As someone who has followed up on Akerlof's (and Bill Dickens') lead, I would say that cognitive dissonance is not about the mutability of subjects, but is really just a logical extension of preference theory. Subjects also have preferences over information; that is, information directly affects their utility (in this theory) as well as indirectly affecting it through their ability to take more effective actions. So people may trade off some effectiveness for some blissful ignorance. It's a theory of rational denial. I'm not a big fan of utility theory generally (I find it metaphysical and unable to accommodate lots of evidence), but this way of presenting cognitive dissonance is simple and useful. It also has a buried political point: the more empowered individuals are to act on the basis of their objectives, the less salient cognitive dissonance will be. Democracy, collective action, etc. are antidotes to denial. Unfortunately, the reverse is also true, beginning from an initial situation of relative powerlessness. Peter Dorman
