Dear Jim,
I understand (or think I do) your qualm about the distinction
between reacting and interpreting. But just as much as Peirce
distinguished between conduct and though only in matters of degree
(thought for him is a form of conduct -- this is clear, for instance,
when he discusses the normative sciences), I think the same holds for
what you call reacting and interpreting. Moreover, dynamical
interpretants have a reactive element of Secondness in them... So I
guess I'm not sure I see where you're aiming... I'll have to think
about it some more and wait to see what others have to say... One last
thing, though: it seems that putting the issue in terms of
"access" to givens (at the end of your post you
write:" The problem is we assume
that what we observe are "mere" facts but we have
no access to mere givens without
representation/observation") brings us back to the dreaded
Kantian ding-an-sich...
best,
Martin Lefebvre
Dear Martin,
Thanks for these comments. You
may well be right that I am introducing an
unnecessary psychological overlay to my account of
representation. What follows are some of my
initial thoughts as I begin the process
of studying your very interesting and helpful
comments.
Could it be that, although it
is not necessary to be conscious in order to interpret a
symbol, it is, nevertheless, the triadic nature of
symbols (or thirdness in general) that makes observation
possible? I'm thinking about the distinction between
reacting and interpreting. Reaction, it seems to me,
affects both the acting and reacting participants in equal but
opposite ways. OTOH interpretation is asymetrical in
that it affects the interpretant without any corresponding affect
on the symbol or the object. Interpretation is more like what we
call observation and reaction is more like what we call
participation. I am not offering the notions
of participation and observation as psychological explanations or
causes of dyadic and triadic relations but rather the
opposite. I'm saying that a dyadic relation is at the root of
what we call the everyday experience of raw (ie un-observed)
participation and that a triadic relation is at the root of
of observation. So often the act of observation
is mis-taken as something that is independent of the
object and its sign (or measurement), but as quantum physics
teaches they are an irreducible triad and can not be built from or
reduced to any combination of participations in dyadic
reactions.
That said I'm still very unsure of
myself on this and you may be right that I am mostly just putting
unneccessary psychological clothes on the naked truth. (Not your
words I know but I couldn't resist once they popped into my
head). But still, there is something about a concern for
modesty that physics and logic lack in a way that psychology as
the study of humans' being can not.
What I take Peirce (a notable
psychologist in his own right) to have rejected about the some of the
psychologizing of his day was the tendency of some to suppose
that labeling a puzzling phenomena with
a familiar psychological name somehow provided an adequate
explanation. But I am not trying to give a psychological
account of representation. On the contrary I am trying to give a
semiotic account of the psychological experience
of observation.
Ah, a quick aside on
consciousness as awareness of interpretation. It seems to me
that there is something fundamentally faulty about the sorts of
explanations that attempt to account for consciousness by a series of
reactions to reactions (responding to responding, knowledge of
knowledge etc). Off hand I can't think of a term for this sort
of analysis but it smacks of an infinite regress and I don't find it
persausive as an argument either for or against some explanation.
The point is a triadic relation is the basis for all these supposed
infinite regressions and triads only go three levels deep before they
cycle back and repeat the same process. Not as an infinite
regression but as a cycle completed. I say three levels deep on
a intuitive hunch. There are only three elements involved and
the analysis can only take three POV. If a phenomenon is triadic
that is enough said about its recursive nature. Talk of an
infinite regression neither adds nor detracts from the analysis.
But these comments are just an speculative
aside. Ha, who am I kidding, my whole post is just a
speculative aside!
In any case, Martin, thanks
very much for your comments. I'm will continue
to ponder them. And I look forward to Joe's take
as well. I'm wondering in particular how this issue might
relate to the distinction between the act of assertion and that
which is asserted. Seems to me a mere fact is dyadic whereas an
asserted fact is triadic. The problem is we assume that what we
observe are "mere" facts but we have no access to
mere givens without representation/observation. We are trying to
build the explanation of a phenomena using building blocks that
include the phenomena itself. Which is why I am so often talking
in circles. On a good day.
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
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