------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date sent: Wed, 28 Apr 1999 14:50:12 -0700
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: It is ludicrous to demand a withdrawal of Yugoslav forces as a
condition of a ceasefire - General Lewis Mackenzie
The Vancouver Sun April 28, 1999
A Soldier's View
GLIMMERS OF HOPE FOR A CEASEFIRE IN YUGOSLAVIA
It is ludicrous to demand a withdrawal of
Yugoslav forces as a condition of a ceasefire
By Lewis Mackenzie
As a result of my United Nations service in Sarajevo in 1992 I
have the dubious distinction of brokering more ceasefire agreements
than any other Canadian. Dubious, because most of them failed!
Nevertheless, based on the theory that you learn from your
mistakes, at around the 15th of 19 ceasefires I was beginning to get it
right.
A few basic rules apply to ceasefire arrangements and the
follow-on activities that should be designed to create real peace. A
ceasefire merely brings most of the killing to a stop. In 1992 in
Croatia 200 ceasefire violations a day by the Serbs and Croats was
described by the UN as "ceasefire holding." A ceasefire does not
produce peace by itself.
First of all, no side in the conflict should be humiliated. Pride
plays a very important part in convincing one or all sides to accept
the terms of a ceasefire.
Secondly, all sides must feel that their people will be secure if a
ceasefire is signed. If the agreement does not account for the
re-establishment of law and order, the conflict will merely move from
war to anarchy.
Thirdly, peacekeepers should come from countries having nothing
to do with the conflict either politically or militarily. Obviously, this
rule does not apply to a peace enforcement contingent or an army of
occupation, both of which would be capable of defending themselves
and others in the conflict zone.
During my recent three weeks in Belgrade I discussed a number
of ceasefire/peace proposals with various government ministers and
deputy prime ministers. I found a refreshing openness to ideas on
how the war might be halted and the rebuilding begun. However, as is
well documented, if President Slobodan Milosevic does not agree it
won't happen.
I hasten to add, before my critics launch a fresh assault, that I was
operating as a private citizen offered suggestions to government
officials where they were solicited. During those three weeks I
discovered a number of "hot buttons" and some areas of compromise.
Anyone discussing cease fire proposals on a more formal basis might
want to consider the following:
A withdrawal of Yugoslav forces — military, police, and
paramilitary — before a ceasefire is, quite frankly, a ludicrous
demand by NATO. I can't believe the alliance is serious. No leader
would ever concentrate his forces in Kosovo for the drive north to
Serbia with NATO aircraft overhead still seeking targets. The
ceasefire must come first.
The disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army will not happen.
Their own spokesman, based in the U.K., has stated that their aim is
to unite the Albanians of Macedonia and Albania proper with the
Kosovo Albanians, thereby creating a Greater Albania. He also
indicated they would never agree to disarm, considering what been
done to them by Yugoslav security forces. I believe him.
The Rambouillet agreement is dead and anyone who thinks
otherwise has only been listening to NATO as opposed to the parties
to the conflict, the Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav leadership.
Their opinions should count for something.
The presence of a follow-on international "peacekeeping'' force in
Kosovo to maintain security for returning refugees is a major problem
for Milosevic; however, it is not an impossible problem. The first step
is not to call it a "force". The word generates problems all by itself. I
used the terms "peacekeeping mission" and "peacekeeping corps" —
anything but "force".
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
monitors, pulled out just before the bombing started, did marvellous
work. Their numbers were approximately 50 per cent of what was
requested in the October 1998 Agreement. I would personally triple
their size. The Yugoslav officials I met with saw no problem with
that.
I do not agree that nations participating in the air offensive should
provide peacekeepers, for all of the obvious reasons. However, with
the UN's inability to put mission into Kosovo on short notice, NATO
troops wearing UN insignia and authorized by a Security Council
resolution for a limited deployment of three months might be the
answer.
During that time nations outside the conflict, such as Ukraine,
India, Brazil, Argentina, China, etc., could deploy their troops to the
area, ready to take over when the NATO troops withdrew.
There were lots of pained expressions in Belgrade when I
proposed such an idea; however. it was not rejected out of hand.
Needless to say, the Albanians will insist on some trustworthy
police/security force in Kosovo, as will the Serbs. This problem could
be managed by deploying a large UNCIVPOL (UN civilian police)
contingent with a mandate to monitor the local police with a view to
ensuring ethnic balance and professional standards. This has worked
well in Bosnia and Haiti and police officers from Canada played a key
role in making the programs work.
Brokering peace is like buying a rug in a bazaar in Tangiers. The
shopkeeper wants $500, you offer $90. Ultimately you both settle for
$210 and agree that he is losing money on the deal and his family is
starving due to his generosity. The point is that both sides get
something.
At present, regarding a ceasefire in Kosovo, the rug dealer is
insisting on $480 and we have gone to $150.
We re still far apart. But we are getting there.
Retired major general Lewis MacKenzie commanded UN troops
during the siege of Sarajevo in the Bosnian civil war in 1992.
[PEN-L:6133] (Fwd) It is ludicrous to demand a withdrawal of Yugoslav force
ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224] Wed, 28 Apr 1999 21:01:43 -0500
