Jim writes:

>The issue might be restated as "why did the US wait so long to intervene in
>WW2?" 

If memory serves, some Japanese planes had to pay a visit to one of your
imperial holdings before you got really cross with them.  Even then, the big
R. didn't open hostilities against the the Euro-fascists until Hitler (who
still fancied his chances in Russia at that stage - and who'd clearly
forgotten what had happened when last the Yanks came across the water some
24 years earlier) rather daringly declared war on the US.

>and why did it allow GM and other US-based corporations free play in
>Nazi Germany? etc. I think you'll find that a lot of leaders of what were
>to be the Allies -- especially in England -- were more or less pro-Nazi.

Hell, Oz was selling Japan all the pig-iron it wanted right up to when they
threw a load of it at Pearl Harbour - our pompously quasi-Pom Tory PM of the
time, Bob Menzies, is still referred to as 'Pig-Iron Bob'.  As has ever been
the case since, we got some of it back - value-added and at some cost (they
flattened Darwin with it).

>But rather than go further in
>speculating about motives, it's important to note that _motives help
>determine the means used_.

And the means used help us determine the motives, no?  And NATO has a PR
hole there we should be able to drive a truck through, if we keep at it. 
It's TV stations and office buildings now.  What 'military targets' await?

>The US/NATO motives pushed them in the direction of ultimatum-based
>diplomacy and then diplomacy with threats of bombing, and then the actual
>use of strategic bombing. The elites see the only way to fix things to
>their liking is to do it _from above_. Did they encourage the democratic
>and generally pacifistic ethnic Albanian movement for more rights (the
>restoration of Kosovar autonomy)? No. That's too messy. It can't be
>controlled, since it involves people who can't be controlled very easily.
>(Look what our "friends" in Afghanistan did!) Instead, bombing was used.
>The elite couldn't use troops, of course, because of the lingering Vietnam
>syndrome and the greater degree of democracy in W. Europe than in the US.
>So bombing -- a "solution" that never solved anything, especially when
>applied alone -- was applied.

Chris thinks - and I simply can not yet bring myself to agree with him -
that the US are gonna fatten up the KLA, give 'em tactical weaponry, and
send 'em in to do the killing and the dying for 'em - with NATO air and
logistic support, no doubt.  Now, I realise this has been standard US
practice for many decades now, but even the Yanks must learn eventually!  Or
are they blithely creating another medium-long-term rod for their own backs
- another erstwhile puppet-cum-demonic-enemy-of-the-people process in train?
 It's a way of avoiding American boys-in-bags, might leave Boris a way out
now that he's declared Russia will respond to a NATO invasion, and it helps
obviate the diplomatic problem of where to invade from, I s'pose ... hey,
mebbe I do agree with Chris ...

>Of course, now that we've demonized Milosevic and labeled the Serbs a
>nation of killers, the popular support for sending in ground troops is
>rising. So the elite is succeeding at achieving a goal they've cherished
>for years, the purging of the Vietnam syndrome and the increase in popular
>willingness to take direction.

Can anybody assure me that no tactical or strategic commie-bloc nuclear
weaponry persists on Yugoslav soil?  If not, can anyone assure me it
wouldn't be under Belgrade's control?  Not a rhetorical question - I just
haven't a clue.  

>But the problem is that the bombing has made th Serbs more resolute, united
>them behind _their_ elite. So chances are that even ground troops won't
>succeed in achieving US/NATO's stated goals. So we might see the Vietnam
>syndrome coming back.

I can't for the life of me begin to imagine a realistic ending to this
nonsense.  This is getting right out of control.  Just look at the July
papers from 1914.  At first, no-one thought we'd be so mad as to go through
with our posturing, then, slowly, the horrible realisation dawned that blood
would be spilled.  Of course, no-one had a clue how big it was all gonna get
for some tragic time to come.  But try, with the benefit of hindsight, to
pick the moment of no-return in 1914.  What would constitute the equivalent
of the Kaiser's sad note to the Tsar today? 

A NATO ground-assault, for mine.  Kaiser Bill effectively telling Tsar
Boris, 'Sorry, mate - gotta do it now - nothing personal.'

Sigh,
Rob.



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