------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date sent: Fri, 07 May 1999 12:22:07 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Sid Shniad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: NATO'S COMPROMISE ON TERMS FOR ENDING STRIFE SIGNALS DIPLOMATIC RETREAT The Globe and Mail Friday, May 7, 1999 NATO'S COMPROMISE ON TERMS FOR ENDING STRIFE SIGNALS DIPLOMATIC RETREAT By Marcus Gee The Kosovo peace plan announced by Russia and seven Western powers yesterday appears to represent a significant diplomatic retreat by NATO. Trapped in a war that they seem incapable of winning with air power alone, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's leading countries have compromised on some of their major conditions for ending the conflict, from the composition of a postwar occupation force to the shape of a postwar political order. They have also shifted position by inviting the participation of Russia and the United Nations in any solution. After initially shunning the UN and brushing aside Russia's objections to the bombing of Yugoslavia, NATO now sees both as crucial to the success to any peace plan. "NATO began all this saying that it was the only effective organization to stand up against this schoolyard bully [Yugoslav President] Slobodan Milosevic," said University of Toronto scholar Aurel Braun. "Well, 40 days later, the schoolyard bully is just fine and NATO is running to the UN." Under the G8 agreement, concluded in Bonn yesterday, the UN would oversee the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo and the establishment of an interim administration. Russia's support would ensure the passage of the plan through the UN Security Council. All this takes NATO a long way from the position held when it began bombing Yugoslavia on March 24. At that time, the alliance said it would stop the bombing only if Belgrade agreed to halt its attacks on Kosovo Albanians, withdraw its military forces from Kosovo, accept the Rambouillet peace plan for a postwar settlement and accept a NATO peacekeeping force that would protect returning refugees. NATO still demands an end to the attacks, the safe return of all refugees and the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. But on the other two points, its position has softened. Consider them in detail: * Postwar occupation force: NATO originally insisted that it would lead any postwar peacekeeping force in Kosovo. When it became clear that NATO leadership was a deal breaker for Belgrade, NATO said Russia and other countries could take part, as long as the force had "NATO at its core." The G8 agreement softens NATO's position still further. It calls for "the deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences." There is no mention of NATO. The omission was a deliberate attempt to secure the help of Russia, which has supported Belgrade in its insistence that the NATO "aggressors" should not be part of any peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Questioned about the change, Canadian Foreign Affairs spokesman James Wright told reporters yesterday that "NATO core participation" must still be a key element in any peacekeeping force. But that fact that NATO was left out of the document was significant. It seemed to indicate that alliance countries might participate under the UN flag, as they do in neighbouring Bosnia. * Postwar settlement: The G8 agreement calls for "the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army)." Notice that the agreement does not demand the acceptance of the Rambouillet peace accords, which called for wide-ranging autonomy in Kosovo and an eventual vote on independence. That is not new. NATO has acknowledged for some weeks that Rambouillet might have to be altered because of what has happened since the bombing started. But the phrase "taking full account" of Rambouillet appears to be a climbdown from NATO's early position that a final agreement would have to be concluded "on the basis" of Rambouillet. It's significant, too, that the agreement explicitly acknowledges the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and the disarming of the Kosovo rebels. Though both were provided for in the Rambouillet accords, it's no mistake that the agreement underlines these points. Belgrade's greatest fear is that foreign troops in Kosovo would give cover to the rebels and prepare the ground for the secession and independence of the Kosovo. Whether this is enough to satisfy Yugoslavia is far from clear. Helpful as it is to get Russia on side, nothing will happen until Belgrade indicates the same flexibility that NATO has.
[PEN-L:6524] (Fwd) NATO'S COMPROMISE ON TERMS FOR ENDING STRIFE SIGNALS DI
ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224] Fri, 7 May 1999 23:08:00 -0500