Gary F., list,
>>[Ben] I argued also that calling it an "interpretant" tended
to minimize the idea that it had to be a _human_ interpretation.
>[Gary] That's a good place to start, i think.
>[Gary] That's a good place to start, i think.
I was thinking in general of the quasimind http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/quasimind.html (and
also specifically of the question whether interpretants are "embodied" in
vegetable organismic processes, and in biological evolution. There seem to be
interpretant-like things embodied there, but as to embodied genuine
interpretants, I haven't dispelled my doubts.)
>[Gary] If any term is the key to his whole system, this [the
interpretant] might be it.
For one person or another, following up on the conception of the
interpretant might indeed by the key to opening the doors to Peirce's whole
system. Most Peirceans will agree that one doesn't really conceive of the
interpretant apart from the sign and the semiotic object. Irreducible triad. The
sign stands FOR an object TO an interpretant. Sometimes I find it convenient to
think of the sign as being "about" the object. A discoloration of a fruit
represents the fruit, it's a sign about the fruit. My interpretant may be:
"rot!"
There's been some argument at peirce-l in the past about whether the three categories correlate successfully with the three semiotic elements & whether they're even supposed to do so. Above is how I've looked at it.
I'll recycle (= quote) myself: A sign is "almost" its (the sign's) object
and conveys information about the object, but is not the object, so familiarity
with the sign is not familiarity with the object. The interpretant is the sign's
meaning clarified, such that the interpretant itself is a sign (a) of the object
and also (b) of interpretant's "predecessor" as a sign of the object. Peirce,
unlike so many before and since, saw that there's much more to signs as a
general phenomenon (general like statisticality and information) than
"signifier" and "signified." Not only does a sign require and address itself to
interpretation, but the interpretant itself is a sign, a night's womb to a
further interpretant dawn, just as a translation is into something itself
further translatable, a ramification has ramifications, and meaning means, means
ceaselessly and sometimes to our chagrin (Merleau-Ponty said 'we are condemned
to meaning') -- and so the interpretant is a sign, promoting and provoking
further interpretation. But the interpretant, though it's a sign, is not an
object's "mere" sign which one would never guess is also a sign about a previous
thing-as-sign about the same object. Instead the interpretant is a sign having
reference to an interpreted sign as well as to the object, and in fact
practically all signs are like this in the interpreter's perspective, links in
chains stretching both fore and aft, just not always with clarity (so usually
it's a relative question, a role question -- "is it the sign or the
interpretant?" -- just like the question of which codings are encodings and
which are decodings), and Peirce conceived the interpretive chain as operative
all the way down to the level of the infinitesimal and the truly continuous.
_Actually_ so infinitely-finely continuous or not, perpetual
interpretation is sometimes to our chagrin, yet also lets us infer around a lot
of bends (of hearts, planets, etc.)
I didn't know about David Lodge's remark on encoding & decoding, I
swear it!
Peirce's classifications of the sciences were, among other things, ways of
organizing his philosophy. Roughly, it's like this, with the earlier furnishing
principles to the later but not vice versa (That's why I put "THEN" in there, as
a reminder):
1. Mathematics -- study of hypotheticals, and drawing necessary
conclusions
THEN
2. Cenoscopy (philosophy) study of positive phenomena in general &
without need of special experiences/experiments, phenomena such as
anybody at any moment will find before his/her notice http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/cenoscopy.html
THEN
3. Special sciences -- study of positive phenomena in their various classes
and resorting to special experiences/experiments.
Back within philososphy:
1. Phenomenology/phaneroscopy -- THE THREE CATEGORIES (FIRSTNESS,
SECONDNESS, THIRDNESS). THE REDUCTION THESIS.
THEN
2. Normative sciences -- esthetics (ideals, the admirable), ethics (right
& wrong), logic (semeiotics)
THEN
3. Metaphysics -- general metaphysics aka ontology, psychical / religious
metaphysics (God, freedom, immortality), physical metaphysics (real nature of
time, space, laws of nature, matter)
And, back within logic or semeiotics:
1. SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR: THE SEMEIOTIC TRIAD: (SIGN, OBJECT,
INTERPRETANT) & KINDS OF SIGNS (ICON, INDEX, SYMBOL; QUALISIGN, SINSIGN,
LEGISIGN; etc.).
THEN
2. CRITIC: THE MODES OF INFERENCE (ABDUCTION, INDUCTION,
DEDUCTION), their various validities & degrees of force.
THEN
3. METHODEUTIC (methods for truth's investigation, exposition,
application).
He also divided sciences into Theoretical & Practical; eventually he
divided them into Sciences of Discovery (all of the above listed ones), Sciences
of Review (compendious, synthesizing results from across the sciences, etc.),.
& the Practical Sciences. He also put a philosophical area into the Sciences
of Review, and called it Synthetic Philosophy, whose tasks included
classifications like the one above.
Here's one of his later classifications, 1903
Here's another:
Best, Ben Udell
----- Original Message -----
From: "gnusystems" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 6:40 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)
[[ Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, Peirce's Terminology in His Own
Words, Edited by Mats Bergman & Sami Paavola
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html ]]
Yes, a superb resource. (And note that the other entries defining various kinds of interpretants -- dynamical, logical, emotional etc. -- are conveniently grouped at the head of the main entry.)
I think it's significant that Peirce introduced and (sort of) defined this term in his first major work (the "New List of Categories"). If any term is the key to his whole system, this might be it.
[[ I argued also that calling it an "interpretant" tended to minimize the idea that it had to be a _human_ interpretation. ]]
That's a good place to start, i think.
Getting back to Kaina Soicheia: i can see why Peirce's relationship with Royce might be significant as context for this piece, but for me (as a relative newcomer) the more immediate connections are with Peirce's other essays -- notably the "New List", which i've just been re-reading because Joe mentioned it awhile back in this connection.
gary F.
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