---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ The Progressive Response 19 April 1999 Vol. 3, No. 14 Editor: Tom Barry ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ The Progressive Response is a publication of Foreign Policy In Focus, a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. The project produces Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) briefs on various areas of current foreign policy debate. Electronic mail versions are available free of charge for subscribers. The Progressive Response is designed to keep the writers, contributors, and readers of the FPIF series informed about new issues and debates concerning U.S. foreign policy issues. The purpose of the and "Comments" section of PR is to serve as a forum to discuss issues of controversy within the progressive community--not to express the institutional position of either the IRC or IPS. We encourage comments to the FPIF briefs and to opinions expressed in PR. We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] (that's irc, then the number one NOT the letter L.) Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post The Progressive Response elsewhere. We apologize for any duplicate copies of The Progressive Response you may receive. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Table of Contents I. Updates and Out-Takes *** CONTAINMENT LITE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS *** By John Feffer *** GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RESOLUTION *** By Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith II. Comments *** QUESTIONS ABOUT FPIF'S KOSOVO BRIEFING DOCUMENT *** *** ULTERIOR MOTIVES? *** ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ I. Updates and Out-Takes *** CONTAINMENT LITE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS *** By John Feffer (Ed. Note: As NATO marks its 50th anniversary in Washington this week, it finds itself immersed in a war in the Balkans, raining bombs on the Yugoslav federation in the name of humanitarianism. In 1949 the U.S. established NATO as a military alliance to defend the West against the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism. When the Soviet Union imploded, the U.S. and other countries of the Atlantic alliance sought to bring Russia into a strategic partnership. Today, NATO's new militarism and its expansionism have undermined that partnership. The following analysis is excerpted from a new FPIF essay by John Feffer on U.S. policy in the former Soviet Union.) *** Containment Lite: U.S. Policy Toward Russia and its Neighbors *** If the U.S. government had wanted to destroy Russia from the inside out, it couldn't have devised a more effective policy than the so-called "strategic partnership." From aggressive foreign policy to misguided economic advice to undemocratic influence-peddling, the U.S. has ushered in a cold peace on the heels of the cold war. Containment remains the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Russia. But it is a "soft" containment. It is Containment Lite. On the foreign policy front, for instance, Containment Lite has consisted of a three-tiered effort to isolate Russia: from its neighbors, from Europe, and from the international community more generally. The Clinton administration's policy of "geopolitical pluralism," designed to strengthen key neighbors such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, has driven wedges into the loose confederation of post-Soviet states. By pushing ahead recklessly with expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. government is deepening the divide that separates Russia from Europe, effectively building a new Iron Curtain down the middle of Eurasia. Instead of consulting with Russia over key foreign policy issues such as the Iraq bombings and allied policy toward former Yugoslavia, Washington has attempted to steer Moscow into a diplomatic backwater where it can exert little global influence. Part of this three-tiered foreign policy of "soft" containment has been to eliminate Russia's last claim to superpower status--its nuclear arsenal--without providing sufficient funds for mothballing the weapons and without pursuing commensurate reductions in U.S. stockpiles. By pursuing a missile defense system, the U.S. has put several arms control treaties in jeopardy; by opposing key sales of Russian military technology, the U.S. has applied a double standard on proliferation. Announcing the largest increase in the military budget since the end of the cold war, the Clinton administration began 1999 with a clear signal that Russia's decline would have little effect on the Pentagon's appetite. While Russia's geopolitical fortunes have been grim, its economic position is even grimmer. In 1992, when implementing the first market reforms, Boris Yeltsin predicted that good times were just around the corner. This corner has retreated further and further into the distance (particularly after the crisis of August 1998 when the ruble went into free fall and Moscow defaulted on its treasury debt). Today, Russia's Gross Domestic Product is half what it was ten years ago. The government is suffocating under $150 billion of foreign debt. Barter has re-emerged as a dominant mode of economic transaction. Workers are paid in kind when they are paid at all. Poverty is rampant. Life expectancy is dipping, the population is declining, and Russia is flirting with Third World status. Economic reform in Russia has not only been unsuccessful, it has been profoundly undemocratic. By collaborating almost exclusively with Boris Yeltsin and his hand-picked "reformers"--and circumventing