[peirce-l] Re: Conceptual Structures Tool Interoperability Workshop

[Gary Richmond]

Auke, Thank you for your good and thoughtful response. At the moment I've so many deadlines approaching that I won't be able to add more than a few inter-paragraphical comments. But first allow to apologize for not acknowledging your co-authorship of "Natural Grammar.". The copy that Sarbo sent me by snail mail begins with the Title and Abstract and does not include the authors' names (perhaps it is a draft?) and there was no cover letter with the paper--although Sarbo did email me saying that he was sending it. In any event, I had assumed that the paper was by Sarbo or Sarbo and Farkas since all the ICCS papers of Sarbo's that I'm familiar with have the latter joint authorship. Now the few comments on the philosophical matters at hand. Auke van Breemen wrote: I expect that we will end up with something at least of the order of the Welby classification. Then 9 aspects will not be sufficient. But the so-called Welby classification involves the consideration of the role of the interpretant in semeiotic moving theoretically somewhat far beyond the 10-adic classification of [year] Although there are areas in which we are in disagreement, Bernard Morand and I have agreed on the list that the 10-adic diagram of x is based on just three of the 10 types discussed in the Welby classification--that is, the trichotomic exposition in the body of the letter. A different, but naturally related question concerns the diagram Peirce drew on the verso of a page of the Welby letter ( it is here that Morand and I disagree, but this is an entirely distinct issue from the one we're presently considering). In any event,  it is the discussion of these, shall we say, "Welby aspects" of the matter which I imagine will be--and surely ought be--on-going. This is truly new territory, and I applaud Bernard for his efforts in this regard even as I disagree with some of his conclusions. The point here, however, is that it seems no longer a question to, for example, Bernard and I (and this is also clearly the position of Liszka, Kent and Parker as well) that the trichotomies relating to the sign/object/interpretant do indeed  "result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS" as Peirce explicitly states in CP .2.254 which prefaces his diagram of the 10-adic classification just mentioned. So what I am going to defend is the use of triadically derived sign aspects for other purposes then typecasting. It is not a defense of the sufficiency of the 9 aspects. GR wrote: . . . In a word, the nine sign "parametric" choices do not themselves represent embodied signs, whereas the ten classes do.[GR, Outline of trikonic, p 6] -- I would prefer 'signs' instead of 'sign classes' but if you accept that we are in agreement here (and I think that Claudio, Sarbo and Farkas would also agree). 1st, again, I say "sign classes" based on Peirce's remark just quoted: "The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS." CP .2.254: 2nd, I'm not sure whether indeed we truly all are in fact in agreement here, or perhaps on what we are in agreement? Would you please clarify what exactly you are suggesting that Guerri, Sarbo, Farkas, you and I are in agreement about?  I think that would be very helpful for the progress of the discussion. <>The point where we differ, as I see it, is whether we deem it possible to analyze sign processes in more detail with the help of sign aspects. I think it is worth a try, while you argue that it will prove to be a dead end. Not so much a "dead end" as theoretically incorrect (the nonagon may prove to be anything but a "dead end" while "proto-signs" seem to me to be exactly this).. Anyhow, when one continues to use the language of really embodied signs to refer to that which is not one (as Sarbo does) one confuses matters. It is quite one thing to suggest informally that something is "iconic" and quite another that it is an "icon" as Peirce defines this in relation to his classification within logic as semeiotic, that is,  for science.. Sarbo, as I see it, consistently theoretically errs in explicitly using a terminology which ought apply only to embodied signs as analyzed in philosophical grammar and critical logic, and begun to be used in the explication of a pragmatic method of inquiry in speculative rhetoric. Further, all the sciences following these are expected to employ the fruits of the mathematical, trichotomically phenomenological, & normative science--including philosophically important esthetic concerns (esp. those related to the summum bonum), ethical concerns (esp. those concerned with establishing habits leading to the growth of character), but perhaps especially logical concerns ( esp. semeiotic inquiry, leading to the