Dear Ben, Gary, Folks--
Ben wrote:
The center of gravity is not always the center of compelling interest. A
tall boat with big sails, you may point at its mid-height in order to
point it out. Its center of gravity may be lower. And there are physical
forces besides gravitation.>>
My response:
Right. I wish I had not confused the issue by adding these comments about
the center of gravity. The reason I did was because I was trying to
distinguish (in my own mind) between the form and inertial mass of an
object. I had in mind a physical metaphor. Form is how the mass of an
object is organized in space and location is its center of gravity. But, I
agree that in a larger sense one's focus of interest may be other than the
physical center of gravity. (Though if you you'll forgive me your example
reminds me of how fast President Reagan's metaphor about a ship or plan
being dead in the water spread like wildfire and now every man of substance
has gravitas.)
Ben wrote: (Beginning with a quote from my earlier remarks)
"One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center of
gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One
can not readily point to the quality or form an object because form is not a
matter of the object's location but of how the object is organized in space
and time".
To the contrary, I think that one can and does point out a form, run one's
finger around it, and point out qualities, shine lights on them, and so
forth. One can point things out in music while the music is playing. Spatial
form is especially subject to being traced out. And the presentation of an
icon requires pointing out the icon itself. "It was greenish-blue -- like
this thing here."
My response:
Well, here we differ. I maintain that it is extremely important to keep in
mind the conceptual distinction between Peircean firstness (quality or form)
and secondness (reaction or inertia). I further believe that all those
aspects of an object which we refer to as its qualities are a manifestation
of the object's form which in turn I believe is equivalent to the object's
organization in space and time. In turn I contend that an object's inertia
mass or resistance to movement is in effect a matter of its location in
space and time. I think this analogy works both figuratively and
literally. But apart from whether one accepts this physical analogy there
remains a concpetual distinction between form and location which I think you
have conflated in your example above. In your example of "pointing out" an
objects form musically or spatially what you have illustrated in not form
per se but the location of an object whose form you wish to highlight. One
locates an object that has form but form itself can not be pointed to as
having a specific location because form is a matter of organziation not
merely location. Form refers to the relative location of parts of whole not
to the overall location of the whole itself. Conversely location is not a
matter of form because location can have a unique center of gravity or focus
which can be pointed to or denoted. On the other hand, the essence of form
can not be captured by mere denotation and must instead be conveyed or
refered to by connotation, implication or illustration. One can of cource
say an object with the form I wish to convey is located there and thus
denote a particular form in that sense. But denoting is not connoting.
Indexes denote, icons connote. The crux of denoting is to locate an object
(of whatever form) in space and time. The crux of iconizing is to present
the form of an object regardless of where it might be located in space or
time. It is generally agreed that in everyday experience different objects
may have the same form but can not have the same location and that the same
object can have different locations. But there is less agreement as to
whether or not an object can change its form and remain essentially the same
object. All of which is to argue that form and location are conceptually
distinct notions which can be used to cross reference one another but ought
not be conflated in ones thinking.
Ben wrote:
What the iconic presentation of appearances makes possible is the
representation of things that are too remote or otherwise inconvenient to
be pointing at, and the representing of things with more generality.>>
My response:
Yes, this is true. but I don't think is contrary to what I'm saying above.
Ben wrote (begining with a quote from my earlier remarks)
[Jim] However one can illustrate the form or quality of an object by
providing a copy of another object that has similar properties. An object
that performs this function is called an icon. To adequately represent or
stand for an object's meaning we must refer to both its connotation and
location. Moreover, I think it is a mistake to restrict the notion of
objects to concrete tangible entities -- An object is anything that can be
represented. Abstract objects such as relations also have forms and
locations that can be connoted and denoted as discussed below.
It's the sign that has connotation (in the sense of comprehension or
intension). An object having connotation is an object being discussed as a
sign while being called an object.
My response:
Yes, good point.
Ben wrote (begining with a quote from my earlier remarks)
[Jim] It is my view (and I think Peirce's) that words or symbols such as
"not", "probably", "if" etc refer to and stand for abstract objects
(relations) that have that do indeed have specifiable forms and locations.
"Not", for example can, perhaps, be loosely defined as the abstract
quality of lacking membership in a particualar class. Many, perhaps all,
objects can participate in the abstact relational quality of "not" being a
member of some class.
If that's true, then the denotation of "not" is universal and its
comprehension is accordingly thin -- nil. Its location is everywhere and its
qualities nil. And I think that that might be the right way to look at it.
Yet it's a strong, definite word. And if, on the other hand, we made it
follow the pattern of the word "probably," then as "improbable chair" means
a chair such that the odds are or were against its even existing, so
"nottish chair" would mean a nonexistent chair. Now the denotation is zero
and the comprehension is that of any contradictory predicate. However, this
involves turning adverbs into adjectives rather than treating them as
elliptical, and I think that your way makes more sense. "Not" almost means
"different (than)." One important difference between them is that
"different" is pretty much always used in some respect in which both sides
of the difference are positively embodied, while "not" is used in connection
even with impossible objects, e.g., "That is not a square triangle."
Everything is in that boat, nothing is a square triangle, but that doesn't
make everything "different," let alone weird. And "different" applied
without qualification usually refers to a contextually understood quality or
modification which is denied in regard to the "different" object.
My response:
Ha! Well I'm not going to get myself entangled in that knotty problem.