Russia's popularly elected legislature, the Duma -- the Clinton administration placed expediency over accountability, transparency, and the checks and balances of a truly democratic system. The international community poured billions of dollars into Russia, money that didn't trickle down but rather was diverted into the pockets of a select few. The result was a crony capitalism far more pronounced than anything on show in Asia: all the corruption with none of the growth. With its cold war containment policy, the United States relied on aggressive rhetoric and military might to confront a powerful Soviet Union. By contrast, today's Containment Lite takes advantage of Russia's economic and military weakness, and at first glance has relied more on carrots than sticks. In reality, however, the U.S. has wielded these carrots much like cudgels. The aid and investments, expert advice and high-profile workshops are designed to reduce the military and diplomatic reach of this erstwhile superpower and to remake the Russian economy in the neoliberal image regardless of social costs. Prodded by these carrots, Russia is moving along a path that has led to economic chaos and escalating resentment. The Clinton administration is acutely aware of the dangers of a Russian implosion. Yet the administration has crafted policies that are inexorably leading to the realization of its own worst fears. Security Issues At one time, Russia was the preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy analysts and intelligence agencies. Beginning in the 1950s, the Soviet Union underwrote anti-colonial disputes throughout the Third World and provided significant aid to countries ranging from Cuba and Angola to Syria and India. Today, Russia's importance has dwindled considerably. It no longer plays a role in the developing world. It has scant influence in Eastern Europe. Closer to home it has retained certain ambitions--to maintain the integrity of its own territory (as in Chechnya) and to maintain influence in its "near abroad" (such as Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova). But its ambitions outstrip its capacity, as the losses in Chechnya and peacekeeping failures in the "near abroad" suggest. The truth is, the Russian military is in dire condition -- the size of its armed forces cut by a quarter in 1998, its weapons systems in deteriorating condition, and few funds available for new acquisitions (by 2005, according to current trends, only 5-7 percent of Russian military will be new). The U.S. State Department acknowledges that the Russian army's combat readiness is in "rapid decay." The morale of the army is even lower now than at the time of the Chechen campaign. As for Russia's ability (or desire) to project force beyond its borders, little Estonia recently declared that its neighbor was no longer a military threat. Even its nuclear arsenal, the one card that keeps Russia in the game, is deteriorating rapidly. Russia is contained, quite literally, by its own weakness. The U.S., particularly through the vehicle of NATO expansion, is taking advantage of this weakness. NATO was designed to deter Soviet expansion into Europe. The Soviet Union is no more, and Russia desperately wants to join Europe, not invade it. Yet, without an enemy in sight, NATO is marching right up to Russia's door. In April 1999, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary became the first new members since Spain in 1982. Twenty-five countries now belong to the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, a halfway house for NATO candidates where they can get help in modernizing their militaries. Virtually every country in the former Soviet bloc supports NATO expansion, partly because of NATO's own aggressive public relations campaign and partly as a first step toward benefiting from European economic integration. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a far more inclusive institution committed to conflict prevention and the protection of human rights, has been sidelined, largely through U.S. maneuvers to restrict its scope and funding. Throughout the ups and downs of U.S.-Russian relations in the 1990s, Russia has considered NATO expansion a deliberate provocation, particularly when expansion has potentially included Ukraine and the Baltic states. The U.S. has responded to Russia's concerns with two initiatives. First, it extended membership to Russia in the PFP program. Then, promising a "special relationship," NATO concluded an accord with Moscow in May 1997 that established various mechanisms of consultation. The accord doesn't give either party the right to veto the actions of the other. But through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the two sides at least meet regularly. The PJC has been largely window dressing. The Russians haven't taken it particularly seriously. And the U.S. has not used the mechanism to involve Russia in key foreign policy discussions. Russia has a long list of grievances on this score, for the U.S. did not consult it on air strikes against Libya (1993), Serbs in Bosnia (1994), Iraq (1995, 1996, 1998), and suspected terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan (1998). When NATO bombed Yugoslavia in March 1999, the conflict between the United States and Russia approached dangerous proportions. Angry that U.S. and West European negotiators abandoned efforts to reach a diplomatic solution, Russia recalled its ambassador to NATO and tried unsuccessfully to rally the UN Security Council against the military action. Anti-American protests flared in Russia, and the Russian government reportedly began to consider