>I think that a lot of economists play a disingenuous game: >they take a non-tautological version of rationality, i.e., >one that assumes that people are atomistically individualistic >with fixed tastes -- and all sorts of convenient ideological >overtones, since this sociopathic behavior is seen as >"rational," in some sense good -- but THEN defend this >concept and its ideological content by invoking the tautological >version. And we know this is true of neo-classical economics generally: take a term in general use, give it a technical definition which is quite different, then use the two interchangebly, thereby giving some very definite (and false) ideological assumptions the status of common sense. When challenged, retreat to the technical definition, disavowing the implicit claim of using the general term, say this is just a definition, justify the definition by a tautological argument. Another example: use the word "efficient" to get all the affective connotation of the word (not wasteful, wisest use, good). When questioned, point out that you simply mean "Pareto efficient" which is like the politician who when charged with being unethical says, "I broke no law." Anyone whose moral sense hasn't been deadened by the study of neoclassical economics can see that since one person having all the stuff while everybody else has nothing is a "Pareto efficient" outcome, the term bears little relation to the common sense definition of "efficient". -bob naiman
