I meant to say Max Fisch, of course.
M.L.
Dear Gary and Tomas, List-,
On the question of proof, here's what Max Fish had to say:
"Our first question is, in what sense can truths of philosophy be proved? Not in the sense in which the theorems and problems of mathematics can be proved. For that kind of proof Peirce reserved the term demonstration [...] The proof of matters of fact consists in bringing them to the test of indubitable experience. "When I say indubitable, I mean of course indubitable today for me. Nothing can be imagined more absolutely satisfactory than that, being indubitable to me, it is equally so to you, for your doubting it would cause me to do so". (Ms L 133, Draft of a letter to J.S. Engle, Feb. 1905) "Now proof does not consist in giving superfluous and superpossible certainty to that which nobody ever did or ever will doubt, but in removing doubts which do, or at least might as some time arise" (CP 3.432).
It seems this answers Thomas's question: the icon, because it is indistinguishable from its object exhibits the object as it is in all its pertinent semiotic features for the task at hand. That Peirce asks his reader to "think in order to see" he is asking that the proof become indubitable to him as well. No other proof than that of perception/observation/experience is to be had.
cheers,
Martin Lefebvre
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:37:58 +0100, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Thomas Riese wrote:
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:23:55 +0100, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Thomas Riese wrote:
"The necessity for a sign directly monstrative of the
connection of premiss and conclusion is susceptible of proof.
The proof is as follows. When we contemplate the premiss,
we mentally perceive that that being true the conclusion is
true. I say we _perceive_ it, because clear knowledge follows
contemplation without any intermediate process. Since the
conclusion becomes certain, there is some state at which it
becomes directly certain. Now this no symbol can show; for a
symbol is an indirect sign depending on the association of ideas.
Hence, a sign directly exhibiting the mode of relation is
required. This promised proof presents this difficulty: namely,
it requires the reader actually to _think_ in order to see the
force of it. That is to say, he must represent the state of
things considered in a direct imaginative way."
(Charles Peirce, Collected Papers 4.75)
Ergo:
CP 4.76 A large part of logic will consist in the study of the
different monstrative signs, or icons, serviceable in reasoning.
Gary Richmond
Ok, Gary, but does the proof prove this?
Thomas;-)
Perhaps the "ergo" was too strong; ergo, whoops, I meant, therefore :-) I will leave it up to you and others to connect CP 4.45 & 4.76.
Gary
Mmh, but Peirce promised a proof right there in CP 4.75
Thomas ;-)
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