re-deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Consultation is not Russia's only concern. The expansion of NATO and the Partnership for Peace means a remilitarization along its borders. The new NATO members will be substantially modernizing their militaries. PFP members, which include strife-torn Georgia and Moldova, have access to free U.S. "hand-me-downs" that substantially increase the threat of conflict in the region. From Russia's perspective, NATO is not just expanding territorially but conceptually as well. Secretary of State Albright has called for NATO to "move beyond a narrow definition of mutual defense" and take action without Security Council mandate. She intends to enlarge NATO's sphere of potential action to include the Middle East and central Africa. By encroaching even more on UN territory, NATO in its new role would enable the U.S. to act without concern for Russia's veto in the Security Council. On the arms control front, meanwhile, the Clinton administration is doing little to balance NATO expansion with a commitment to mutual disarmament. Russian ratification of the START II treaty, for instance, was one of the many victims of U.S. strikes on Iraq in December 1998. The U.S. government didn't notify Russia or the UN Security Council before launching the attacks. In retaliation, the Russian Duma suspended debate mere hours away from ratifying the treaty. Arms control aside, Russia's nuclear force is declining daily. It is estimated that the Russian arsenal will fall below 1,000 warheads simply as systems are retired. Without START II, which puts a cap of 3,000-3,500 warheads on each side, the U.S. could remain at 6,000 warheads. With the treaty, the U.S. will destroy warheads and Russia will destroy missiles, an asymmetry that puts Russia at a strategic disadvantage. While START II is in this sense a double bind for Russia, many Russian politicians still hope to ratify the treaty in order to salvage good relations with the United States, keep the aid flowing, and prepare for more significant disarmament initiatives such as START III. Another challenge to current and future reductions in strategic arms is the Clinton administration's desire to modify--or perhaps even scuttle--the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty in order to pave the way for a new national missile defense system. Many Russian experts have declared the ABM treaty linked to START II--if the first dies, so will the second. The Clinton administration favors "modification" while opponents such as powerful Republican Senator Jesse Helms have called for scrapping the treaty. The Pentagon reportedly offered Moscow a disturbing quid pro quo on the ABM issue: if Russia looks the other way while the U.S. develops a missile defense system, Washington will allow Russia to deploy new strategic missiles with three warheads. Although at peace with one another, the two countries are paradoxically moving away from arms control and towards arms augmentation. Meanwhile, the lion's share of U.S. aid to Russia is directed toward the containment and dismantling of its weapons, much of it through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. In his 1999 State of the Union address, Clinton called for a 70 percent increase in funds to help Russia dismantle nuclear warheads and better control fissionable material. The U.S. government is understandably concerned about the potential for Russia's nuclear weapons to circulate on the world's black market. Disarmament communities in both countries are justifiably delighted to witness the destruction and not mere limitation of nuclear weapons. The opportunity for disarmament is breathtaking. But the funds provided by the Clinton administration are not sufficient even to pay for the implementation of START II, much less the full range of arms control measures that the U.S and Russia are or should be considering. Which means that a cash-strapped Russia must pay for its own humbling and the disarmament process is regrettably slowed . Recommendations NATO remains a key sticking point in U.S.-Russian relations at the moment. Particularly destabilizing from Moscow's viewpoint is NATO's interest in preparing the Baltic states for admission as well as efforts to absorb Ukraine into the alliance. Russia has drawn its version of a line in the sand -- a "red line" -- which it warns NATO not to cross or risk "destruction of the existing world order." Given Russia's consistent opposition as well as the sheer number of actual and potential crises on Russia's border, the U.S. must consider whether admission to NATO will make the petitioning states more or less secure. Meanwhile, the U.S. must make a commitment to the Permanent Joint Council and actively engage Russia on the broadest range of security issues, including arms limitations. NATO, for all its efforts to redefine its mission, has not spent much time on arms control (indeed, the 1999 Washington Summit will focus on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, a modernization initiative). For conventional arms control to proceed, NATO must concentrate more on the contraction of its forces than the expansion of its influence. To address Russian concerns about the asymmetry of nuclear arms control, the Clinton administration should consider the proposal of Jonathan Dean, of the Union of Concerned Scientists, to add a protocol to the current START II treaty that would limit total deployed warheads to 1,000 and then proceed with the START III negotiations (concerning data exchange, warhead dismantling, tactical warheads and sea-launched cruise missiles). This disarmament process will cost money, of course, but every dollar spent neutralizing nuclear weapons on both sides is money well spent. (John Feffer is the author of Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolutions (South End, 1992), Beyond Detente: Soviet Foreign Policy and U.S. Options (Hill and Wang, 1990), and several In Focus briefs (on NATO, U.S.