growth of intellect and the evolution of consciousness). Now your suggestion considering sign types  "according to the categories" You divided matters thus. <>- possibilities of signs - aspects of signs - embodied signs - 10 sign types - real or operative signs - actual thought, argument, 1 sign type Expressed trikonically this might be: All occasions of signs: 1ns, possibilities of signs - aspects of signs (in the language of Sarbo/Farkas) |> real or operative signs - actual thought, argument (the kind of sign semeiotic deals with) embodied signs - 10 sign types But this seems in error (the result, perhaps, of excluding the 10th sign in the proto-schema and valorizing the 9 over the 10) Still, I will have to spend some time considering this. Yet, even in this form I would say that "possibilities of signs" might find _expression_ in something like Guerri's nonagon (although perhaps not at the level of rigorous logic as semeiotic, but in a more informal kind of _expression_, more closely related to design and architecture--indeed, this is precisely how Guerri tends to use it). Now, is this rigorous science? I would hope that Claudio would simply smile to suggest, "Well, I hope not!" :-) Science is, I'm afraid, only a small part of it (but, of course, Peirce never tired of making that argument, and much better than I'll ever do it) <>Now lets pose the following question: Are the 9 sign types (the argumentative sign type excepted), each on its own, modes of thought or do they only become real in arguments? I think the later. As you must know by now, I do not even see the "9 sign types" as embodied signs, so they don't factor in semeiotic at all (not in semiosis as it is analyzable) I assume you refer  not to the 10-adic classification but to the 9 'un-embodied' sign types, the "parametric" of my paper (btw, I must--and in my paper indeed do--credit Ben Udell with the "parametric language" used to express exactly what I see to be the distinction necessarily to be made between the 9 and the 10). In semeiotic proper, one ought not analyze, say, with the argumentative sign type "excepted" as you just suggested, for one ought always be referring to at least the 10-adic classification and the analysis of embodied signs. The conflation of the two (9 & 10) is exactly what I find in error in Sarbo and tend to rant about to anyone who'll listen (and I would like to suggest that even a tetradist, Ben Udell, makes the distinction and so avoids conflation the two.) <> That however does not make them worthless. On the contrary distinguishing sign types enable us to arrest our moving thought and to become critical. Perhaps in Guerri's sense, but not in Farkas/Sarbo's as I see it. <>Side question: If we analyze a living argument according to its constituents in terms of sign types, do we meet always all sign types or can we do without some of them in some cases? I think the former but will not argue it now. This probably depends on what you're referring to in saying "sign types." I will not now argue for either stance, but at the moment I would tend to disagree with you and say that we can indeed do without some of  the embodied signs "in some cases." <>But why should we stop here? Why shouldn't we try to cover all the way to the manifold of sense? To push further is the attempt I see in Sarbo's proto-sign approach. You call that approach dyadic. I am far from sure that that is the right criticism. It sets off with a contrast, the contrast that emerges when something (the blowing whistle of a train for instance) is entering the field of consciousness. Thus,  conflation begins. . . <> But from then on it is all mediation until the intrusion is understood. I do not see mediation discussed (certainly not in Peirce's sense) in Sarbo's/Farkas' proto-semiotic. Mediation is thirdness, requires the kinds of embodied sign Peirce ever analyzes, etc. Whenever Sarbo analyzes something--say, the fairy tales he's fond of--he uses a strange terminology which conflates semeiotic terms and his  proto-semeiotic theory. This seems to me literally pure analytical nonsense. <> That is, if we do not look at it as stating a bottom up approach, for if we do, then indeed, a mechanism is supposed and not an adaptive system that is habitually interpreting. No doubt at the dyadic level, at the level of secondness, this is mechanism. Who'd deny it? Peirce has also analyzed this in considerable depth. I haven't time at the moment to comment on this further, but there is a great deal to be said about Peirce's own analysis at this mechanical level. But Sarbo's quasi-proto-semiotic language results in a confusion regarding what has already been achieved by Peirce in both the analyses of secondness as such (mechanism, etc.) and thirdness as such (mind). So I will