Peter Dorman wrote:
> How is this: "If agreement X is signed into law during time period Y, what will be
>the
> change in sea level between Jan. 1 2000 and Jan. 1 2030?" And "If agreement X is not
> signed into law....?" And the payoff is in 2030.
Close enough for this discussion, I think.
> One problem: Agreement X must be specified precisely in order to satisfy the terms of
> the betting game, but negotiations are not complete, and the agreement could fall
> within a wide range of content specifics along a number of parameters. The Hague
> negotiations were multi-dimensional, after all. Thus, either agreement X is
>specified
> so broadly that the dispersion of guesses is dominated by different perceptions of
>the
> likely content of X, or it is specified so narrowly that it fails to yield sufficient
> information to guide negotiators. Or the betting game is conducted only upon the
> conclusion of the agreement and serves to assist ratification only. (This is what I
> mean by a small number of applicable issues.)
But by this argument it is impossible to ever give useful policy advice. After all,
ifanyone claims to offer an opinion on the likely consequences of some policy X, you
could respond that "either the policy X is specified so broadly that the estimation of
its
consequences is dominated by different perceptions of the likely content of X, or it
is specified so narrowly that it fails to yield sufficient information to guide us."
> Second problem: Ratifying X is not independent of other state variables that rational
> bettors would take into consideration in formulating their bets. Thus, in the
> simplest case, the successful conclusion of X is plausible predictor of the
>likelihood
> of concluding further agreements between now and 2030. So just what are these bets
> telling us?
In this case you could say that one of the main reasons to ratify X would be to make
it easier to ratify further agreements in the future. This is a reasonable point to
consider when considering whether to ratify X.