-Russian Relations, Eastern European economic reform, and the situation in former Yugoslavia). He is also co-editor of Europe's New Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1996).) Sources for More Information NATO at 50 (FPIF, March 1999) by Tomas Valasek, Center for Defense Information http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n11nato.html U.S.-Russia Security Relations (FPIF, September 1998) By Laura Payne, Center for Defense Information http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n26fsu.html Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion (FPIF, May 1997) by Kathryn Schultz and Tomas Valasek, Center for Defense Information http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol/v2n35nat.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ *** GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RESOLUTION *** By Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith (Ed. Note: Congressman Bernie Sanders will soon be introducing a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for an overhaul of the global economy. In a new FPIF policy brief, Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith summarize the resolution's comprehensive recommendations. The entire policy brief will soon be posted at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n12gsdr.html, and the entire resolution can be found at http://www.netprogress.org ) *** Global Sustainable Development Resolution *** For the past decade, through both Republican and Democratic administrations, the U.S. government has promoted a model of free-market global capitalism that it claimed would benefit the great majority of people both at home and abroad. This model has failed. Over and over the mantra has been repeated that "there is no alternative" to this deregulated global capitalism. But, from debates over NAFTA, Fast Track, WTO, MAI, and the IMF, and from scholars and activists around the world, progressive alternatives have been emerging. Their aim is to build a new global economy that benefits poor and working people and the environment rather than despoiling the planet and its people to enrich a wealthy elite. A group of progressive legislators, nongovernmental organizations, trade unionists, and expert advisers have recently helped draft the Global Sustainable Development Resolution, incorporating many ideas drawn from this international dialog. The resolution was initiated by Congressman Bernie Sanders and has Sherrod Brown (OH), Cynthia McKinney (GA) and Dennis Kucinich (OH) as original cosponsors. The resolution lays out a path for reconstructing the global economy based on labor and human rights, protection of the environment, and new initiatives to encourage socially and environmentally sound national and local development. Commenting on the resolution, the Campaign for Labor Rights wrote that, if passed, "This resolution would be a starting point for taking power away from corporations and putting it back into the hands of the people. Skeptics will rush to tell us that this resolution cannot possibly pass a Congress whose members have ridden to power on corporate money -and they will be right. Its importance lies not in its immediate legislative chances. This resolution bangs on the wall and forces the corporate cockroaches and their friends in government to come running out and declare themselves AGAINST worker rights, AGAINST environmental protection, AGAINST democratic process, AGAINST accountability. And it puts us in the affirmative on those values." Goals: Under the resolution, U.S. policy goals include: * reducing the threat of financial volatility and meltdown * democracy at every level from the local to the global * human and labor rights for all people * environmental sustainability worldwide * economic advancement of the most oppressed and exploited groups Major recommendations of the resolution include: Initiating National Dialogue: The U.S. shall establish a Commission on Globalization to develop the broadest possible dialogue by the people of the U.S. on the future of the global economy. Initiating Global Dialogue: The U.S. shall initiate the establishment of a United Nations Commission on the Global Economy to initiate a process of global dialogue on the future of the global economy. It will also create a Global Economy Truth Commission to investigate abuses in the use of international funds and abuses of power by international financial institutions. Global Sustainable Development Agreement: A series of Bretton Woods-type conferences, with representation of civil society, will make recommendations for and initiate negotiation of a Global Sustainable Development Agreement. Global Sustainable Development Financial Strategy: Through such negotiations, the U.S. will develop and implement a strategy to counter those aspects of the global financial system that make it more difficult for communities, regions, and countries to pursue sustainable development. The purpose of this strategy is to restructure the international financial system to avoid global recessions, protect the environment, ensure full employment, reverse the polarization of wealth and poverty, and support the efforts of polities at all levels to mobilize and coordinate their economic resources. The financial