Greetings all, There���s been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some.
Ben wrote: ���I don���t know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that���s about all. I don���t have some hidden opinion on the question.��� Prof. Ransdall (or do you prefer Joe?) replied: ���I don���t think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce���s approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn���t mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing.��� I want to agree with Joe; it���s hard for me to see Peirce overlooking that bit, for several reasons. But the question of why verification isn���t a formal element in inquiry needs some unpacking. The discussion sounds like everyone���s talking about isolated instances. All the examples given to illustrate testing here are particular, individual cases where one person observes something, draws a conclusion, and checks to see if he���s right. That���s not the only way to view the development of thought. Take Joe���s common-sense example: ���You tell me that you observed something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . . Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.)��� I don���t think anyone finds this sort of thing unusual; the difficulty with this illustration is in *how* it bolsters the case Joe is making. It also seems to me there���s some confusion about what we���re arguing about. The role of verification ��� in *inquiry* or *thought*? At the level of individuals or in general? Let me try to illustrate what I mean. When checking your work, you might discover that you���d made an error (often the case with me), or even that you initially had the right answer but somehow messed up (not often the case with me). This occurs at the individual level. But animals reason too, though they don���t verify. And that���s telling. (This was Ben���s point when quoting Lewes on Aristotle: science is science because of proof, testing, verification.) At the general level it doesn���t seem to be the case. I cannot think of any time in the history of physical sciences when the scientific community at large said anything like, ���Copernicus goofed ��� Ptolemy was right after all!��� and *reverted* to the original way of doing things. It just doesn���t happen. When a development occurs in knowledge, it���s pretty much forward-moving. The same goes for other fields of inquiry. One major reason verification didn���t seem to figure in Peirce���s 3-headed view, then, turns on his conception of thought, even of logic. At times he speaks of it in the particular sense of someone at the desk thinking away, but other times he speaks of thought in a more general sense. It���s this sense that was more interesting to him. Among other things Peirce studied was the history of the logic of science ��� ���science��� understood in both the particular sense and the general sense of knowledge as such. The general sense was more important; Peirce regarded individuals (including himself) as tiny parts of the continuum of thought, cells in a body, atomic particles even. And like physics, things behave a little bit differently at the microscopic level than at the macroscopic. Verification is part of the microscopic realm, an individual affair: at the macroscopic level, knowledge simply evolves. When I say that verification is not a formal element of *thought* (rather than inquiry), I mean the development of thought *as a whole* does not do the verifying. That���s what individual scientists do, and their work has effects on the whole. So verification has its place inquiry, but it isn���t a formal component of thought simply because it���s not itself a general operation; it is to thought as the electron���s spin is to a ball���s ballistics. I hope I���m not just rehashing what���s been said before; this discussion goes way back before I joined (a week or so ago). Just trying to help clarify the problem. Best wishes, jacob -------- Original-Nachricht -------- Datum: Sat, 12 Aug 2006 13:36:47 -0500 Von: ���Joseph Ransdell��� <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> An: ���Peirce Discussion Forum��� <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: The ���composite photograph��� metaphor > Ben: > > I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of distinguishing > sense from nonsense. That���s what the pragmatic maxim is all about, isn���t > it? > Tom��� Short���s take on this has to do with Peirce���s supposed failure to > realize that his view of infinite interpretability entailed an infinite > deferral of sense being given to the initially senseless symbol. In my view > Tom > doesn���t understand what Peirce���s view in the work of the late 1860���s > actually is. I think I can establish pretty persuasively that Peirce was, to > put > it mildly, a bit more sophisticated than Tom credits him with being. It is > really just a matter of understanding what he meant by an ���imputed > quality��� in defining the symbol in the New List, which Tom finds too > distastefully > Lockean to be taken seriously; but it has to be laid out and tediously > tracked through text after text in order to put an end to the sort of > misreading of Peirce that Tom gives, which is what I am currently completing. > I > don���t see that it has anything to do with verification, though. It is just > a > question of what his theory of meaning is. > > Joe Ransdell > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Joseph Ransdell > To: Peirce Discussion Forum > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2006 1:01 PM > Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The ���composite photograph��� metaphor > > > Ben Says: > > I don���t know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and > irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that > question, that���s about all. I don���t have some hidden opinion on the > question. Tom > Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis > learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw > this problem. I wasn���t convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think > that it���s the verification problem; I can���t help thinking that if Peirce > had > seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. > > REPLY: > > I don���t think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just > that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way > you think it is, and Peirce���s approach to logic as theory of inquiry > doesn���t > mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a > thing. Oh, well, one can of course explain about how publication works, and > how people are expected to respond to the making of research claims to do > what one can describe as ���verifying��� them. That would involve discussing > such things as attempts to replicate experimental results, which can no > doubt get complicated in detail owing to the fact that it would only rarely > involve exact duplication of experimental procedures and observations of > results, the far more usual case being the setting up of related but > distinguishable lines of experimentation whose results would have rather > obvious > implications for the results claimed in the research report being verified or > disverified, depending on how it turns out. I don���t think there would be > anything very interesting in getting into that sort of detail, though. > > Take a common sense case of that. You tell me that you observed > something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a > certain > location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in > question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check > it > out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. > Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think > we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some > financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification > of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both > confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim > disverified. But then some fourth person . . . Well, you get the idea. > So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what > Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) > > The question is, why have philosophers of science so often gotten all > agitated about the problem of verification as if something really important > hinged on giving an exact account of what does or ought to count as such? > > You tell me, but my guess is that it is just the age old and seemingly > insatiable but really just misguided quest for absolute and authoritative > certainty. Why this shows up in the form of a major philosophical industry > devoted to the production of theories of verification is another matter, and > I suppose that must be explained in terms of some natural confusion of > thought like those which make it seem so implausible at first that we can get > better control over our car when it goes into a skid if we turn the car in > the direction of the skid instead of by responding in the instinctively > reasonable way of trying to turn it in opposition to going in that unwanted > direction. Okay, not a very good example, but you know what I mean: > something can seem at first completely obvious in its reasonableness that is > actually quite unreasonable when all relevant considerations are taken duly > into account. some of which are simply too subtle to be detected as relevant > at first. Thus people argue interminably over no real problem. It happens > a lot, I should think. > > In any case, a will-of-the-wisp is all that there is in the supposed > need for some general theory of verification. There is none to be given nor > is there any need for one. People make claims. Other people doubt them or > accept them but want to be sure and so they do something that satisfies > them, and others, noting this, are satisfied that the matter is settled and > they just move on. Of maybe nobody is ever satisfied. That���s life. Of > course it can turn out at times that it is not easy to get the sort of > satisfacion that counts for us as what we call a verification because it > settles > the matter in one way, or a dissatisfaction because it settles it in a > contrary way. But that is all there is to it. Maybe there are fields or > types > of problems or issues in which the course of experience of inquiry about > them has resulted in the development and elaboration of procedures that are > regarded as having verification or disverification as their normal result, > but that will surely just be because that particular sort of problem or > subjectmatter happens to require analysis of a certain rather complex kind > involving a lot of detailed procedure. I don���t know what can lie at the > end of > it all, though, other than the fact, if it is a fact, that people have > finally had enough of it to not feel any need to do anything further. That > culminating de facto acceptance is of course always capable of being > mistaken. Such is the view of the fallibilist who is not a pathological > sceptic. > > Joe Ransdell > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.405 / Virus Database: 268.10.9/417 - Release Date: > 8/11/2006 -------- Original-Nachricht -------- Datum: Sat, 12 Aug 2006 23:59:29 -0400 Von: "Benjamin Udell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> An: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Betreff: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor > Joe, Gary, Jim, list, > > Well, your response certainly poses a challenge, Joe. I'll try. Then I > must go and, well, eat. > > >From your transcription from Letter to Lady Welby Dec 23, 1908 (in > _Semiotics and Significs: Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and > Victoria > Lady Welby_, ed. Charles Hardwick, Indiana U. Press, 1977, p.83) > http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html : > 66~~~ > It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate > without, and Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that the > Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral > experience. > ~~~99 > > That is the sense in which I mean