Booleans towards
> abstraction and the treatment of concepts as extensions
> of classes leads to a confusion over the relation between
> "abstract" or "pure" logic and predicate logic. How this is,
> is not always easy to see, but the segmenting of the judgement
> relation does seem to lead to a problem in seeing the abstract
> logic as a special case of predicate logic. How serious any of
> this is I don't know. For instance, Mitchell took issue with a
> "Mr. Peirce" for speaking of a "universe of relation" instead of
> a "universe of class terms." (Studies in Logic; Johns Hopkins 1883).
> Maybe Peirce was vaguely aware of something which the products of
> analysis would end up obscuring.
>
> Jim,
>
> Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking
> about
> the notion of judgment that was represented by the "judgment stroke" in
> Frege's
> “Begriffsschrift” and that supposedly got turned into the turnstile symbol (
> ⊦ )
> or “assertion symbol” in later systems of notation?
>
> Jon
>
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