continue to argue as forcefully as I can against Sarbo's program, and for both these reasons. <>Since I am co-author of Natural Grammar your remark below also applies to me: Again, my apologies. I honestly didn't know. <>GR:Sarbo comments that "We gladly acknowledge that the term proto-sign has been suggested by Gary Richmond," but does not note that I coined this term while expressing exasperation at their referring to the elements of their own dyadic and, in fact, wholly Boolean structure as if they were actual, embodied signs. --- I am sorry you feel that way and can only say that we did only state who suggested the term out of intellectual honesty. That has nothing to do with the position taken by the person suggesting the term, that can, as in this case it obviously is, also be somebody with strong inclinations against the theory. I completely agree with your analysis. Perhaps I was simply expressing my own psychological state (exasperation is just part of it, btw) at seeing the term suddenly being used as the title of a paper (not the one you co-authored). Let me simply put it this way: I do not believe that there are proto-signs, including the type Sarbo attempts to identify. Again, my use of the _expression_ was only a temporary expedient allowing for the discussion to go on when Sarbo was my house guest  for a few days following ICCS04. As far as I'm concerned, there are only signs, there are no proto-signs. However, there are three Universes of Experience, and the mechanical is certainly one of them. <> As a matter of fact, the term proto-sign was welcomed by Sarbo just because it indicates that the elements must not be taken as actual, embodied signs. Then Sarbo should stop trying to analyze fairy tales and the like with it. It is embodied signs which occur in art, for example the folk art of the fairy tale. <>With regard to 'wholly Boolean structure' I have to disagree with you. The Boolean operators figure in the model but the structuring is according to the gradual development of the sign in an interpretative system eventually determining its interpretant to stand in the same relation to its object as it stands itself. Without however a concrete interpretation. It is a model of a process, not any specific process itself. Process is associated with thirdness in Peirce. As soon as thirdness is involved one enters the realm of semiosis which can be analyzed, of course, semeiotically (but not proto-semeioticall). Perhaps you are correct, that Sarbo's proto-semiotic is not a 'wholly Boolean structure.' Indeed, upon reflection I see it is not. But this  because Sarbo brings into his mix the language of authentic semeiotic (as in his fairy tale analyses)  twisting it up into his proto-semiotic structure. This is not rigorous science as I see it, nor does it even offer the "suggestive" cultural & design possibilities of Claudio's nonagon (which, as you know, I find problematic for the reasons I've already given). <>With regard to conceptualization you asked me to be more precise. You stated: GR:First, I would like to suggest that ICCS and CGs are more closely associated with "knowledge representation" than with "knowledge management" while the two over-lap to some extent. And I asked how conceptualization fits in. Adding that I expect an overlap between knowledge representation and conceptualization. Knowledge representation is aiming at forming information systems. It has more to do with organizing knowledge, often recorded first in natural language, in such a way that it better serves some purposes. Conceptualization is what I assume to have taken place in order to get the knowledge that has to be represented. But, since representing knowledge does add something to what is known through conceptualization, it in a sense itself is a form of conceptualization. However, it seems to be played by different rules. It is as if we conceptualize if we try to understand something, while if we engage in knowledge representation we only try to get rid of ambiguity and aim at consistence. And this is precisely why even Semantic Web is, while necessary, will not prove sufficient. <>As if it does not matter what it is we try to understand or, probably more precise, as if we delegate the task of understanding to the persons that feed the knowledge. Here I see some moral issues. Suppose a client-organization that has some knowledge to be represented. The Representing person may gain an insight that is in some useful respects superior to the knowledge of the client. But the connection with reality is not his issue. Then the client does not have the possibility of self control with respect to that aspect. And for such reasons a Pragmatic Web is called for. Gary <> --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com