IN THIS MESSAGE: Brecher Resigns From Sander's Staff Over War; Peace Plan Fraud May 4, 1999 Congressman Bernie Sanders 2202 Rayburn Building Washington, DC, 20515 Dear Bernie, This letter explains the matters of conscience that have led me to resign from your staff. I believe that every individual must have some limit to what acts of military violence they are willing to participate in or support, regardless of either personal welfare or claims that it will lead to a greater good. Any individual who does not possess such a limit is vulnerable to committing or condoning abhorrent acts without even stopping to think about it. Those who accept the necessity for such a limit do not necessarily agree regarding where it should be drawn. For absolute pacifists, war can never be justified. But even for non-pacifists, the criteria for supporting the use of military violence must be extremely stringent because the consequences are so great. Common sense dictates at least the following as minimal criteria: The evil to be remedied must be serious. The genuine purpose of the action must be to avert the evil, not to achieve some other purpose for which the evil serves as a pretext. Less violent alternatives must be unavailable. The violence used must have a high probability of in fact halting the evil. The violence used must be minimized. Let us evaluate current U.S. military action in Yugoslavia against each of these tests. Evil to be remedied: We can agree that the evil to be remedied in this case -- specifically, the uprooting and massacre of the Kosovo Albanians -- is serious enough to justify military violence if such violence can ever be justified. However, the U.S. air war against Yugoslavia fails an ethical test on each of the other four criteria. Purpose vs. pretext: The facts are incompatible with the hypothesis that U.S. policy is motivated by humanitarian concern for the people of Kosovo: In the Dayton agreement, the U.S. gave Milosevic a free hand in Kosovo in exchange for a settlement in Bosnia. The U.S. has consistently opposed sending ground forces into Kosovo, even as the destruction of the Kosovar people escalated. (While I do not personally support such an action, it would, in sharp contrast to current U.S. policy, provide at least some likelihood of halting the attacks on the Kosovo Albanians.) According to The New York Times (4/18/99), the U.S. began bombing Yugoslavia with no consideration for the possible impact on the Albanian people of Kosovo. This was not for want of warning. On March 5, 1999, Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema met with President Clinton in the Oval Office and warned him that an air attack which failed to subdue Milosevic would result in 300,000 to 400,000 refugees passing into Albania and then to Italy. Nonetheless, "No one planned for the tactic of population expulsion that has been the currency of Balkan wars for more than a century." (The New York Times, 4/18/99). If the goal of U.S. policy was humanitarian, surely planning for the welfare of these refugees would have been at least a modest concern. Even now the attention paid to humanitarian aid to the Kosovo refugees is totally inadequate, and is trivial compared to the billions being spent to bomb Yugoslavia. According to the Washington Post (4/30/99), the spokeswoman for the U.N. refugee agency in Macedonia says, "We are on the brink of catastrophe." Surely a genuine humanitarian concern for the Kosovars would be evidenced in massive emergency airlifts and a few billion dollars right now devoted to aiding the refugees. While it has refused to send ground forces into Kosovo, the U.S. has also opposed and continues to oppose all alternatives that would provide immediate protection for the people of Kosovo by putting non- or partially-NATO forces into Kosovo. Such proposals have been made by Russia, by Milosevic himself, and by the delegations of the U.S. Congress and the Russian Duma who met recently with yourself as a participant. The refusal of the U.S. to endorse such proposals strongly supports the hypothesis that the goal of U.S. policy is not to save the Kosovars from ongoing destruction. Less violent alternatives: On 4/27/99 I presented you with a memo laying out an alternative approach to current Administration policy. It stated, "The overriding objective of U.S. policy in Kosovo -- and of people of good will -- must be to halt the destruction of the Albanian people of Kosovo. . . The immediate goal of U.S. policy should be a ceasefire which halts Serb attacks on Kosovo Albanians in exchange for a halt in NATO bombing." It stated that to achieve this objective, the United States should "propose an immediate ceasefire, to continue as long as Serb attacks on Kosovo Albanians cease. . . Initiate an immediate bombing pause. . . Convene the U.N. Security Council to propose action under U.N. auspices to extend and maintain the ceasefire. .. . Assemble a peacekeeping force under U.N. authority to protect safe havens for those threatened with ethnic cleansing." On 5/3/99 you endorsed a very similar peace plan proposed by delegations from the US Congress and the Russian Duma. You stated that "The goal now is to move as quickly as possible toward a ceasefire and toward negotiations." In short, there is a less violent alternative to the present U.S. air war against Yugoslavia. High probability of halting the evil: Current U.S. policy has virtually no probability of halting the displacement and killing of the Kosovo Albanians. As William Safire put it, "The war to make Kosovo safe for Kosovars is a war without an entrance strategy. By its unwillingness to enter Serbian territory to stop the killing at the start, NATO conceded defeat. The bombing is simply intended to coerce the Serbian leader to give up at the negotiating table all he has won on the killing field. He won't." (The New York Times, 5/3/99) The massive bombing of Yugoslavia is not a means of protecting the Kosovars but an alternative to doing so. Minimizing the consequences of violence. "Collateral damage" is inevitable in bombing attacks on military targets. It must be weighed in any moral evaluation of bombing. But in this case we are seeing not just collateral damage but the deliberate selection of civilian targets, including residential neighborhoods, auto factories, broadcasting stations, and hydro-electric power plants. The New York Times characterized the latter as "The attack on what clearly appeared to be a civilian target." (5/3/99) If these are acceptable targets, are there any targets that are unacceptable? The House Resolution (S Con Res 21) of 4/29/99 which "authorizes the president of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with the United States' NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" supports not only the current air war but also its unlimited escalation. It thereby authorizes the commission of war crimes, even of genocide. Indeed, the very day after that vote, the Pentagon announced that it would begin "area bombing," which the Washington