strategy will provide an alternative to the "new financial architecture" being proposed by the IMF, World Bank, G-7, and U.S. Treasury. It will: * encourage economic policies based on domestic economic growth and development, not domestic austerity in the interest of export-led growth * encourage the major industrial countries to coordinate their economic policies to stimulate domestic demand and prevent global deflation * establish a tax on foreign currency transactions -- known as a "Tobin tax" -- to reduce the volume of destabilizing short-term cross-border financial flows and to provide pools of funds for investment in long-term environmentally and socially sustainable development in poor communities and countries * help countries adjust currency exchange rates without competitive devaluations * develop means for assuring global liquidity, such as an expansion of the system of Special Drawing Rights * reduce the flows of destabilizing short-term capital by the adoption of capital controls as necessary * establish standards for and oversee the regulation of banks and non-bank financial institutions by national and international regulatory authorities * encourage the shift of financial resources from speculation to sustainable development that is useful and environmentally positive, such as community development and targeted investment for small- and medium-sized businesses and farmers * create public international investment funds to meet human and environmental needs and ensure adequate global demand by channeling funds into sustainable long-term investment * develop international institutions to perform functions of monetary regulation that are currently performed inadequately by national central banks, such as a system of internationally coordinated minimum reserve requirements on the consolidated global balance sheets of all financial firms Reform of International Financial Institutions: The IMF, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions will be required to reorient their programs from the imposition of austerity and destructive forms of development to support for labor rights, environmental protection, rising living standards, and encouragement for small- and medium-sized local enterprises. The IMF will terminate all activities except those fulfilling its original mandate of addressing short-term external trade imbalances. Debt Reduction: The U.S. shall work with others to write off the debts of the most impoverished countries by the end of the year 2000. The U.S. will work with other nations to establish a permanent insolvency mechanism for adjusting the debts of highly indebted nations. Checks on Unaccountable Corporate Power: To help establish public control and citizen sovereignty over global corporations and reduce their ability to evade local, state, and national law, the U.S. shall enter into negotiations to establish a binding Code of Conduct for transnational corporations which includes regulation of labor, environmental, investment, and social behavior. In addition, corporations incorporated and/or operating in the U.S. shall be held liable in U.S. courts for harms caused abroad. Reform of International Trade Agreements: WTO and all other agreements regulating international trade will be renegotiated to reorient trade and investment to be means to just and sustainable development. (Brendan Smith is a Senior Legislative Aide for Congressman Bernard Sanders(I-VT) and Jeremy Brecher is the co-author of Global Village or Global Pillage.) Sources for More Information The Global Sustainable Development Resolution is available via the World Wild Web at: http://www.netprogress.org. AFL-CIO Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.aflcio.org Campaign for Labor Rights Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: www.clr.org Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.policyalternatives.ca/ Center for Economic Policy Analysis Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/index.htm Citizen's Trade Watch Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.tradewatch.org/ Council of Canadians Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.canadians.org Economic Policy Institute Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.epinet.org Fifty Years Is Enough Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.50years.org Financial Markets Center Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.fmcenter.org Focus on the Global South Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.focusweb.org Friends of the Earth Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.foe.org Global Exchange Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.globalexchange.org Institute for Policy Studies Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.igc.org/ifps International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.icftu.org/ International Forum on Globalization Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.ifg.org International Innovative Revenue Project Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://ceedweb.org/iirp/ International Labor Rights Fund Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.laborrights.com Jubilee 2000 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.j2000usa.org/j2000 National Labor Committee Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.nlcnet.org Preamble Center Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.preamble.org Results Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://results.action.org Sierra Club Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.sierraclub.org/ Third World