Gary, Thanks for your extensive answer. It is more then I asked for but the surplus does address an important issue.
I think it comes down to whether it is correct to hold, as you do, that the 9 aspects can not be useful for anything except for establishing the 10 types of signs. As in: GR: My biggest complaint with 9-adic structures concerns their being used at all to provide a theoretical basis for anything except Peirce's 10-adic classification of signs. I have not been convinced of the theoretical soundness of basing other structures on Peirce's 9-adic arrangement. -- Let me start by stating that I disagree with respect to the limitation of the usefulness of the sign aspects to the establishment of sign types. But I have to add immediately that I expect that we will end up with something at least of the order of the Welby classification. Then 9 aspects will not be sufficient. So what I am going to defend is the use of triadically derived sign aspects for other purposes then typecasting. It is not a defense of the sufficiency of the 9 aspects. GR wrote: <>. . .strongly supports the notion that the 9-adic diagram presents only the types of relationships possible for yet to be embodied sign classes. In a word, the nine sign "parametric" choices do not themselves represent embodied signs, whereas the ten classes do.[GR, Outline of trikonic, p 6] -- I would prefer 'signs' instead of 'sign classes' but if you accept that we are in agreement here (and I think that Claudio, Sarbo and Farkas would also agree). The point where we differ, as I see it, is whether we deem it possible to analyze sign processes in more detail with the help of sign aspects. I think it is worth a try, while you argue that it will prove to be a dead end. I suggest approaching the matter according to the categories. We get then: - possibilities of signs - aspects of signs - embodied signs - 10 sign types - real or operative signs - actual thought, argument, 1 sign type Now lets pose the following question: Are the 9 sign types (the argumentative sign type excepted), each on its own, modes of thought or do they only become real in arguments? I think the later. That however does not make them worthless. On the contrary distinguishing sign types enable us to arrest our moving thought and to become critical. Side question: If we analyze a living argument according to its constituents in terms of sign types, do we meet always all sign types or can we do without some of them in some cases? I think the former but will not argue it now. But why should we stop here? Why shouldn't we try to cover all the way to the manifold of sense? To push further is the attempt I see in Sarbo's proto-sign approach. You call that approach dyadic. I am far from sure that that is the right criticism. It sets off with a contrast, the contrast that emerges when something (the blowing whistle of a train for instance) is entering the field of consciousness. But from then on it is all mediation until the intrusion is understood. That is, if we do not look at it as stating a bottom up approach, for if we do, then indeed, a mechanism is supposed and not an adaptive system that is habitually interpreting. Since I am co-author of Natural Grammar your remark below also applies to me: GR:Sarbo comments that "We gladly acknowledge that the term proto-sign has been suggested by Gary Richmond," but does not note that I coined this term while expressing exasperation at their referring to the elements of their own dyadic and, in fact, wholly Boolean structure as if they were actual, embodied signs. --- I am sorry you feel that way and can only say that we did only state who suggested the term out of intellectual honesty. That has nothing to do with the position taken by the person suggesting the term, that can, as in this case it obviously is, also be somebody with strong inclinations against the theory. As a matter of fact, the term proto-sign was welcomed by Sarbo just because it indicates that the elements must not be taken as actual, embodied signs. With regard to 'wholly Boolean structure' I have to disagree with you. The Boolean operators figure in the model but the structuring is according to the gradual development of the sign in an interpretative system eventually determining its interpretant to stand in the same relation to its object as it stands itself. Without however a concrete interpretation. It is a model of a process, not any specific process itself. With regard to conceptualization you asked me to be more precise. You stated: GR:First, I would like to suggest that ICCS and CGs are more closely associated with "knowledge representation" than with "knowledge management" while the two over-lap to some extent. And I asked how conceptualization fits in. Adding that I expect an overlap between knowledge representation and conceptualization. Knowledge representation is aiming at forming information systems. It has more to do with organizing knowledge, often recorded first in natural language, in such a way that it better serves some purposes. Conceptualization is what I assume to have taken place in order to get the knowledge that has to be represented. But, since representing knowledge does add something to what is known through conceptualization, it in a sense itself is a form of conceptualization. However, it seems to be played by different rules. It is as if we conceptualize if we try to understand something, while if we engage in knowledge representation we only try to get rid of ambiguity and aim at consistence. As if it does not matter what it is we try to understand or, probably more precise, as if we delegate the task of understanding to the persons that feed the knowledge. Here I see some moral issues. Suppose a client-organization that has some knowledge to be represented. The Representing person may gain an insight that is in some useful respects superior to the knowledge of the client. But the connection with reality is not his issue. Then the client does not have the possibility of self control with respect to that aspect. Auke --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