Post (4/30/99) characterized as "dropping unguided weapons from B-52 bombers in an imprecise technique that resulted in large-scale civilian casualties in World War II and the Vietnam War." It was your vote in support of this resolution that precipitated my decision that my conscience required me to resign from your staff. I have tried to ask myself questions that I believe each of us must ask ourselves: Is there a moral limit to the military violence you are willing to participate in or support? Where does that limit lie? And when that limit has been reached, what action will you take? My answers led to my resignation. Sincerely yours, Jeremy Brecher ============================================ Date: Fri, 07 May 1999 18:30:38 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: G-8 KOSOVO PRINCIPLES - A N O T H E R P E A C E P L A N F R A U D Mime-Version: 1.0 P r e s s I n f o # 6 7 G 8 K O S O V O P R I N C I P L E S - A N O T H E R P E A C E P L A N F R A U D May 7, 1999 "The G8 foreign ministers' declaration of principles to resolve the Kosovo "crisis" is a mishmash of face-saving elements for the West and addresses none of the root causes of the conflict or the failure of the West as a mediator," says TFF director Jan Oberg. "This declaration may be used to justify continued bombing and, if implemented, promises a very sad future for the Balkans. But 'conflict illiteracy' abounds, so leading media call it a peace plan - repeating their treatment of Rambouillet." Here follows the full G8 text of principles as published by BBC on May 6. - - - - - "The following general principles must be adopted and implemented to resolve the Kosovo crisis: * Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. * Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces. * Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives. * The establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants for Kosovo. * The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations. * A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework. An agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other countries of the region and the demilitarisation of the UCK. * Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the crisis region." - - - - - "Here are 10 reasons why this declaration can be seen as another peace plan fraud: 1. The ministers call this a "crisis" and not a "conflict" or a "war." That indicates that their purpose is to create a face-saving formula for the crisis created by NATO's Balkan bombing blunder. People in Yugoslavia (FRY), the Kosovars in particular and the surrounding countries see it as a conflict that exploded in war and aggression. The principles grasp none of the deep roots of the conflict itself and focus on none of the needs of the peoples living in the region. 2. They avoid reference to NATO's bombing and under what conditions it would stop. 3. The ministers begin with withdrawal of FRY forces (which, all or some, from where to where?) and ends with a general reference to (later) demilitarisation of the UCK under the point "political process." This continues the lack of balance - introduced last year by ambassador Holbrooke - in dealing with two fighting parties/forces in a civil war. 4. It does not state whether all or some FRY forces shall be withdrawn. It mentions 'demilitarization' of UCK, but can there be an Army without weapons? If so, is this an endorsement of the KLA-dominated 'government' recently formed outside the constitution and political framework of Kosova? 5. The ministers avoid defining the international "presences;" but the wording 'international civil and security' does represent an important move away from "NATO alone" over "NATO lead" and "international security force with a NATO core." Good that the UN is, finally, to play a role, but will it be as leader or as a hostage holding the rubber stamp? 6. Reference to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of FRY is not enough. The declaration does not mention that FRY shall be consulted about its own future. The UN Security Council shall decide about an interim administration and the interim political framework shall take full account of the Rambouillet accords. But they violated the integrity and sovereignty of FRY and were no 'accords.' 7. The ministers seem to believe that it is an 'interim administration for Kosovo' rather than a socio-psychological, people-based peace-building process which will bring peace to the region. This continues the disastrous top-down 'engineering' or 'managerial' approach to conflict where a shift to consultation, trust-building, and regeneration of civil society is much needed. 8. The declaration is most interesting for what it does not say a word about, namely: a) local and regional trust- and confidence-building, b) consulting with FRY and KLA/UCK and Dr. Rugova, c) negotiations between the conflict's core parties, and d) a Balkan regional approach and process. 9. The ministers avoid mentioning any regret or apology to the peoples of Yugoslavia for the civilian deaths and damage caused - and thus fails pitifully to open the door to reconciliation between NATO countries and the 10 million citizens of FRY. Lacking both in self-criticism and empathy, the G8 believes that NATO countries can get away with first failing in violence-prevention, then in impartial mediation and now in aggression and then become a trusted, legitimate peacemaker! 10. With so many crucial issues left out and so much vagueness, FRY is likely to ask for clarifications or say no - and then NATO can legitimate continued bombing of those who say no to 'peace principles.' This document fails to open a single door to genuine conflict-solution. It addresses neither the original roots causes of the Albanian-Serb conflict, nor the much worse regional and world crisis created by NATO's disastrous policies. The obscurities, the omissions, the shortness, the contradictions and the absence of any expression of empathy with human suffering indicate the deep divisions among the drafters. Russia is 'on board' this - if they are - only because the West is more important to it than Kosovo. I would be surprised if Yugoslavia perceives it as anything but window-dressing. It is tragic that the most powerful leaders have learnt no lessons about conflict-resolution. To paraphrase Einstein, with NATO's bombings since March 24, everything has changed except the most powerful leaders' way of thinking about conflict and 'peace' and thus we drift towards more catastrophes," predicts Jan Oberg. © TFF 1999 You are welcome to reprint, copy, archive, quote or re-post this item, but please retain the source. _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/ Dr. Jan Oberg Director, head of the TFF Conflict-Mitigation team to the Balkans and Georgia T F F Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research Vegagatan 25, S - 224 57 Lund, Sweden Phone +46-46-145909 (0900-1100) Fax +46-46-144512 Email [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.transnational.org
