Ben says:
BU: I quoted Peirce on verification to
show that, in the Peircean view, the doubting of a claimed rule is not
automatically a universal, hyperbolic, Cartesian doubt of the kind which Peirce
rejects, especially rejects as a basis on which (a la Descartes) only
deductive reasoning will be allowed to build -- a Cartesian needle's eye of
doubt through which all philosophical ideas are mistakenly forced to pass or be
discarded. I was defending myself against Charles' claim that my view of
verification implied some systematic incorporation of Cartesian doubt into
research practices and against Charles' suggestion that therefore
maybe I was a nominalist. . . .
Evidently you still think that I'm talking only of conscious deliberate verification involving the taking of physically active steps. That is not at all the only kind of verification which I've been discussing. <>The things which you describe are only part of that which I mean by "verification," which I'm using as a forest term for the various trees. In experience and life, the greater part of experience whereby the mind supports and verifies (to whatever extent) is experience which the mind already has, and the main active steps are usually at most a bit of digging through memory. The whole "feeling" of experience, acquaintance, knowledge, recognition, etc., as involving a _pastward_ orientation is no mere accident of linguistic history; likewise the "feeling" of settlement, establishment, etc., as involving becoming part of the past (not in the sense of the departed but instead in the sense of that which has been, that which is the foundation on which we stand). Oftenest, when a mind forms an interpretant supported by that mind's experience, that's it right there -- recognition takes place at near lightspeed -- "verification accomplished," as far as that mind is concerned, and accomplished more or less fallibly as is often if not always also recognized by the given mind. That is a big part of what I mean by "verification," and I hold that it happens just as largely and minutely and consciously and unconsciously at every semiosic stage and level, just as largely and minutely and consciously and unconsciously as objectification, representation, and interpretation happen.
<>BU: If, after all this, you wish that I would just use some other word than "verification," I'm open to suggestions. I've also used "recognition" but the problem with that word is that it also names a psychological act in some sense that "interpretation" and "representation" do not, and there are other and related problems with it as well. Though I didn't see it clearly from the start, "recognition" in the sense in which I've used it really should not be _equated_ with "acknowledgement" any more than "representation" should be _equated_ with "assertion." "Establishment" seems to come closest to the desired sense, but it is also used in the sense of "founding" or "setting up" as in "establishing an organization" etc., and even in the verificational sense it's kind of strong in its "up-or-down" feeling; one is particularly unaccustomed to a phrase like "degrees of establishment." Also it's hard to form a word like "interpretant" or "recognizant" from "establish" -- going back to Latin, it should be "stabilient" but that word does not evoke the word "establish." Maybe I could go half-Spanish and coin "establecent." Or "establizant"? "Establicant"? "Establishant"?
JR: I don't think you will find another word that will work, Ben. Anyway, I looked up "verify" (and its conjugate terms) in the on-line Century Dictionary. (It is not listed as one of the the entries written by Peirce himself, by the way, but I've come to think of the Century as being the best dictionary to consult for any word in use during his lifetime, in any case.) For every of the several closely related senses the implication is always there that there is some prior claim requiring the verification and I don't see how that would make sense if it is supposed that what is being verified has already involved that very component.
JR: I was just referring to the context as being one in which the problematics of category theory are relevnat, as is not the case here, in my opinion.
Joe
Evidently you still think that I'm talking only of conscious deliberate verification involving the taking of physically active steps. That is not at all the only kind of verification which I've been discussing. <>The things which you describe are only part of that which I mean by "verification," which I'm using as a forest term for the various trees. In experience and life, the greater part of experience whereby the mind supports and verifies (to whatever extent) is experience which the mind already has, and the main active steps are usually at most a bit of digging through memory. The whole "feeling" of experience, acquaintance, knowledge, recognition, etc., as involving a _pastward_ orientation is no mere accident of linguistic history; likewise the "feeling" of settlement, establishment, etc., as involving becoming part of the past (not in the sense of the departed but instead in the sense of that which has been, that which is the foundation on which we stand). Oftenest, when a mind forms an interpretant supported by that mind's experience, that's it right there -- recognition takes place at near lightspeed -- "verification accomplished," as far as that mind is concerned, and accomplished more or less fallibly as is often if not always also recognized by the given mind. That is a big part of what I mean by "verification," and I hold that it happens just as largely and minutely and consciously and unconsciously at every semiosic stage and level, just as largely and minutely and consciously and unconsciously as objectification, representation, and interpretation happen.
Science is distinguished by (among other things) a very active attitude of
taking verificational steps in a context where an everyday mind
(and also a scientific mind busy with other things) is often content to
stand/sit/rest on the established.
<>[JR: Omitting more to the same effect.]
<>BU: If, after all this, you wish that I would just use some other word than "verification," I'm open to suggestions. I've also used "recognition" but the problem with that word is that it also names a psychological act in some sense that "interpretation" and "representation" do not, and there are other and related problems with it as well. Though I didn't see it clearly from the start, "recognition" in the sense in which I've used it really should not be _equated_ with "acknowledgement" any more than "representation" should be _equated_ with "assertion." "Establishment" seems to come closest to the desired sense, but it is also used in the sense of "founding" or "setting up" as in "establishing an organization" etc., and even in the verificational sense it's kind of strong in its "up-or-down" feeling; one is particularly unaccustomed to a phrase like "degrees of establishment." Also it's hard to form a word like "interpretant" or "recognizant" from "establish" -- going back to Latin, it should be "stabilient" but that word does not evoke the word "establish." Maybe I could go half-Spanish and coin "establecent." Or "establizant"? "Establicant"? "Establishant"?
JR: I don't think you will find another word that will work, Ben. Anyway, I looked up "verify" (and its conjugate terms) in the on-line Century Dictionary. (It is not listed as one of the the entries written by Peirce himself, by the way, but I've come to think of the Century as being the best dictionary to consult for any word in use during his lifetime, in any case.) For every of the several closely related senses the implication is always there that there is some prior claim requiring the verification and I don't see how that would make sense if it is supposed that what is being verified has already involved that very component.
BU: Lately I've noticed that people talk about "the categories" and seem to
mean the basic semiotic elements (object, sign, interpretant). When I see
"categories" or "categorial" I usually take it initially in the cenopythagorean
sense (quality, reaction, representation). Anyway, I'm unsure how you mean
"categorial" here, but it may ultimately make not that much difference. Anyway,
I'll respond to the rest of your post later.
JR: I was just referring to the context as being one in which the problematics of category theory are relevnat, as is not the case here, in my opinion.
Joe
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