Network Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.twnside.org.sg Tobin Tax Initiative Website: http://www.ceedweb.org/ttinit.htm UNCTAD Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Website: http://www.unctad.org/ United Nations Human Development Program Website: http://www.undp.org ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ II. Comments *** QUESTIONS ABOUT FPIF'S KOSOVO BRIEFING DOCUMENT *** It's a good idea to try for independent thinking under the circumstances, but I don't think your questions go very far. They're all basically tactical. What they avoid is the unspeakable question, which puts journalists outside the pale if they ask it, and consequently is invisible in the U.S. media. As Norman Solomon points out, this is the question that lies beyond the borders of permissible dissent. That is: What is NATO doing in Yugoslavia? What are its overarching strategic objectives? Have they been the same since the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia? Two weeks ago the San Francisco Chronicle's Frank Viviano visited a NATO base (ex-Wehrmacht) in Germany, where it set up a mock Kosovo village in 1990 and began doing wargames. Of course neither he, nor you, ask the obvious -- Why would NATO choose Yugoslavia as a target for military intervention, even before the breakup began? Has there been a consistent NATO strategy and objective from the beginning, and if so, what has it been? What about the role of imposing IMF-mandated economic reforms, which as Clinton points out for us, have been agreed to in all the former Yugoslav republics, including Bosnia, where an IMF appointee runs the Central Bank? What about arms sales in Eastern Europe (at least the rise in defense stock prices has been getting a little news coverage)? What about the one industry and resource which has a more determining role over U.S. policy than any other -- oil? Could these be playing any role? The U.S. media won't even print the Rambouillet agreement itself, and when you look at what it says about free markets, who would control the media and press, foreign appointment of local officials with no elections, etc., it's no wonder. It reminds me of the Platt Amendment. Could this be a clue? It's not enough to point out the hypocrisy of being against ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and not in the Krajina, or against crimes against civilians in Kosovo and not in Rwanda. These have been kind of the limit among U.S. progressives in questioning administration policy. You point out the desire of the Clinton (and Bush before) administrations' move to leave the UN structure and use NATO as a unilateral instrument of intervention, and question its legality. But the question is -- why? We all know that it offers more freedom for unilateral action, but in pursuit of what? Sean Gervasi, I think, tried to ask and answer some of those questions. In some of the European press there's discussion of it too. But not here. You tend to fall into the Milosevic-demonization mode, which is used in the U.S. media to obscure examination of NATO and U.S. objectives. And on the KLA, you don't even have to go to the European press for a more realistic assessment of its connection to heroin traffic in Europe, and its relation with U.S., German and Croatian political and intelligence figures. How about the Washington Post or Christian Science Monitor of last summer? You might expect bells to go off among those who remember the Golden Triangle and the Hmong, or the Contra-drug connection. I hope you do another round, but next time go a lot deeper. David Bacon [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ *** ULTERIOR MOTIVES? *** Is there some possibly self-enhancing purpose to what we and NATO have been doing in the Balkans? What good could possibly accrue to the US by destabilizing several of the Balkan countries, strengthening Milosevic, and enhancing the despicable ethnic cleansing of Kosovars? What secret gains are Clinton, Blair, and other Western leaders hoping to obtain? Or, is this merely an extension of racism/culturalism at its worst in a world rapidly becoming fascistic? Or is there some economic gain to be made? What is really going on? Cheers! Jay Shapiro [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Progressive Response, go to: http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/progresp.html and follow the instructions. For those readers without access to the www send an email message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the words "join newusfp" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send an email message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the words "leave newusfp" in the body of the message. Visit the Foreign Policy In Focus website, http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/iflist.html, for a complete listing of In Focus briefs and text versions of the briefs. To order policy briefs, our book Global Focus: A New Foreign Policy Agenda 1997-98, or for more information contact the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies. IRC Tom Barry Co-director, Foreign Policy Project Interhemispheric Resource Center (IRC) Box 2178 Silver City, NM 88062-2178 Voice: (505) 388-0208 Fax: (505) 388-0619 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] IPS Martha Honey Co-director, Foreign Policy Project Director, Peace and Security 733 15th Street NW, 10th Floor Washington, DC 20005 Voice: (202) 234-9382 Fax: (202) 387-7915 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:5641] Progressive Response: NATO-Russia, Global Economy
Interhemispheric Resource Center Tue, 20 Apr 1999 14:46:50 -0600
