Jim Devine wrote:
>BTW, it's not the decline of real wages that matters, as much as the
>decline of real wages _relative to labor productivity_.
That's an old story. In the heart of the 1960s (1962-67, to be
precise), U.S. real compensation in the nonfarm business sector rose
2.5% a year, while productivity rose 3.3%. In the 1970s, it was 1.3%
and 2.0%, respectively. Just how much of this is the result of
capital mobility, and how much is union-busting, the erosion of the
minimum wage, deregulation, paring back the welfare state (such as it
was), etc.?
>Doug, you know that I am familiar with these facts, so it feels like
>you're talking down to me.
Sorry if it sounded that way; that wasn't what I wanted to do. I was
a bit surprised, though, that the IMF earned no mention, while
capital mobility dominated the post.
> I am _not_ blaming everything on mobile capital. The IMF and its
>SAPs are part of a broad political-economic process that includes
>capital mobility as one aspect. That process is hard to summarize
>(so that you can find lots of things to quibble about). It could be
>summarized as a "neo-liberal revolution" or as a process of
>"competitive austerity and export promotion." (do you want me to
>post long essays so that there's nothing left to snipe at, since all
>questions have been answered?)
Doesn't take long essays to make these points; you just did it in a
short paragraph. It's way too easy to blame "globalization" or
"capital mobility." Among other things, this removes human agency
from the picture.
Doug