that the sign does not convey > experience, acquaintance, etc., with its object. "Its Interpretant is all > that the > Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral > experience." > > That is because one's experience of the sign is not one's experience of > the object. And that, in turn, is because the sign is not the object. The > sign is merely _almost_ the object, enough to convey information, but not > enough to be the object itself (except in the limit case), not enough that > one's experience of the sign would be one's experience of the object. > > - One's experience of the object is not one's sign of the object. > - One's experience of the sign is not one's sign of the sign. > - One's experience of the interpretant is not one's sign of the > interpretant. > > One has experience of something as a semiotic object at least insofar as > one is experiencing it as the focus of one's interest rather than as a sign > or interpretant of some other thing in the focus of interest. It's not > "simple dyadic" experience of the object, because one is experiencing the > object nevertheless in light of other things as signs and interpretants about > it, and, by one's intention or not, one is thereby testing the signs & > interpretants. However, when one experiences something as a sign about > something > else, what is learned along that path also becomes further learning about > the thing which served as a sign. Certainly if we're discussing a person, > one's experience of a person behaving as a deliberate sign tells one a lot > about that person as, himself, a subject matter, a topic, a semiotic object. > > When I say that my verification is not merely my sign, I mean that my > (verificative) experience of (for instance) a sign X, is not itself sign X, > nor > is it my sign Y of that sign X. My experience OF that verificational > experience is not my experience of a sign. Etc. > > Why is that? Because, as Peirce says repeatedly, having a sign of > something is not having an experience of that thing. To me that says the same > thing > as "get out into the labs and the field" -- not in order to bypass and > eschew signs, but instead in order to test them. > > One moves among things, deals with them, and one notices that things tell > one about other things -- the objects are also signs -- and one notices > that one has sometimes alternate interpretations of the same signs, and one > needs sometimes to verify. One notices that one can arrange for oneself to > have experiences of objects, signs, interpretants. One ends up with > experiences about experiences. One is capable of that kind of layered > reflexivity. > I think of the experience, in its verificatory aspect, as a second object > -- the "subject" as when we say "the subject perceives the object" -- though > perhaps I should say that the experience is the subjectness, the > subjectedness. Experience is a kind of subjection. As the sign's cryptic > _night_ is > converted into the interpretant's clarifying _dawn_, so the object's > _dusk_ which led to the sign's night, is converted into the experiential > subject's _day_ as the confirmation of the interpretant's dawn. The semiotic > object is the determinant force at the start; the experiential subject is what > logically stabilizes that force. > > Object, sign, and interpretant are indeed elements of experience, and > often enough, though not always, one has conscious experience OF them. The > mind > as we know it is certainly rich enough to involve unconscious inference > processes which go beyond mere information processing. But we need to start > from the basis of what one _does_ experience. > > When sign and interpretant convey information and clarification of the > object in some respect that goes beyond one's experience of the object -- far > enough beyond to occasion doubt -- then one resorts, if possible or > convenient, to an experience of the object, an experience determined and > informed > by interpretant, sign, and the object both as represented through them and > as already familiar, an experience determined and informed by them _as_ a > test of them. One may dig the requisite experience up from memory. Or one > may seek to acquire it. Either way, at some point the experience is formed > into a recognition logically determined by object, sign, and interpretant. > From the case where the experience is retrieved from memory, we can change > analytic direction and draw the formal lines tighter for cases where a > retrieval moment is not experienced and where interpretant and recognition > come > together. (Note: Where they really are one, there it seems to me that > object and sign are one, and that all four are effectively one; perhaps this > amounts to some sort of implicit recognition of itself by an experience, I'm > not sure; I'm disinclined to conceive such a case in a way that deprives > such recognition of content. I'm thinking in the direction of an icon as > self-representative, an index as self-representative, etc.; I'm thinking that > the self-representative sign is very near to the conception of a given sign > as a _versatile_ general standard for locating, measuring, translating, and > testing -- signs as guides (like the polestar), measures, keys, criteria.) > > Well, what _is_ this recognitive experience? Since it is logically > determined by semiosis and determines semiosis going forward, semiotics > should be > able to characterize it in semiotic terms. It's not the object, the sign, > or the interpretant, yet _is determined by them_. It is the experience OF > the object and OF the sign as sign of the object and OF the interpretant as > interpretant of sign and its object. If you say that it's an interpretant, > I say, no it's not one's interpretant of the object, it's one's experience > of the object in light (light being tested) of sign and interpretant. > Peirce has already clearly distinguished between the two and done so with, I > think, good reason, founded in consideration of what a sign is in the first > place. Moreover the recognitive experience is one's experience