The problem is that neither Kant, nor anyone else, has established the criteria (or in comp. sci. parlance; decision procedure)for adequately defining just what rationality consists of. He could not overcome the gauntlet laid out by Sextus Empiricus. The 20th century should convince us that humans are not rational, nor necessarily moral for that matter. The ecology of the brain is something of a Rube Goldberg device; intermittent epochs of reasoning and PLENTY of a-rationality.... Ian > -----Original Message----- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Ricardo Duchesne > Sent: Friday, July 09, 1999 1:43 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [PEN-L:9047] Re: Kant on Debt > > > The theoretical novelty of Kant's ethics is his claim that we can > establish > for ourselves what morality is, that we can freely determine our > moral actions because we are rational agents. Being rational means > that we are capable of self-governing our behavior, of establishing for > ourselves what is right. The very idea that we are rational agents > implies that we can think of ourselves as acting under rules of > our own choice, that we can govern ourselves morally by imposing a moral > law on ourselves, a law which gives rise to an obligation, or a necessity > to act in a certain way. > > Morality, then, if it is to be an expression of our self-determination as > rational beings, *cannot* be grounded 1) on any empirical fact about > what is pleasurable and what is painful to us; 2) on any > contingent custom/ norm practiced by a particular culture; 3) on any > psychological disposition, however benevolent, found within ourselves; > 4) on any obligation imposed by some natural law or supreme > legislator beyond our reason. > > We are speaking of a moral obligation which the self-reflecting > self imposes on him/herself regardless of what s/he wants, > regardless of feelings of love, loyalty, friendship, or generosity. > For morality, if it is to be universal, cannot be dependent on any > contingent factor. Neither can this moral obligation be defined by > any state of affairs it might bring about - no, it has to be defined > apriori by the willing agent him/herself. And it has to be > categorical: do it because you have will it as a rational agent to be > the right thing to do. > > Kant sought to formulate a moral law which could be universalized, coming > with the formula: 'Act only according to that maxim through which you > can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. > This the maxim which critics said was purely formal, to the point > that it merely states that one should behave in a way which is > consistent, in the sense that everyone else can act according to that > maxim without contradicting its universality. I think this is the > context of Kant's example on the repayment of debt: promise for the > repayment of a debt should always be kept, otherwise the very > principle of promising would cease to have universality. > > But Kant expressed the categorical imperative in other ways which are > not formal: 'Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in > your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time > as an end and never simply as a means'. But Kant's discussion still > remains abstract in that he does not specify how this principle > became actual in the world... >
