[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

[Benjamin Udell]

Joe, Gary, Jim, list,   I forgot that I had wanted to make a remark on the Pragmatic Maxim in the present connection.   >[Joe] I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of distinguishing sense from nonsense.  That's what the pragmatic maxim is all about, isn't it? ....   The Pragmatic Maxim is all about distinguishing sense from nonsense, given a healthy inquirial setting. By itself, it is about the clarification of conceptions. It is not about actually checking them, which also is important in order _soundly_ to distinguish sense from nonsense.  I think that, as a practical matter, the result of semiotics' more or less stopping at the stage of clarification, is that degenerate forms of pragmatism, feeling the importance of practical, actual verification and consequences, have emphasized actual outcomes ("cash value") at the expense of the conception of the interpretant, an expense exacted through persistent misreadings of the Pragmatic Maxim as meaning that the meaning of an idea is in its actual observed consequences "period, full stop."    Yet the Pragmatic Maxim provides a basis for saying that _the interpretant is addressed to the recognizant_.  The interpretant, the clarification, is in terms of conceivable experience having conceivable practical bearing. It is a narrowing down of the universe represented by the sign -- it picks out some ramifications of value or interest under the standards of the interpreter.  As an appeal to possible relevant experience, _it is an appeal to possible recognizants_.  As experiences, the recognizants are not merely "specialized" down from the sign's represented universe; instead they are downright singularized, insofar as experience is singular.  For instance, a prediction based on a hypothesis is a potential recognizant, or a step in the formation of an actual recognizant. It tends to be a prediction which is, itself, crucial-testable, and whose confirmation  lends support to the hypothesis, while its disconfirmation disconfirms the hypothesis. The less crucial-testable a prediction is, the more it is like a hypothesis itself if it is testable at all.   Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com