not only of > the object but also of the sign and of the interpretant itself, as well. It > is determined by all three, determined twice over so to speak: > > It's an experience which began as an incomplete experience of object and > of sign and interpretant in respect of the object. That's the "first" wave > of determination. In 'renewing' such acquaintance as mind has with the > object, and in doing so in a way determined by the sign and interpretant, the > mind's experience is developed in such a way as learn more about all three > _in respect of_ one another and indeed, in respect of experience -- > experience of objects and of signs and of interpretants and even _of_ > experiences of > whatever. > > Now, maybe you keep thinking, but the experience is made of objects, > signs, interpretants, so, what is supposed to be this experience which is more > than them? > > But the experience which is "more than them" was always there, always > "more than them," helping make them what they are -- evolutionary. Even > unconscious inference to a conclusion involves recognition, unconscious > recognition and an unconscious version of experience. Sometimes we learn or > mis-learn > from things without even (consciously) knowing it, at least without > knowing it until later. Maybe it's a recognition which the conscious mind > would > not embrace but would instead renounce. And maybe the conscious mind would > be right and maybe it would be wrong, to do so. > > The point is that Peirce characterizes semiosis with reference to > (collateral) experience of the object in such a way that said experience > _can't be > diagrammed as object, sign, or interpretant_ in those relations in which it > is experience of object and of sign and of interpretant, and yet one needs > to diagram it since _it is determinational in semiosis_. > > There is this experience, of them collaterally to one another, which > seems, for its part, the experience, to rely on mediation by some unconscious > substrate such that one's experience of object, sign, and interpretant is > direct but mediated. But if this unconscious substrate does not itself involve > unconscious recognition and unconscious experience, then it is a mistake > to suppose it to be an inferential, semiotic process at all -- it is instead > at best an information process basically vegetable-organismic in kind, > further analyzable into material and mechanical processes, though, at every > stage of the reduction, we know that something is lost. However, as I said, > there seems good reason to think that there _are_ unconscious inference > processes. My guess is that they "work their way down" pretty deep, and get > rather strange, but are still inference processes. > > Consider the recipient in the info-theoretic scenario. Here are the > correlations -- not equations, but correlations: > > source -- object > encoding -- sign > decoding -- interpretant > recipient -- recognizant > > The recipient, like the perceiving _subject_, is the one to whom any task > of verification falls, along with the task of determining redundancy of the > message's information with respect to information from outside the message > or set of messages. How does the recipient do this? Presumably with some > resort to info from alternate information channels, indeed, _an indefinite > totality of alternate info channels_, not depicted in the standard diagram. > That doesn't mean that it makes sense to drop the recipient out of the > picture and replace the recipient with a "grand decoder." The decoder, in any > usual sense, doesn't test the system itself or redesign it, rearchitect it, > guide its evolution on the basis of learnings. That "totality of alternate > channels" and sources, encoding, decodings, the same recipient behaving > variously across those channels but also other recipients as sources, etc., -- > is the world with its existential consequences; the recipient is the one > who takes on the challenge of dealing in terms of those consequences and > seeks to shape them and learn from them and evolve, intelligently let himself > be shaped by them, allowing and even actively arranging for truth itself to > decide many things. In all those alternate info channels, the recipient is > there too. They get omitted from the standard diagram because they're not > in question at the time. Some of them seem so transparent to the recipient > that they hardly seem worth calling "channels." Some of them are so clear > and also so sure and sound that they are anchorage. That sureness and > soundness is on the basis of existential consequences arising from the > recipient's total world and is something for the recipient to learn, not the > decoder > (though of course one could imagine a decoder being evolved, however long > it might take, into a nontrivial recipient). The accumulation of anchorage, > a totality of sure 'channels,' sources, encodings, decodings, and > recipience, combined into that "earth" to which we refer in the phrase "down > to > earth," is the job of the recipient; and the recipient is an element in each > of > those channels too. > > I hope that there is some clarification in my example above. I also think > that the example points a way to building bridges between semiotics and > information theory. Not that I'm interested in a "reduction" of semiotics to > information theory. Information theory is not really _about_ the > recipient's design activity, so far as I can tell, though plenty of > information > theory and cybernetics are about how to design and improve systems. To turn > around and study those designers, that is another thing. As subject matter, > self-reference, the ongoing redesign of systems, intelligent evolution, a > consequential self-testing of the system at every moment -- such things lead > into the business of semiotics and philosophy. > > You also seem to see a problem in the notion that I conceive the act of > verification as singular. Just because you or I "verify" something, just > because you or I do some reasonable corroboration (I'm using "verify" as the > forest term for all the trees of "confirm," "corroborate," "prove," etc.), > doesn't mean that it is _really_ true. You seem to be looking in my talk of > verification for a conception which would do the job of a final > interpretant. But I wouldn't look for _that_ kind of verification as being > actually > available to you or me or any finite community of investigators. I have > already used other ways to distinguish verification from interpretation, and > have no need or desire for a _final_ attainment of truth to be part of it. I > remain as steadfast as ever against the "consensus" truth theory > mis-ascribed to Peirce. Instead I conceive of a final recognition along with > Peirce's > final interpretant, as a limiting idea at least, the final recognition of > the final interpretant, etc., which research _would_ be destined to reach > sooner or later if pushed indefinitely far. > > Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Joseph Ransdell > To: Peirce Discussion Forum > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2006 8:31 PM > Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor > > > Ben: > > JR: I must say that I think you are missing my point because of some > mistaken assumption that I can't identify. The reason I gave the simple > example of a common sense verification was to make as clear as I could that > there > is no deep logical point involved. Consider again my simple example: You > see something and tell me about it and I take a verifying look. I see > what I expect to see given what you told me to expect and that's enough for > me. That is a verification. It doesn't follow that either of us grasped the > truth of the matter, but if you did indeed grasp it by taking a look as you > passed by the object and I did indeed grasp it by taking another look then > we are both correct. But where in all of that is this all important > difference you keep talking about between mere interpretation and experience" > There was no more or less experience in my look than in yours, and no more > or less interpretation, as far as that goes, other than the memory that the > reason I took a look myself was because I wanted to see if what you saw is > what you thought it to be, which I am willing to credit if, after taking a > look myself, the description matches up. There is no denial of > verification involved in any of this. It is an imaginary account of a very > simple > case of verification. > > JR: Now you can complicate it as much as you want, turn the look at a > macroscopic object requiring no special instruments of vision (a burning fire) > into, say, the look at the object which is involved in the case of > scrutinizing a bunch of measurement data gathered from cranking up a particle > accelerator at CERN with the help of a thousand other people, and the basic > idea of verification or disverification is unchanged except for being required > to be vastly more sophisticated, given the enormously different conditions > of perceptual access to the object, and of course given the equally > enormously greater amount of inference involved in the one case than in the > other > when we move from understanding the perceived object to be a burning > building to the compared case of understanding the perceived object to be, > say, > a quark doing its thing under this and those conditions. Exactly the same > sort of gross macro description of it applies as semiotically construed: > an object is perceived as manifesting this or that, which, semiotically, is > talked about in the same terms regardless of the difference between being > an object with manifest qualities functioning as representations > interpreted as being a burning fire or quark doing whatever quarks do. > > JR: So I just don't get it, Ben. Of course there is much of > philosophical interest, at a specialized level, if one wants to deal with > highly > complex experiences instead of simple ones. I am not denying that. I assumed > that you would understand that. You say: > > BU: One might make similar remarks on abductive inference, which is > belief-laden and context-sensitive and would require getting into lots of > details and variation case by case. Note that the kind of hypotheses which > inferential statistics characteristically produces are "statistical > hypotheses" > rather than explanatory ones, and it is not as if statisticians never had an > interest in the subject; a few years ago one statistician wrote here at > peirce-l about being interested in general approaches to the production of > the content of hypotheses which go beyond the usual statistical kind. > Statistics deals with phenomena in general and, though often applied in > idioscopy, > is not itself about any special class of phenomena. Yet one does, in at > least some philosophy, attempt and pursue general characterizations _of_ > abductive inference and this is because abductive inference is a logical > process of a general kind and is therefore part of philosophy's subject > matter. > > JR: Yes, of course, but why would I deny any of that? You then say: > > BU: Verification is also a logical process of a general kind. The > question is, is it some kind of interpretation, representation, or > objectification, or combination thereof? Or is it something else? > > JR: Now that baffles me. Of course it is some kind of "interpretation, > representation, or objectification, or combination thereof." Why would you > even say such a thing? Is it something else? Well, it is supposed to be > all of that considered as occurring subsequent to some prior instance of > "interpretation, representation, or objectification, or combination thereof", > relating to that prior instance as sufficient like it (or in some other way > relevant to it) to count as something that might verify or disverify a > claim made that cited the prior instance as evidential relative to that > claim. Yes, it is one thing to be a verification and quite another to be that > which is verified. But what is all of this talk about the one being a mere > sign and interpretant whereas the latter