Gary, Ben, Jim, list,
Thanks, Gary, for calling attention to the possible connection between
yours and my Inner and Outer distinction that, until you mentioned it, had
not occurred to me, and for reminding me of the location of my "as if"
post. Not sure that I follow you close enough to compare our notions, in
lieu of a comparison, I am elaborating on some thigs I have said in light
of possibly taking a run later at a comparison later on.
I use the word semiosis in reference to sign processes or the activity of human and possibly other sentient beings mediated by signs, and the word semiotic or theory of signs in reference to analyses of sign processes. That is, I take semiosis as the subject of semiotic. My saying that there are two semiosical triads is to say that as I understand Peirce, his analysis (semiotic) reveals that sign processes (semiosis) embody two interrelated but distinguishable triads, the triad (Interpreter Sign Object) that accounts for the existence of signs and the triad (Interpretant Sign Object) that accounts for how signs acquire and determine their significant effects. I understand Peirce to say that anything suited to be a sign becomes a sign when and only when it is interpreted as a sign. The world is not littered with signs waiting to be interpreted, but with things suited to becoming and being signs if and when they are interpreted as signs. In short, involuntary and deliberate acts of interpretation or representation bring signs qua signs into existence. Apart from Interpreters or Representers involved in acts of interpretation or representation there would be no signs, and, hence, no Interpretants. I understand Peirce to say in New Elements that, interpreted or uninterpreted, anything suited to be an Index when interpreted as an Index will be interpreted as being just the Index that it is suited to be. I take this to mean both that anything suited to be an Index is not, but would become, an Index when it is interpreted as an Index and just the Index that it is suited to be (its connection to an object makes its Dynamical Object nonnegotiable). Uninterpreted as an Index, what is absent from anything suited to be an Index that is required for it to be and function as a sign is an Interpretant which determines and embodies the Semiosical Object of the sign that must be furnished either, like Bens response to seeing smoke that an artist might have represented Iconically, more or less directly by an Interpreters interpreting it as an Index, or indirectly by its being represented as an Index in and by a Symbol that differs from Icons and Indices by its determining its Interpretant. Peirce goes on to say in New Elements that being interpreted is part of what must be included in anythings being suited to be a Symbol. Uninterpreted, anything suited to be some kind of sign may be suited to be an Icon or Index, but it is not suited to be a Symbol. Acts of Interpretation or Representation (re-presentation) do not, as with Icons and Indices, interpret or represent things always already suited to be Symbols, but actually participate in suiting things to be Symbols. As I presently see it, the contribution of acts of representation to suiting things to be Symbols is to the Interpretant. Together with the signs contribution to determining its Interpretant, acts of representation participate in determining the Interpretants of Symbols and, hence, to some degree, complete them. The Symbols determining its interpretant for an Interpreter occurs together with the Interpreters contribution. [I am thinking here of signs and not replicas of signs such as instruction manuals.] Symbols manifest a vagueness that varies according to the ratio, so to speak, of the Interpreters to the Signs contribution to determining its Interpretant. The symbolic interpretations of the performance of a play among various members of the audience will vary considerably as a consequence of their Interpretants being to a considerable degree idiosyncratically determined by the Interpreters. The symbolic interpretations of mathematicians reviewing an original proof of a theorem, the Interpretants of which are to a greater degree determined by the form of the argument, will vary considerably less. [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] What I have outlined above is at least obliquely related to my speculation on the Inner and Outer Worlds at the end of my as if post. The Outer World furnished with objects in themselves interacts with the Inner World furnished with conscious, actively responsive and responding beings (mind or quasi-minda FIRST) whose response (collectively) and responses (particularly and singularly) to the interaction (a SECOND) bring a Third Semiosical World into being wherein, relative to the First World (what is first for us is not first for Nature), Second World objects in themselves furnish Dynamical Objects for the Signs that inhabit the Third World while the responses of First World beings furnish their Interpretants Semiosical Objects. One further speculation: When Ben first joined the list and introduced his fourth, I responded by saying something to the effect that I have wondered if it might make sense to think that there may be something ontologically antecedent to Peirces Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. I have always found the similarities and differences between Unity as such and Qualitative suchness which either manifests or participates in Unity, and between Unity as such and Continuity which also either manifests or participates in a Unity that differs from the Unity of Firstness, somewhat ambiguous. In thinking about the possibility of my First World, Second World, and Third World (which, by the way, is in no way influenced by my study of Karl Popper), I keep running into the possibility of a ONE WORLD embodying the First and Second Worlds together with the evolution of the Third World.
Charlies --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com |
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