Except to say that I'm unsure that "not" being a general means that it is a
once everywhere. I think what being a general (maybe as distinct from being
a universal like time which is indeed everywhere all the time ;) might mean
is that something can potentially be applied to any object rather than in
actually being a property of every object. Because as you say, if something
is a property of all objects than than quality has no distinguishing
features or meaning at all. Indeed that's party what makes is so difficult
to grasp the nature of space and time -- they are universal and were it not
for the fact that they had dimensions (length width and breadth in the case
of space and past present and future in the case of time) we would have no
notion of them at all. Maybe not, Ben -- I'm just thinking on the wing
here.
Ben wrote (begining with a quote)
[Jim] And these sorts of abstract relations can be illustrated and pointed
to. What makes "not" and all other abstractions difficult to conceive and
illustrate is that abstractions are not forms or qualities of concrete
objects themselves but are forms of the way in which concrete objects
relate to one another. Logical relationships are abstact properties of
the time/space continuum in which all concrete objects swim. To illustrate
them we need to point to actions (and their consequences) over time and
involving more than one concrete object. That's why math is not for all of
us -- me for example. A symbol that does not perform the iconic and
denotative function is like a gesture without movement -- sound and fury
signifying nothing. Again, myself a good example.
Despite what Gary says, I think that this sort of thing was a problem with
Awbrey's thinking -- the retreat into abstraction. What mode of
representation is 1st-order "not" -- not some higher-order abstract
connotation or denotation, of which we can devise manifold versions -- can
deal with it in terms of intension, or in terms of extension and classes
or model theory and multiple universes. Maybe the quantum Many Worlds
Interpretation is true. It is, indeed, saying that all alternatives --
whose structures are the subject matters of deductive mathematical
theories of logic, information, and probability -- are in fact embodied
across quantum branchings. As with quantum mechanics, one can think about
these things like "not" and "probably" and never get over their weirdness
and _Twilight Zone_ qualities (though quantum mechanics seems to be a heck
of a lot weirder).
It seems to me that with "not" we have not so much comprehension or
denotation, as a _straightforward generalized manner of alteration (and not
mere modification) of comprehension_, and an accordant alteration of
denotation. "Not" makes "not blue" out of "blue." The comprehension is
flipped, likewise the denotation is shifted from one portion of the universe
to the rest of the universe excluding that portion. You're saying that we do
not directly witness or represent representational relations, but have to do
mockups in terms of comprehension and denotation. We certainly have to give
concrete examples, but after a while one grasps words like "if" and "not." I
think that we directly and unabstractly represent representational and
logical relations with words like "not." Adverbs (though not adverbs of
manner) and conjunctions are their most appropriate grammatical form. You
have the word "not" denoting everything and therefore comprehending
(="connoting" in your sense) nothing; then you shift and have it having
qualities and location in abstract, higher-order senses. We can spin some
pretty find garb out of qualities and locations for representational
relations, which make them more tractable, let us discuss them as objects.
But we already see them plain in simple 1st-order words like "not" which, in
fact, remain indispensable in all higher-order structures. We still end up
talking about "belonging" and "_not_ belonging" to a class, etc. And there's
never any getting away from that need for words like "not." So what is this
"not," as such, in its first-order sense, which is indeed indispensable at
all higher orders or levels? We're not going to build reaction and quality
out of "purely" representational relations, but we won't do the opposite
either.>>
My response : Whew!
Ben wrote:
Now, Peirce actually says that there is a third category, that of
representational relations. And it seems to be represented not by a
dimension of information like comprehension and denotation, but rather by
transformations of information. Symbols like "not" determine the
interpretant to perform those transformations. Then it appears that
information is conveyed sometimes more efficiently by those
transformations than by always "spelling things out," which can't always
be done. Something's not blue? I can't even say "it's red or orange or
yellow or green or -- purple!" because "or" is another logical-relation
word. All I could do is say what color the thing _is_, which will make
clear that it isn't blue. I may not know what color it is. The
logical-relation words allow tons of useful vagueness.
So, those transformations do amount to another element or aspect, if not a
dimension (as in the formula "comprehension x denotation = information), of
information. We just don't have a name for it. When we isolate it, its
bearer, its sign, may look like a mere gesture, but that doesn't mean that
it is in fact empty. That it must ultimately be connected to icons & indices
doesn't mean that there is no representational mode for it other than
comprehension and denotation. In fact icons & indices won't get far without
some help from symbols, and it likewise appears that there is a mode of
representation which works through transformations of information and which
is neither comprehension nor denotation.
My response:
I find all this very interesting. I think I'm more satisfied with the
notion of information as representation than I take you to be. But I agree
that representation is more than just "refering" which is the main function
of either illustrating (connoting) or pointing to (denoting). I think
representation ALSO includes the notion of "standing for" which is in my
mind something more than merely referencing or indicating what is being
indexed or iconized. A lot more. And I look forward to more discussion of
just how "standing for to" or interpretation occurs. I think it needs the
same sort of detailed analysis as the notions of refering which are achieved
through icons and indexes (or their imputed functions reflected in our
communal habits of symbol usage).
As for Jon's earlier insistance that pure symbols did not perform the
functions of icons or indexes (if indeed this was his position), I thought
that he had abstracted and saved the bathwater from the baby rather than
vice versa. As the old starkist add used to remind us, we want tuna that
tastes good; not tuna with good taste.
Thanks for your comments -- I look forward to more.
Best wishes as always, .
Jim Piat
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