is an experience? Both are > equally describable in semiotic terms and are equally experiential. And then > you > say: > > BU: Now there are two more questions here: Did Peirce think that > verification was important and determinational in inquiry? (Yes). Did Peirce > think > that verification is a distinctive formal element in semiosis? (No.) > > JR: Yes, well that is what I said, too. But I thought that is precisely > what you disagreed with? I don't get it, Ben. And then you say: > > BU: Your discussion of an emphasis on verification as reflecting a > pathology of skepticism, a search for infallible truth, etc., goes too far in > de-valorizing verification, certainly to the extent that you may be ascribing > such a view to Peirce. > > JR: Ascribing such a view to Peirce? I was doing no such thing, nor was I > "devalorizing verification" but only saying that there is nothing > happening in verification that requires the isolation of some analytical > element > not already available in the basic semiotical structure that Peirce > delineates. Next, you provide a long quote from Peirce on verification, as > follows; > . > BU quoting Peirce: > 34. Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1) seems to me to have > come pretty near to stating the true cause of the success of modern > science when he has said that it was *_verification_*. I should express it in > this way: modern students of science have been successful because they have > spent their lives not in their libraries and museums but in their > laboratories and in the field; and while in their laboratories and in the > field they > have been not gazing on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in passive > perception unassisted by thought, but have been *_observing_* -- that is, > perceiving by the aid of analysis -- and testing suggestions of theories. The > cause of their success has been that the motive which has carried them to the > laboratory and the field has been a craving to know how things really were, > and an interest in finding out whether or not general propositions actually > held good -- which has overbalanced all prejudice, all vanity, and all > passion. Now it is plainly not an essential part of this method in general > that the tests were made by the observation of natural objects. For the > immense progress which modern mathematics has made is also to be explained by > the > same intense interest in testing general propositions by particular cases > -- only the tests were applied by means of particular demonstrations. This > is observation, still, for as the great mathematician Gauss has declared -- > algebra is a science of the eye,(2) only it is observation of artificial > objects and of a highly recondite character. Now this same unwearied > interest in testing general propositions is what produced those long rows of > folios of the schoolmen, and if the test which they employed is of only > limited > validity so that they could not unhampered go on indefinitely to further > discoveries, yet the *_spirit_*, which is the most essential thing -- the > motive, was nearly the same. And how different this spirit is from that of the > major part, though not all, of modern philosophers -- even of those who > have called themselves empirical, no man who is actuated by it can fail to > perceive. > ~~~99 [bold & italics at the Website] > > JR: There is nothing in that quote that cuts against my view, Ben. It > is mostly concerned with stressing the importance of active observation in > experimental work, but all of that is as true of the original observation > on the basis of which the research claim is made as it is of the observation > that goes on in verificational procedures. There is nothing in there to > suggest that one is only about signs and inferences but is not experiential > whereas the other has to do with experience, supposedly unlike the first. > You then say: > > BU: Can there be any serious doubt that Peirce did indeed think that > verification has a determinational role in inquiry, that it settles questions > in ways the support the further advance of inquiry? > > JR: No, but who said anything about doubting that? Dropping on down, > you say: > > BU: I point out that verification involves, and is a kind of, > experience/observation of a thing, and that , so a verification is not a sign > or > interpretant in those relations in which it is a verification. > > JR: Now I find that sentence just unintelligible, something is > conceptually askew in it, e.g. in the phrase "sign and interpretant convey > information but not experience of the thing", which involves what is to me an > unintelligible contrast. The conceptions of "sign" and "interpretant" are > used in > the analysis of experience. Any time you have an experience there is, if > one is regarding it semiotically, a sign and an interpretant and an object, > too, and whenever there is occasion to make use of the conceptions of > sign, object, and interpretant there is some implicit reference to experience. > Why? Because the representation relation is a categorial -- hence > universally present -- element of experience. It is an aspect of an > experience, > any experience. And you go on to say things like: > > BU: But my verification is not, for me, merely a sign, but instead an > experience, > > JR: "merely a sign"? "but instead an experience"? "merely"? "instead"? > I just don't get it. Ben I don't mean to ridiculing you in any way in > saying this sort of thing, but am trying in doing so to isolate the > misunderstanding which I think must be underlying the production of sentences > that > I find puzzling as grammatical constructions, given my understanding of the > uses of semiotic terminology. > > >From this point on I would just be repeating myself, I think. So let me > close this message at this point. > > Joe > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > -- "Feel free" ��� 10 GB Mailbox, 100 FreeSMS/Monat ... Jetzt GMX TopMail testen: http://www.gmx.net/de/go/topmail --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
