I want to strongly endorse this statement. I too have strong feelings about the "holocaust" issue. I get angry when I hear this word (and "genocide") tossed about casually in the context of Serbia/Kosovo -- not only because, as obscene as the killing and expulsion is, it does not compare to the Nazi policies, but also because it misses the main point. The allied war on Nazi Germany did not save any Jews (or Gypsies, "superfluous" Slavs, etc.). No effort was made to disrupt the actual killing apparatus. Refugees were spurned. So, even in the best-case scenario for war -- a real Hitler, a real holocaust -- the military option failed to defend human rights. This does not mean I think war against Hitler was wrong, just that the lesson we should learn from this is that war of this sort is not the answer to human rights crises. (The allied victory, to its credit, prevented Hitler from establishing dominion over Europe. No doubt NATO can claim the same success with Milosevic if it wants.) The only difference I have is with the mandate that international forces be unarmed. I agree that there are many situations where that would be a good idea. But I would not abstain from armed force in all circumstances. So what would distinguish the "good" armed forces of the future from the disastrous forces of today? (1) Genuine international accountability. This would require a post-hegemonic world, but the struggle for a truly international regime of human rights and accountable force would be a good lever for achieving post-hegemony. (2) A focused human rights mandate. Force should not be used to draw borders, impose or depose governments, etc. It should be used to defend civilian communities, disarm the attackers, and guarantee the enforcement of a set of fundamental rights. (3) It should be generous with economic aid in situations in which poverty is a cause of violence. In fact, the entire premise of such a force is that it would command the overwhelming support of most locals (armed and unarmed alike) through its credible promise to make life more peaceful and fulfilling while retaining genuing political neutrality. If it can't command this support it should stay out. Peter Robert Naiman wrote: > > I think that an important point here that should be emphasized is that if you have >good reason to believe that the government of country X has a plan to attack some >part of its civilian population, then there is a strong argument that attacking that >country militarily may be the *last* thing that you want to do, because there is a >long history of wars being used as a pretext and cover for population explulsions, >massacres, etc. Indeed, some are suggesting that Milosevic actually calculated that >NATO attack would provide him the pretext and suitable environment for expulsions, >and I think this is a plausible suggestion. > > Consider 1948 in Israel. Might fewer Palestinians have been expelled from Israel if >the Arab nations hadn't attacked following the declaration of the state of Israel? >We'll never know. Maybe more would have been expelled, if the armistice lines were >different, maybe Palestinians would have been expelled from the West Bank and Gaza >also. On the other hand, maybe the war consolidated the position of the more hawkish >camp in the Israeli leadership -- there were divisions (Peretz Kidron in "Blaming the >Victims" relates how the civilian population of Nazareth was spared, because the >commander of the Israeli forces refused the order to expel its inhabitants.) >Certainly the war swept aside the possibility of pressing the enforcement of the 1947 >UN partition plan, which would have been much better for the Palestinians than what >happened. I'm not saying that a different policy was politically possible at the >time, and most folks certainly didn't know what was in store, only that in! hin! > dsight one can make a good case that a non-military strategy might have had a much >better outcome for the Palestinians. > > Similarly, WWII did not prevent the Holocaust. The actual occupation by Allied >forces did halt it, but after it was mostly complete. And the war may well have >exacerbated the Holocaust, by strengthening Hitler's position, sealing the borders >(this last point is suggested in the recent book "The Myth of Rescue" -- i.e. the war >stopped the flow of refugees. I highly recommend the book -- includes an interesting >passage pointing out the misleading nature of the exhibit at the U.S. Holocaust >museum which suggests that the Allies could have disrupted the Holocaust through >bombing.) > > we're told that we need an alternative besides NATO and "doing nothing," and I'm all >for discussing alternatives, but it should be pointed out that 1) it is highly >probable that things would be much better than they are now if NATO had never bombed >2) even if one thinks that the international intervention was insufficient before the >bombing, that doesn't mean that there was no intervention, or that the intervention >was useless. There were OSCE monitors, aid groups, NGOs, including peacekeepers, >journalists, and these things have a deterrent effect. Maybe not as much as one would >like, but they should not be discounted. > > I was part of a peace team (CPT) in Hebron in the West Bank from February to July >1996, and I can report to you from direct personal experience that we stopped a lot >of bad things from happening. We averaged about 5 people, we had no governmental >authority or legitimacy or budget or assistance, and yet we did a lot. The TIPH >(Norway) also had a deterrent effect, even though they were severely limited by their >mandate: unlike us, they had cars. It was considered common knowledge that fewer bad >things happened in Jerusalem and Ramallah than in Hebron and Nablus because there >were many internationals in the former and few in the latter, etc. > > I would say based on my experience, and I think what we've seen in Kosovo bears this >out, that a situation of low-intensity war with international unarmed monitors, NGOs, >peacekeepers, journalists, aid groups, etc. is highly preferable to one of total war >and no monitors. > > It should also be noted that whatever deterrent effect the threat of external >military force is supposed to have is largely eliminated by the actual application of >the force. What is the threat now? Only more escalation, precisely the dynamic we >want to avoid. > > But if we're talking about military force that would stop bad things from happening >to civilians, then I think the only way you could avoid the likely outcome that >military intervention makes things worse for civilians is that the intervention force >has massive superiority, intervenes on the ground immediately and is successful >immediately, is willing to sustain casualties, and have the protection of civilians >as its top priority. > > In other words, it has to be totally unlike any military that exists or has ever >existed or perhaps is ever likely to exist. > > Thus, I would suggest the following three principles for any intervention force that >progressives should support. > > 1) Participation in it should be entirely voluntary. By "entirely voluntary" I mean >that one volunteers for the assignment at the time of the assignment. There can be a >standing force, but members of it have to specifically request the assignment. Such a >force is most likely to accept danger, and prioritize humanitarian concerns. > > 2) Such a force should be unarmed. This is most likely to guarantee the "do no harm" >principle. Such a force is unlikely to make things worse. > > 3.) Such a force must not be controlled by the United States, the Security Council, >the big powers, or anything like NATO. > > There is already a literature on this, and indeed were many appeals from the >Kosovars for such nonviolent intervention in the past, prior to NATO's intervention. >These calls were inadequately responded to simply due to lack of resources. > > Contributions to CPT are tax-deductible. > > -Robert Naiman >
